John, Jon, Edwina, Gary, Robert et al,
The way "all these issues" is mentioned, implies this is a periodic
happening and you've evidently survived them all so I am reassured.
I for one don't see any principle except in things. Thus I was pleased
to know of Peirce as a chemist, coastal surveyor and linguist.
Qualities and dynamics superpose themselves like layers; then we have
the situation where the whole of the sciences seems like the part and
vice versa; leading to the almost mindblowing "topology" rightly needed
in our diagrams.
(I'm told Windelband and Rickert distinguished between individuating and
non-individuating sciences, with various branches of biology spread in
between.)
Continual reminders to cite examples surely needn't be taken as
demeaning, as long as one is not implying theoretical work being done is
short of intrinsic value: but it loses its value TO us without examples,
if we haven't a secret untalked-of stock of them, triggered by
terminology or notations. Example giving was done to good effect
yesterday over the street cry.
Didn't Peirce point out theory needs metaphor or other concretes to make
sense - i.e metaphor, an imagined relation (in the laboratory atop our
shoulders), is itself a concrete. One can have signs of signs.
Halliday cites Shannon and Wheeler as referring to matter as a special
case of meaning. While extreme materialists make claims for "what", a
more realistic answer could be "where" (in some sense) and "is" (in some
sense), also "how conveying". Speculative work on dimensions and the
quantum is no less concrete. Deductive experimenting is sometimes
touted as the only component of science whereas induction and abduction
(similar territory to Newman's "notions") has always been equally vital
for hypothesis-forming (and usually around 200 years prior). The force
of deduction is more specific than that of induction.
Words allude, but we get meaning from words when several of the
allusions intersect. Hence meanings in Peircean theoretical terms and
notations are easier to convey when accompanied by illustrations.
The public currently seem to be taught to idealise, nominalise and reify
altogether, hence superficial and misguided evaluations deplored by
John. Hegel seems to have insisted on an ineluctable monolith as the
only reality, and I get the impression mimetics is usually portrayed
similarly. Extreme materialists disallow tentative hypotheses. By
contrast Gilson described methodical realism, while Popper proposed
propensity fields (which I call "happening places"). Newman extolled
"degrees of" inference, which is how partial knowledge can be made
highly useful.
I wish to ask whether, when we are discussing the interrelation between
theory and concretes, we have been idealising / reifying / nominalising
the very components in our discussion, after the habit of Ockham, Hume
and Hegel; and whether double checking this will improve the present
generosity discussion. Who was urging the dehegelising of Peirce only
this morning (I can't organise my e-mails)?
What do list members think regarding this? Please add Peirce's terms /
notations to points I've mentioned.
Michael Mitchell
ex-translator
U.K.
- - -
On 2020-05-13 19:17, John F. Sowa wrote:
Jon ,
... And since Gary R takes your side in all these issues ...
Some are more inclined toward and adept at abstract theory,
others prefer to pursue concrete applications, and others (like Peirce
himself) can do both.
But the point I was making is that if you want to understand Peirce,
you must read his writings as coming from someone who spent a lifetime
doing both.
Unfortunately, the various collections (CP, W, and NEM) ... emphasize
the results of his thinking, but they skip the details about his
practice.
Examples: His father taught him Greek, Latin, and mathematics from
early childhood. He was doing chemistry experiments from the age of
8, and he worked his way through the kinds of experiments a college
student would be doing. He read his brother's logic textbook, cover
to cover, when he was 12. And he published a pioneering book in
astronomy in his first full-time job at the Harvard observatory.
None of us can redo our early childhood experience. But when we read
any theoretical statement by Peirce, we must remember his background,
his criteria for evidence, and his 60+ years of empirical/critical
methods
As Peirce said, it's indeed wonderful that different people have very
different ways of thinking. But in order to understand any of them,
we must recognize their background in order to understand how and why
they came to their conclusions. Otherwise, the evaluation is
incomplete or superficial at best, misguided or false at worst
John
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