Edwina, Jon Alan, Helmut, List Most of the discussions on the list have focused philosophical questions on final causes, efficient causes, goals, etc. ... and many disagreements have been found ... I would point out that these discussions focus on what is happening in the interpretants of the hexadic sign and I have even seen that a subject on their plethora -which I have not yet been able to consult- has been created. But on what happens before, apart from a consensus on the Od-Oi-S sequence that no one questions, there is very little. I mentioned it necessarily in the parable value example in response to Jon Alan in which I mentioned that the utterers of the sign could do nothing but mark the sign of its subjectivity. Even when he utters the word "pipe" he mobilizes his own conception of the concept of "pipe", most likely consistent with what is in the mind of most potential receivers. However, in all cases whether it is the concept itself (for example in a discussion about the harmfulness of pipes), a real pipe or a painful experience related to a pipe,, it will be necessary to verify that it is indeed a pipe. And if I chose pipe" everyone will have understood that it is to ensure the reinforcement of René Magritte.
What I want to emphasize here is that it may not be a good methodology to give such a preference for interpretation in semiosis without focusing the analysis on the whole process. And I come to Edwina's question: "Comment?" I read it in French but I could have read it in English ... and probably the ambiguity was it intended ... I rephrase it this way: how individual semiosis articulates with global semiosis ? Edwina provided an interactionist response that would result in a final interpretant that will obviously be historically dated as a provisional result of these multiple interactions. For my part I proposed a slightly different conceptualization that takes into account the fact that the signs being obligated interfaces (a medium for the communication of a form for example) between the outside world and the inner world it is necessary to grasp by "a same movement of thought", the before-sign and the after-sign with the physiological perception of the sign as a connection between these two worlds. Otherwise we run the risk of introducing unsuspected biases that lead to questions that do not arise or that arise in other words, such as those I mentioned at the beginning of this post. Je considère que le texte ci-dessous est fondamental pour justifier l'emploi d'un nouveau concept qui remplira cette fonction de "contre-réaction sociale" des semiosis individuelles : *" But while I say this, it must not be inferred that I regard consciousness as a mere "epiphenomenon"; though I heartily grant that the hypothesis that it is so has done good service to science. To my apprehension, consciousness may be defined as that congeries of non-relative predicates, varying greatly in quality and in intensity, which are symptomatic of the interaction of the outer world -- the world of those causes that are exceedingly compulsive upon the modes of consciousness, with general disturbance sometimes amounting to shock, and are acted upon only slightly, and only by a special kind of effort, muscular effort -- and of the inner world, apparently derived from the outer, and amenable to direct effort of various kinds with feeble reactions; the interaction of these two worlds chiefly consisting of a direct action of the outer world upon the inner and an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer through the operation of habits. If this be a correct account of consciousness, i.e., of the congeries of feelings, it seems to me that it exercises a real function in self-control, since without it, or at least without that of which it is symptomatic, the resolves and exercises of the inner world could not affect the real determinations and habits of the outer world. I say that these belong to the outer world because they are not mere fantasies but are real agencies." **CP (5.493 ,Pragmatism, 1906)* But this fundamental text alone does not solve the question posed by Edwina because it obviously lacks the commens, this concept that dominates both the emission of signs and their receptions. A concept that is added to this text allows us to situate Peirce's semiotics in the social field, his study in sociology and his practice among social practices. But the commens as Peirce presents it is a general framework in which individual signs are supposed to cooperate to arrive at a kind of social semiosis whose dynamics feed on individual variations. These are mostly the result of material changes in the outside world as a result of the development of science and technology, their impact on the environment, the circulation of ideas (and viruses...), etc. It is not integrated es-qualities into the semiotic sequence; it is just the framework in which it unfolds. One way to integrate it is to use the concept of an institution as defined and used in institutional analysis. On the use of this concept in sociology there are significant differences between its development in the Anglo-Saxon world (William Richard Scott; Douglass North <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Richard_Scott> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Douglass_North>, Nobel Prize for Economics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nobel_Prize_for_Economics> in 1993; Di Maggio, The new institutionalism) mainly in the field of economics an European thinkers (MarcelMauss, Max Weber) with a large French School quite dispersed (MichelFoucauld, Cornelius Castoriadis, René Lourau). That is why I will not refer today as I did in 1989 to its Hegelian version. The latter, ignored from Wikipedia in English, classically distinguishes the three moments from the concept "instituted", "instituting", institutionalization and applies it rather in terms of critical sociological in fields such as psychotherapy, pedagogy, the sociology of organisms and interventionism, psychosociology,... (see https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analyse_institutionnelle ). That is why I will give at least a consensual definition with all the approaches I have just mentioned that will be compatible with the commens and pragmatic thinking present in the 5,493 mentioned above. I borrow most of them in the en. Wikipedia : *"institutional theory is a theory on the deeper and more **resilient <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resilience_(organizational)>** aspects of social structure. It considers the processes by which structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. Different components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into decline and disuse.(**https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutional_theory <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institutional_theory>*) I'will add to this an important precision which concerns the continuous movement of change of the *commens *by institutions modified by social movements driven by the evolution of science and technology in the broadest sense including communication techniques and populist challenges that place irrational leaders in a position to legislate, that is, able to impose laws. Peirce provides a "weak" version of institutional interaction (*an indirect action of the inner world upon the outer through the operation of habits*) in relation to the means of influence of his time. Today we can clearly assume that what has been called "the communication society" and even the "consumer society" have multiplied by an extremely high factor these indirect actions which can be real mass manipulations. This concept thus extended and stripped of any economic or ideological connotations seems to me perfectly suited to guarantee the operationality of semiotic analysis in today's world. My study on nicotine is a good example and my answer "parable" to Jon Alan an illustration in the course of the list. Best regards, Robert Le sam. 23 mai 2020 à 22:46, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> a écrit : > Robert, list > > Yes - I see your point and agree. Certainly, if the FI in ONE semiosic > process was in a mode of Thirdness, then, the 'preceding' nodes of the > process could not be in any other mode than Thirdness. > > But is the Final Interpretant ever due to only one semiosic process or > from one individual? I don't want to be seen as 'slithering out' of your > justified comment - but isn't the FI due to a 'commons' - where, if we > imagine a complex networked web of semiosic interactions from MANY > individuals - where some are functioning in 1ns, some in 2ns, some in a > mixture of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns, and some in 3ns.....that the Final Interpretant > in this networked community - would be that generalized law? Then, this > community will presumably change its habits - but - even so, a community > will continue to 'be semiosic' within all ten sign classes, so to speak - > and will only once-in-a-while develop a Final Interpretant from within its > semiosic processes. > > Comment? > > Edwina > > > > On Sat 23/05/20 4:32 PM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina ,Helmut, List > > The final interpretant certainly is a change of habit (which may be the > preservation of habit or the return to old habits) but it can not be only a > Thirdness . If this were the case there would be only one class of hexadics > signs : > > Od3àOi3à S3àX3àY3àZ3 > > in some system X,Y,Z of denominations either with Z interpretant final ... > The change in habit may or may not be a change in the subjective theory of > the receiver or a change in his physical reaction patterns or in his modes > of emotional reactions ... and then we find the 28 classes ... > > Best regards, > > Robert > > Le sam. 23 mai 2020 à 15:38, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca > a > écrit : > >> Helmut, list - I wonder if we are mixing terms. >> >> Final cause and the final interpretant are not at all similar. >> >> 1] Final Cause is not the same as Final Interpretant. >> >> Peirce locates the three interpretants in order of, as I see it, of >> emergence in the semiosic process, which does therefore insert a >> temporality, with the immediate interpretant as the individual subjective >> experience of the data from the DO and IO as mediated by the >> sign/representamen, and then the Dynamical Interpretant ‘which is the >> actual effect which the Sign determines [again, within the individual] – >> and then the Final Interpretant…’the way in which every mind would act’ >> 8.315 – which latter inserts a commonality of understanding. >> >> If we understand that logic requires a process of generality, then the >> final interpretant includes that generality. That is, it includes the >> category of Thirdness. But we must remember, that not all semiosic events >> include this generalizing category. Indeed, most of our semiosic >> interactions 'stop', so to speak, with Firstness and Seccondness. This is >> why that last node in the hexadic process is not always present to that >> process. Indeed - we could even say the semiosic process is most often a >> five rather than six node process! >> >> That would actually make sense, if we understand the Final Interpretant >> as a 'commonality of laws', as a Logical Interpretant, to be engaged >> in expressing those habits or laws. Habit changes are not carried out every >> second but with less frequency. >> >> >> 2] What is final cause? To Peirce, as I understand it does not include >> an agential purpose. 1.211, with final cause instead understood, as he puts >> it, as ‘the ideal or final’. But what is this 'ideal or final'? Does it >> include a sense of value? Who or what would provide this value? Or is it >> instead ‘the general principle which is regarded as the cause and the >> individual fact to which it is applied is taken as the understood factor >> [EP 2.315-6]. What is this general principle? >> >> Final cause can also be understood as Thirdness, the law. This brings in >> Peirce's concept of matter as mind. As he writes, 'Mind has its universal >> mode of action, namely, by final causation....with natural selection" the >> theory of how forms come to be adaptive, that is, to be governed by a quasi >> purpose. 1.269, The key word is 'adaptive' where organisms interact with >> each other and adapt. >> >> How does this universal law of mind operate? By, for example 'the great >> law of association, an attraction between ideas' 1.270.. Or, the universe >> functions within a 'law of nature, ie, the rationalization of the universe' >> 1.590. And 'the process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and >> more to embody those generals which were just not said to be destined which >> is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable' 5.433. [see also >> agapistic evolution]. Note that evolution is not 'destined' but >> 'reasonable'. That inserts the notion that 'matter is effete mind. 6.25 >> where the two 'universes' of mind and matter coincide 6.501. Or 'matter is >> mind hidebound with habits' 6. 158 >> >> Note, Helmut, that this definite end of final cause is not predetermined >> but operates within the objectively existent world and renders that >> world functional and adaptive; it is 'adaptation' which is the 'definite >> end' I,e., the generation of functional habits of Mind-as-Matter, not >> some predetermined agential idea. >> >> Therefore - the way I see it is that the Final Interpretant is a >> not-often-realized semiosic event, where a commonality of interpretation is >> generated by a commonality of individuals [human or otherwise]. While Final >> Cause has to do with the concept of Mind-as-Matter, where Mind is >> constantly 'actualizing' itself as Matter, within a complex and dynamic >> interactional process of networked semiosis. >> >> Edwina >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat 23/05/20 4:03 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: >> >> Jon, List, >> >> Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he? "For evolution is nothing >> more nor less than the working out of a definite end", is theism and >> speculation, isn´t it? One may also assume, that evolution is continuous >> adaption without an end. And when he wrote "A final cause may be conceived >> to operate without having been the purpose of any mind", had he forgotten >> then, that he had claimed that the universe has a mind? If it has, why >> should it pursue its own end? I think doomsdayism is always theistic >> speculation. The big chill too, like the big bang, is not scientifically >> proven. >> I think, that evolution itself has a mind, though working quite slowly. >> A better example for final cause I see in the needs of organisms, who >> pursue an end to these needs. Or their DNA does it for them, which is a >> memory of the mind of evolution of their species. Organisms who have brains >> apply a third kind of causation, volitional or example causation: They >> remember or anticipate something they want to get. >> These three kinds of causation are related by analogy to the three kinds >> of inference. >> >> Best, >> >> Helmut >> >> >> 23. Mai 2020 um 04:14 Uhr >> "Jon Alan Schmidt" >> wrote: >> Robert, List: >> >> Thanks for providing this creative answer to some of my questions, which >> I have been pondering carefully. It confirms that we have very different >> theories about semeiosis, and apparently very different interpretations of >> Peirce's writings on that subject. For one thing, he explicitly and >> repeatedly affirms the reality of final causes, and even points to >> biological evolution as a paradigmatic manifestation of them. >> >> >> CSP: Perhaps, since phrases retain their sway over men's minds long >> after their meaning has evaporated, it may be that some reader, even at >> this day, remains imbued with the old notion that there are no final causes >> in nature; in which case, natural selection, and every form of evolution, >> would be false. For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out >> of a definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having >> been the purpose of any mind ... but that definite ends are worked out none >> of us today any longer deny. Our eyes have been opened; and the evidence is >> too overwhelming. (CP 1.204, 1902) >> >> >> Notice that for Peirce final causes do not entail agency, theistic or >> otherwise. He confirms this later in the same manuscript. >> >> >> CSP: It is, as I was saying, a widespread error to think that a "final >> cause" is necessarily a purpose. A purpose is merely that form of final >> cause which is most familiar to our experience. (CP 1.211) >> >> >> However, I will not belabor that point any further. Instead, for >> comparison I will try to spell out my own semeiotic analysis of my previous >> post, hopefully sometime this weekend. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 10:58 AM robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >>> Jon Alan, List >>> >>> >>> I'd rather we stay on the list. I have clues that suggest that people >>> are interested; if some are embarrassed they have no obligation ... >>> >>> Today I will answer your questions using another rhetorical means, the >>> parable ... >>> >>> "A parable is a succinct, didactic >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Didacticism> story, in prose >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prose> or verse >>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Verse_(poetry)>, that illustrates one or >>> more instructive lessons or principles" ( >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parable ) ... >>> >>> I assure you, it will be prose ... >>> >>> >>> >>> On 05/20/20 at a certain time, in the mind of a person living in Olathe, >>> Kansas,USA, (the sender), a person who has well-established and known >>> ideas from the list on the final causes, effective causes, determinations, >>> ... a subjective theory labelled "JAS" (Od) is formed the idea of >>> addressing questions to a member of the list in particular and also to the >>> list (the receiver, the receivers)… he imagines a series of questions >>> (Oi) that are necessarily determined by his theory which they carry "in >>> hollow" the mark ... he writes them and publishes them (S) … its main >>> receiver (his first name is an index perceived first) perceives this text >>> ... in the course of his reading his mind is inhabited by more or less >>> blurred mnemonic reminders of a large number of objects of previous >>> discussions, more or less interconnected, mixed - as with each of the >>> messages he received from the same sender - with this following information >>> (index) which never ceased to amaze him: " Professional Engineer, >>> Philosopher Amateur, Lutheran Layman". All this has formed in his mind >>> a kind of "interpretation guide" from which he apprehends the content of >>> the messages received from this sender, a set to which is added the one to >>> which I answer by the parable - under construction before my eyes and soon >>> under yours, i e of all those who will perceive it (read it). This receiver >>> has therefore, with more or less accuracy, conceptualized this set. He >>> finds himself obliged, simply to have read this injunctive message, in >>> which the sender has somehow " printed his mark", to modify or not his >>> uncertain conceptualization in which dominates the idea of " >>> predestination" that his studies and readings have allowed him to >>> associate with Lutheranism (Calvinism too) and in general protestantism: >>> It's (If) … in immediate reaction in his mind is recalled his own >>> subjective theory which contains his long-held opinions on these issues >>> (Ie). He acquired them early by reading Jacques Monod's 1965 Nobel >>> Prize book ," Hasard and Necessity," later reinforced by reading René >>> Thom's book, Medall Field of Mathematics (1958), entitled " Structural >>> Stability and Morphogenesis, W. A. Benjamin, (1972) ". After a quick >>> confrontation between the two theories for a possible change in the way he >>> considers the questions of the final causes and the efficient causes, he >>> decides not to modify one iota and to communicate this decision to the >>> person who asked it and to the list (Iex) in the explicit form that >>> here: "In his world of signs, determinations are efficient causes and >>> there is no need to incorporate final causes that his own subjective theory >>> and underlying atheism exclude." . >>> >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Robert (the receiver) >>> >>> >>> >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chance_and_Necessity >>> >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >> should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >> NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the >> sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by >> The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben >> Udell. >> >> >> >
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