Michael, List: MM: The way "all these issues" is mentioned, implies this is a periodic happening and you've evidently survived them all so I am reassured.
Yes, there are strong methodological disagreements between some of us, which unfortunately have a tendency to derail threads from substantive discussion. MM: Example giving was done to good effect yesterday over the street cry. As I have admitted on multiple occasions, example-giving is not one of my personal strengths, so I am glad to learn that my attempt in that case might have been successful. MM: I wish to ask whether, when we are discussing the interrelation between theory and concretes, we have been idealising / reifying / nominalising the very components in our discussion, after the habit of Ockham, Hume and Hegel; and whether double checking this will improve the present generosity discussion. Could you clarify exactly what you mean by idealizing/reifying/nominalizing in this context? Perhaps by giving a few examples? :-) MM: Who was urging the dehegelising of Peirce only this morning (I can't organise my e-mails)? Jon Awbrey <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00123.html> was quoting Robert Marty <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00054.html>. Note the links to the List archive <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l>, which can be viewed either by thread or chronologically and is also searchable. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, May 13, 2020 at 5:27 PM <[email protected]> wrote: > John, Jon, Edwina, Gary, Robert et al, > > The way "all these issues" is mentioned, implies this is a periodic > happening and you've evidently survived them all so I am reassured. > > I for one don't see any principle except in things. Thus I was pleased to > know of Peirce as a chemist, coastal surveyor and linguist. Qualities and > dynamics superpose themselves like layers; then we have the situation where > the whole of the sciences seems like the part and vice versa; leading to > the almost mindblowing "topology" rightly needed in our diagrams. > > (I'm told Windelband and Rickert distinguished between individuating and > non-individuating sciences, with various branches of biology spread in > between.) > > Continual reminders to cite examples surely needn't be taken as demeaning, > as long as one is not implying theoretical work being done is short of > intrinsic value: but it loses its value TO us without examples, if we > haven't a secret untalked-of stock of them, triggered by terminology or > notations. Example giving was done to good effect yesterday over the > street cry. > > Didn't Peirce point out theory needs metaphor or other concretes to make > sense - i.e metaphor, an imagined relation (in the laboratory atop our > shoulders), is itself a concrete. One can have signs of signs. > > Halliday cites Shannon and Wheeler as referring to matter as a special > case of meaning. While extreme materialists make claims for "what", a more > realistic answer could be "where" (in some sense) and "is" (in some sense), > also "how conveying". Speculative work on dimensions and the quantum is no > less concrete. Deductive experimenting is sometimes touted as the only > component of science whereas induction and abduction (similar territory to > Newman's "notions") has always been equally vital for hypothesis-forming > (and usually around 200 years prior). The force of deduction is more > specific than that of induction. > > Words allude, but we get meaning from words when several of the allusions > intersect. Hence meanings in Peircean theoretical terms and notations are > easier to convey when accompanied by illustrations. > > The public currently seem to be taught to idealise, nominalise and reify > altogether, hence superficial and misguided evaluations deplored by John. > Hegel seems to have insisted on an ineluctable monolith as the only > reality, and I get the impression mimetics is usually portrayed similarly. > Extreme materialists disallow tentative hypotheses. By contrast Gilson > described methodical realism, while Popper proposed propensity fields > (which I call "happening places"). Newman extolled "degrees of" inference, > which is how partial knowledge can be made highly useful. > > I wish to ask whether, when we are discussing the interrelation between > theory and concretes, we have been idealising / reifying / nominalising the > very components in our discussion, after the habit of Ockham, Hume and > Hegel; and whether double checking this will improve the present generosity > discussion. Who was urging the dehegelising of Peirce only this morning (I > can't organise my e-mails)? > > What do list members think regarding this? Please add Peirce's terms / > notations to points I've mentioned. > > Michael Mitchell > ex-translator > U.K. >
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