Dear JAS, list,
Thank you for all your work in collating. *Now let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in fact. (CP 1.299)* With best wishes, Jerry R On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 9:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: > List: > > Speculating is easy and sometimes even fun, but I suggest that the best > way to ascertain what Peirce means by "predestinate" is carefully studying > how else he uses the word and its close cognates in his writings (all bold > added). > > CSP: Because the only purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion, we > have seen that everyone who investigates, that is, pursues an inquiry by > the fourth method [that of science] assumes that that process will, if > carried far enough, lead him to a certain conclusion, he knows not what > beforehand, but which no further investigation will change. No matter what > his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one > *predestinated* belief. (CP 7.327, 1873) > > CSP: Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but > the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves > to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are > carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the > operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no > selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can > enable a man to escape the *predestinate *opinion. This great hope is > embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is > fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean > by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That > is the way I would explain reality. > *Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be > avoided. It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are > ever fated, and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be > freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated to die. (CP 5.407, EP > 1:138-139, 1878) > > CSP: At the same time that this process of inference, or the spontaneous > development of belief, is continually going on within us, fresh peripheral > excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits. Thus, belief > is partly determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience. Is there > any law about the mode of the peripheral excitations? The logician > maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that > of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain *predestinate *conclusions > which are the same for all men. This is the faith of the logician. This is > the matter of fact, upon which all maxims of reasoning repose. In virtue of > this fact, what is to be believed at last is independent of what has been > believed hitherto, and therefore has the character of *reality*. Hence, > if a given habit, considered as determining an inference, is of such a sort > as to tend toward the final result, it is correct; otherwise not. Thus, > inferences become divisible into the valid and the invalid; and thus logic > takes its reason of existence. (CP 3.161, 1880) > > CSP: [T]he only object to which inquiry seeks to make our opinion conform > is itself something of the nature of thought; namely, it is the > *predestined* ultimate idea, which is independent of what you, I, or any > number of men may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which remains > thought, after all. (CP 8.101, c. 1900) > > CSP: In the light of what has been said, what are we to say to that > logical fatalism whose stock in trade is the argument that I have already > indicated? I mean the argument that science is *predestined *to reach the > truth, and that it can therefore make no difference whether she observes > carefully or carelessly nor what sort of formulae she treats as reasons. > The answer to it is that the only kind of *predestination *of the > attainment of truth by science is an eventual *predestination*,--a > *predestination > **aliquando denique*. Sooner or later it will attain the truth, nothing > more. ... Let us remember, then, that the precise practical service of > sound theory of logic is to abbreviate the time of waiting to know the > truth, to expedite the *predestined *result. (CP 7.78, c. 1905-6) > > CSP: I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so > far as there is any "truth") to its being the *predestined *result to > which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907) > > > It is not that reality *itself *is predestined, but that reality is the > *object > *of "the predestinate opinion," which is "the ultimate interpretant of > every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904)--whatever *would *be believed by an infinite > community after infinite inquiry. Brute 2ns and spontaneous 1ns ensure > that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, rather than actual; > as Vincent Colapietro has put it, "It means what *would *occur, not what > will inevitably despite all else occur." There is no agency implied, > immaterial or otherwise. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > >>
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
