Jon Alan, List Answers #1
#1.1 On the unicity of the commens. I know the texts you quote ... I wanted to say and the rest proves it: one commens for each pair of minds. That is what you wrote. But now in your answer you write this: # 1.2 "*Whenever communication happens, a sign fuses or welds multiple distinct minds into one mind, which is the commens on that particular occasion."* Jon Alan this addition of the term "multiple" that is not in your initial text change everything, at least for me! Because with "multiple" you have possibly welded very large human communities into the commens in each particular occasion. So preliminary question: this commens where is it? Is it a creation that weld all the minds concerned with every mass communication? Or are there any social construction outside of those minds that have internalized it through social learning from birth? In other words, is it the particularity of a universal commens independent of all these minds? It is an old debate and you will understand that the answer to this question conditiones the continuation of the debate, especially the question of conceptualism. It is important that you enlighten me on this before I continue my reading. Best, Robert Le lun. 1 juin 2020 à 02:05, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> a écrit : > Robert, List: > > This post responds to #8, #9, and #10 below, completing my attempt to > provide "clarifications that would allow [you] to access [my] full concept > of semiosis." > > RM: "and thus the immediate (communicational) interpretant is a > determination of the commens" …finally a clarification on this immediate > interpretant that you say is a determination of the commens. I have to go > back to point 2 where I called him (A,B). So the commens has > determinations? > > > As explained previously, according to Peirce every mind "is itself a sign, > a determinable sign" (SS 195, 1906), including the commens as "that mind > into which the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order > that any communication should take place" (EP 2:478, 1906) Moreover, > according to Peirce every sign is a determination of some mind. > > CSP: Indeed, two minds in communication are, in so far, "at one," that > is, are properly one mind in that part of them. That being understood, the > answer to the question will go on to recognize that every sign,--or, at any > rate, nearly every one,--is a determination of something of the general > nature of a mind, which we may call the "quasi-mind." (EP 2:389, 1906) > > CSP: It seems best to regard a sign as a determination of a quasi-mind; > for if we regard it as an outward object, and as addressing itself to a > human mind, that mind must first apprehend it as an object in itself, and > only after that consider it in its significance; and the like must happen > if the sign addresses itself to any quasi-mind. It must begin by forming a > determination of that quasi-mind, and nothing will be lost by regarding > that determination as the sign. (EP 2:391, 1906) > > > A sign *token *is "an outward object" that embodies a sign *type*, while > the corresponding sign *itself *is a determination of the commens as the > "one mind" into which "two minds in communication" are thereby fused or > welded to become "at one." Since the only interpretant that is *internal* > to the sign itself is the *immediate* interpretant, it must correspond > directly to the *communicational* interpretant, since it likewise "is a > determination of ... the commens" (EP 2:478, 1906). > > RM: What you mean? That the commens is general and that the immediate > interpretant is a particularity of him? But then if it is general it cannot > fit in a particular pair (A, B) ... > > > My apologies, I do not understand your question and comment here. Hopefully > what I have already written explains better what I meant. > > RM: You see that I point out what you seem to want to avoid … > > > Why do you say this? What exactly are you suggesting that I "seem to > want to avoid"? > > RM: "The dynamical interpretant is the sign token's actual determination > of the interpreter's mind" which seems to me to be a little more consistent > with the literature provided that this determination of the mind of the > receiver B be the determination of the commens (A,B), the common mind… > > > No, again, the determination of the commens is the sign itself, including > the immediate (communicational) interpretant. This is *not* the same as > the determination of the interpreter's mind, which is the dynamical > (effectual) interpretant. > > RM: "while the final interpretant is the sign's ideal effect; both are > external to the sign, and thus external to the commens." I expected it of > course here and more than usual it seems to me literally "falling from the > sky" since it is a pure view of the mind, which nothing calls in the > current of semiosis. > > > It is not "falling from the sky," it is coming from Peirce's writings. Again, > every mind is a determinable sign, and every sign is a determination of > some mind. In other words, *mind is semeiosis*, the continuous process > of determination--in this case, not efficient causation or logical > constraint, but simply *becoming more determinate*. Moreover, > "everything indeterminate is of the nature of a sign" (CP 5.448n, EP > 2:392n, 1906), and this is what prompts one of Peirce's most famous > statements, although the full context is rarely included when it is quoted. > > CSP: The October remarks [CP 5.446-451, EP 2:350-353, 1905] made the > proper distinction between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz: > indefiniteness and generality, of which the former consists in the sign's > not sufficiently expressing itself to allow of an indubitable determinate > interpretation, while the latter turns over to the interpreter the right to > complete the determination as he pleases. It seems a strange thing, when > one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to > supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in > the fact that the entire universe,--not merely the universe of existents, > but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, > the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as "the truth,"--that > all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively > of signs. Let us note this in passing as having a bearing upon the question > of pragmaticism. (CP 5.448n, EP 2:392n, 1906) > > > The purported *fact* that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if > it is not composed exclusively of signs," is "the explanation of the > phenomenon" that a *general* sign "turns over to the interpreter the > right to complete the determination as he pleases." The entire universe > is just such a general sign--"a great symbol" that involves "its Indices > of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities," and "an argument" that involves > propositions and terms while "working out its conclusions in living > realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). Its ideal beginning in the > infinite past would be "[u]tter indetermination. But a symbol alone is > indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute > beginning, is a symbol" (EP 2:322, 1904). Its ideal end in the infinite > future would be utter determination, "dead matter" as "the final result of > the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the > brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.210, 1898). > > What does this imply for us at the present, as well as "at any assignable > date" (CP 1.409, EP 1:277, 1887-8) between the two limiting states (CP > 8.317, 1891)? We are *all* interpreters of the universe as a general > sign, such that it has left us "to supply a part of its meaning" by turning > over to us "the right to complete the determination" as we please. In > other words, the outcomes still ahead of us are *not* "predetermined," > even though the final cause of all semeiosis is "the predestinate opinion > ... which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate" > because it "is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in > this opinion is the real" (CP 5.407, EP 1:138-139, 1878). On the contrary, > "Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little > function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering > the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is 'up to us' to do > so" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903). > > RM: It seems to me an obligation to you because of your conceptualist > conception, after descending on the earthly realities with determinations > to go back into the sky of ideas to encapsulate the totality of the process > in an ideal world. > > > I still do not understand what you mean by "conceptualist conception" or > why you attribute it to me, and again, the ideas that I have been outlining > are not from "the sky" but from Peirce's writings. The abundant quotations > that I have provided should be sufficient to demonstrate that, but if > anyone sincerely believes that I am taking any of them out of context, then > I stand ready to consider carefully whatever case such persons are willing > and able to make in good faith for that assessment. Peirce himself had > much to say about ideals, including the following that comes right before > the last sentence that I quoted above. > > CSP: The very being of the General, of Reason, *consists* in its > governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that > its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in a > state of incipiency, of growth. ... So, then, the development of Reason > requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever > can occur. ... This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in > embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which > did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but > is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of > Reason. I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the > admirable than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose > admirableness is not due to an ulterior Reason is Reason itself > comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. (CP > 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903) > > > With sincere respect, anyone who *denies* the reality of ideals (and > final causes) is disagreeing with Peirce (not just me) in a very > fundamental way. He even states quite plainly that *every* sign has the > same *purpose*, the same *ideal*, and the same *ultimate interpretant*. > > CSP: What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a > proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. *The > purpose of every sign* is to express "fact," and by being joined with > other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an > interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and > as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. > Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he > never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very > fact, that is, *the ideal sign* which should be quite perfect, and so > identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter > denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the > Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua* fact, will be that Universe > in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that > is not abstracted but complete, is *the ultimate interpretant of every > sign*. (EP 2:304, 1904, bold added) > > > While it has taken several posts and many, many words, I hope that I have > finally succeeded in fully spelling out for you my current thinking about > all this, and I look forward to your considered feedback. Even if we > continue to disagree, I appreciate the exchange and have learned much from > it, as well as from the other discussions that have taken place with you > and others along the way. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, May 28, 2020 at 11:45 AM Robert Marty <robertmarty...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Again a part in french : "To conclude and pending final clarifications >> that would allow me to access your full concept of semiosis, failing which >> I will have to conclude that I am unable to do so, I would like to quote >> after quoting JJ Rousseau previously , to quote these famous verses by >> Nicolas Boileau (1636 - 1711): >> >> Le jeu. 28 mai 2020 à 17:26, robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com> a >> écrit : >> >>> Jon Alan, List >>> >>> Thank you again for explaining your designs on how the hexadic sign >>> works and for summarising them at the end of your post. This has allowed me >>> to limit myself to reviewing your summary and I have been spending time on >>> it for several days. I saw of course that you published a new post. I >>> quickly went through it. I think it might complicate things even more for >>> me. I therefore prefer to share with you my critical comments and my >>> questions about this one summary before considering it with the seriousness >>> that any real debate deserves .... I cut your summary into ten parts: >>> >>> 1-" *In summary, when there is an event of semeiosis--i.e., when a >>> dynamical object determines a sign token to determine a dynamical >>> interpretant--the commens is the one mind into which the sign itself fuses >>> or welds the otherwise distinct minds of the utterer and interpreter." * >>> >>> I rephrase: whenever in the whole world an inter-individual >>> communication takes place between the mind of a utterer A and that of an >>> receiver B is produced one individual instances (token) of a sign that has >>> the power to create a third unique mind that I note (A, B) in which the >>> mind of A and the mind of B are merged. I immediately note a presupposition >>> that for you any sign is an existing concept (type) that is individualized >>> in each communication. I immediately point to it as a *conceptualist >>> assumption *that I don't share. Nor does Peirce, who expresses it in >>> his criticism of Hegel: >>> >>> * "He has usually overlooked external Secondness, altogether. In other >>> words, he has committed the trifling oversight of forgetting that there is >>> a real world with real actions and reactions. Rather a serious oversight >>> that. Then Hegel had the misfortune to be unusually deficient in >>> mathematics. He shows this in the very elementary character of his >>> reasoning. (CP 1.368)* >>> >>> Moreover, if I follow you strictly, the world population being estimated >>> at 7.55 billion and ifon the rough valuation to 5 billion the number of >>> inhabitants who has the opportunity to communicate, we will theoretically >>> have at every moment as many minds as pairs (A,B) or 5 000 000 000*(5 000 >>> 000 000-1)/2 minds. This is obviously an untenable position - and I do not >>> insult you to think that you support it. That's why I think that, from the >>> next sentence, write: >>> >>> 2- *"The dynamical object of the commens is the universe of reality, >>> and its immediate *object is the logical universe of discourse … >>> >>> You write "*The dynamic object of the commens*" what could mean that >>> the commens has a dynamic object and therefore would be a sign? I don't >>> think it's your thought (but I have to consider that I may be the victim of >>> a translation error) because following you write "*is the universe of >>> reality*" and therefore this beginning of sentence should read "the >>> dynamic object of this sign belongs to the universe of reality". If your >>> expression revisited by me is valid, according to 1 the Od of the >>> sign-token (or sign-type, you do not specify) is in "*the universe of >>> reality*" whose relationship with the commens (A,B) is not specified >>> either. >>> >>> 3- And following here is Oi who is, or is in "*the logical universe of >>> discourse*", a new universe that is described as "logical" by a not >>> knew authority, don't related to the previous one and is not precised but >>> I suppose it is included, and, >>> >>> 4- we learn that it has be "as established by collateral >>> experience/observation that the utterer and interpreter have in common. " >>> hence I deduce that in every commun mind (A, B) there are only the >>> personal experiences and observations of the utterer and the receiver. I >>> can't imagine two people who in their lives have never met the word >>> "logical" and have no idea what logic is, could build such a universe every >>> time they communicate. >>> >>> 5- But now you're writing " *The immediate object of the sign itself is >>> how it identifies those objects--e.g., descriptive words and/or designative >>> gestures*--" which obliges me to return to my previous understanding >>> since we have two immediate objects, the first is associated with the >>> commens (or perhaps in the commens) and the second is associated with the >>> sign and describes as a *"how*" that is to "identify" "these" objects, >>> *"these"* denoting Od and Oi in their respective universes. The sign >>> itself would show in some way these two objects that is to say that it is >>> the sign that would designate the Od and the Oi. But we know that it is Od >>> and Oi which determine the sign in semiosis. While everywhere Peirce writes >>> that the sign is passive in the relationship with the immediate object that >>> determines it,for you he designates it. I don't understand. >>> >>> *6- and following "the immediate interpreter is how he transmits >>> information about these objects", yet another element of the sign that is a >>> "how" able of transmitting information about these objects. I understand >>> that although the perception of the sign can convey information about >>> objects by bringing shapes into the mind, but of the perception that you >>> never speak and I do not even know if you count it in your vision finally >>> very personal*. >>> >>> 7-" *both are internal to the sign*" … Are you talking about semiosis? >>> I think so but a little redundancy helped to know what you put here, at >>> that moment "inside the sign". >>> >>> 8- "*and thus the immediate (communicational) interpretant is a >>> determination of the commens"* …finally a clarification on this >>> immediate interpretant that you say is a determination of the commens. I >>> have to go back to point 2 where I called him (A,B). So the commens has >>> determinations? What you mean? That the commens is general and that the >>> immediate interpretant is a particularity of him? But then if it is general >>> it cannot fit in a particular pair (A, B) ... You see that I point out what >>> you seem to want to avoid ... >>> >>> 9- " *The dynamical interpretant is the sign token's actual >>> determination of the interpreter's mind*" which seems to me to be a >>> little more consistent with the literature provided that this determination >>> of the mind of the receiver B be the determination of the commens (A,B), >>> the common mind... >>> >>> 10 – "*while the final interpretant is the sign's ideal effect; both >>> are external to the sign, and thus external to the commens*." I >>> expected it of course here and more than usual it seems to me literally >>> "falling from the sky" since it is a pure view of the mind, which nothing >>> calls in the current of semiosis. It seems to me an obligation to you >>> because of your conceptualist conception, after descending on the earthly >>> realities with determinations to go back into the sky of ideas to >>> encapsulate the totality of the process in an ideal world. >>> >>> >>> >>> Pour conclure et dans l'attente de derniers éclaircissements qui me >>> permettraient d'accéder à votre conception pleine et entière de la >>> semiosis, faute de quoi je devrai conclure à mon incapacité de le faire, je >>> me permets de citer après avoir cité précédemment JJ Rousseau, de citer >>> ces célèbres vers de Nicolas Boileau (1636 – 1711): >>> >>> *"Ce que l’on conçoit bien s’énonce clairement, et les mots pour le dire >>> arrivent aisément*" approximate translation (unsecured) could be: >>> >>> >>> >>> "*what is well conceived is clearly enunciated ,and the words for to >>> say it happen easily".* >>> >>> >>> >>> So be it… >>> >>> Best regards, >>> >>> Robert >>> >>>>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
