Jon Alan, List Thank you Jon Alan. Your post shows us the good side of your "radical" literalism . It also highlights how the Collected papers which play a very great role to publicize Peirce was fundamental but they also introduced great difficulties that the chronological edition will resolve - when it is will completed. I think you are circulating the text of R 787 on the list so that we also power as beneficiaries. Many thanks ... Best regards,
Le ven. 12 juin 2020 à 03:06, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> a écrit : > Robert, Gary F., List: > > I was intrigued by Robert's quote from CP 2.278 and wanted to take a look > at its context. It turns out that this is one of those places where > unfortunately the arrangement of the material by the CP editors is highly > misleading. > > - 2.278-280 is from R 787 (c. 1895-6), "That Categorical and > Hypothetical Propositions are one in essence, with some connected matters." > - 2.274-277 and 2.283-284 are from R 478 (1903), the "Syllabus" for > the Lowell Lectures. > - 2.281 is from R 404 (1894), "The Art of Reasoning. Chapter II. What > Is a Sign?" > - 2.282 is from R 595 (1895), "Short Logic." > > Although the notes indicate that 2.278-280 actually comes after 2.332-339 > in R 787, they fail to mention that Peirce wrote four additional paragraphs > between them that are omitted, along with at least 15 pages prior to > 2.332. There are two more omitted paragraphs after 2.280, which are > followed by 1.564-567, then another omitted paragraph, and finally > 2.340-356. Two manuscript pages originally missing from R 787 turned up > later as R 787(s), and I was delighted to discover that they include an > interesting passage about "scientific intelligence" that Gary F. quoted in > a post <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-05/msg00160.html> a > few weeks ago, citing NEM 4:ix-x where Carolyn Eisele attributes it to an > "unidentified fragment." I am now preparing a complete transcription to > restore the original flow of the entire text of R 787 for further study, > but for now, here is the whole paragraph that concludes with 2.278. > > CSP: An idea is called up when an idea sufficiently like it is called up. > A representation of an idea is nothing but a sign that calls up another > idea. When one mind desires to communicate an idea to another, he embodies > his idea by making an outward perceptible image which directly calls up a > like idea; and another mind perceiving that image gets a like idea. Two > persons may agree upon a conventional sign which shall call up to them an > idea it would not call up to anybody else. But in framing the convention > they must have resorted to the primitive diagrammatic method of embodying > the idea in an outward form, a picture. Remembering what *likeness* > consists in, namely, in the natural attraction of ideas apart from habitual > outward associations, I call those signs which stand for their likeness to > them *icons*. Accordingly, I say that the only way of directly > communicating an idea is by means of an icon; and every indirect method of > communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon the use of an > icon. Hence, every assertion must contain an icon or set of icons, or else > must contain signs whose meaning is only explicable by icons. The idea > which the set of icons (or the equivalent of a set of icons) contained in > an assertion signifies may be termed the *predicate* of the assertion. (R > 787:22-23[26-27]) > > > The unpublished paragraphs preceding this one reveal that what Peirce > means here by "an idea" is "a dream without a habitat" (R 787:20[24]), > seemingly anticipating the first of his "three Universes of Experience" > that "comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of > poet, pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a > name within that mind" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908). He adds that "Every > idea ... is more or less vague," such that "An idea cannot accurately be > said to have any identity ... Ideas have no *hic et nunc*, no *hecceity*, > by which they could be *this* and *that* independently of their likeness > to one another ... The vagueness of every idea deprives it of absolute > identity even with itself" (R 787:21[25]). It is an idea in *this *sense > that according to Peirce can only be communicated "by means of an icon"; > namely, "the *predicate *of the assertion." > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Jun 11, 2020 at 2:40 PM robert marty <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> I agree with you. The stakes seem minor to me; In fact, I subtitled my >> book "L'Algébre des Signes" with "Scientific Essay according to Charles >> Sanders Peirce" and I made it clear in my introduction that given the state >> in which Peirce's work is presented ("The Peircian Continent" very well >> described by Jean-Marie Chevallier) it was an illusion of achieving a >> perfect harmony with all his writings. By gathering the thesaurus of 76 >> definitions of the sign my conviction was definitively established. >> However, I have to justify the "according to Charles Sanders Peirce." >> That's why at every moment and whenever it is possible I show that what I >> assert is what Peirce said. Hence an important selection of quotes to >> support my posture. And you understandt that I choose texts rather >> mathematics and more precisely algebraics (CP 2.279) that others avoid >> carefully, hence a false image of the works of Peirce (what John Sowa >> rightly proclaims). >> >> >> >> But Peirce taught us that" The only way of directly communicating an idea >> is by means of an icon; and every indirect method of communicating an idea >> must depend for its establishment upon the use of an icon. " (C.P. 2.278) >> what , in addition, is a necessity that we can reads in the lattice. >> >> >> >> I have an icon-metaphor that allows to understand at a glance the posture >> I have just described: >> >> [image: Une image contenant carte, texte Description générée >> automatiquement] >> >> The hypoicône (CP 2.227) define the representation of my personal >> approach in the "Peircian continent" by a parallelism in the creation of a >> straight line of a linear regression, a basic technique of statistics that >> was learned in the first of many scientific courses. In this image the dots >> are accumulations of Peirce's texts relating to the semiotics themes and >> the straight line is the path I strive to trace. Initially we have only >> points defined by their coordinates. Then we asks the problem: is there a >> straight line that passes close to all these points? The aim is to test >> whether the observed "vague" variations, given the inevitable errors on the >> measurements, would be roughly represented by a straight line. The equation >> of this straight line would be then the simple model of proportionality >> between the two measured variables. It is obtained by imposing that the >> sum of the squares of the distances of the points to the right that one >> seeks must be as small as possible. >> >> I constantly have this image in mind ... >> >> Best regards, >> [image: moindres carrés.jpg] >> Le jeu. 11 juin 2020 à 14:54, <[email protected]> a écrit : >> >>> Robert and Auke, >>> >>> I don’t think anyone questions the reality of a pool of information, >>> published or not, which is not the “private property” of individual owners >>> but is (or should be) a resource available to all members of a culture. If >>> we want to discuss its role in cultural semiosis, why not use an >>> established term such as “knowledge commons”? (See for instance Hess and >>> Ostrom (2007), *Understanding Knowledge as a Commons*.) Peirce had to >>> define his peculiar term *commens* precisely because it was (and is) >>> *not* in common use. Appropriating Peirce’s technical term to evoke the >>> broader concept of the *commons* invites confusion by reading into >>> Peirce a conception that is only vaguely related to the context of his >>> argument. >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >> -- >> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy >> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty >> de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty >> <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty?fbclid=IwAR0N4S-t_avO38YlBYcj_-a2YYcsNvl6joIhTkajX0lMQhV8CXRQjQeXXxQ> >> semiotiquedure.online ; semioticadura.online ; hardsemiotics.online >> >
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