Jon, List Jon I suppose that in this search for coherence in "certain aspects of Peirce's thought" you do not rule out using mathematical objects which are appeared in ulterior development of this discipline that was not at his disposal more than 100 years ago? Otherwise, wouldn't the pure approach literalist be a true corset for research completely contrary to the foundations of his thought ?
Best regards, Robert Le sam. 13 juin 2020 à 03:15, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> a écrit : > Gary F., List: > > Thanks for your comments. I am indeed eager to recognize and explore the > *evolution > *of Peirce's thought over the course of his life as reflected in his > manuscripts, which is why I always provide the year of publication or > composition whenever I cite or quote him, and I encourage others to do > likewise. > > The complete lack of any further progress on the Chronological Edition > over the last decade-plus (and counting) has been very frustrating to me. > At the same time, it has forced me to examine and transcribe the available > images of various post-1892 manuscripts myself, which I believe has been > quite valuable in a way that simply reading them as published texts cannot > duplicate. As you rightly said, "It’s as close as we can get to the > experience of *following *Peirce’s arguments by *thinking along with > their process*." Accordingly, it will forever baffle me that there are > those who persistently dismiss the value of supporting our interpretations > of his writings by extensively quoting his own words. This is not some > "radical" type of "literalism," but rather a common practice in the > mainstream of philosophical scholarship. > > As for "real-world (biological/psychological/experiential) applications of > Peircean semiotic/pragmaticism," it is not that I have no interest in them, > just that I am not as adept at discussing them. Where I think we may agree > is that we are not especially interested in real-world applications of > ideas that others *claim* to be Peircean semeiotic/pragmaticism, but that > clearly *deviate* in significant ways from what he actually wrote, both > terminologically and conceptually. Again, it may very well be the case > that alternative vocabularies are more familiar to most practitioners > today, or that alternative theories match up better with reality; but their > proponents should still acknowledge that those words and ideas are *different > *from what we find in Peirce's writings. I know that you and I both try > to do so on such occasions. > > Finally, I am apparently obliged to say for the umpteenth time that I have > no plan to attempt a coherent synthesis of Peirce's *entire *system of > thought, or even his later writings. Instead, I will continue to do what I > have always done, and what much of the relevant secondary literature has > routinely done--attempt a coherent synthesis of certain *aspects *of his > thought, grounded carefully in his entire corpus. I will always appreciate > how the List has served as a sounding board for presenting, correcting, and > refining my thinking on such matters. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jun 12, 2020 at 8:13 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > >> Jon A.S. (and list), >> >> That is a very interesting discovery, and I look forward to your complete >> transcription of R 787. It occurs to me that much of your recent >> contribution to the list and to Peircean scholarship has been to restore >> the integrity of Peirce’s manuscripts, which (as the late John Deely >> observed) were torn apart by the editors of the *Collected Papers* and >> rearranged thematically. Maybe that was their only choice for getting the >> Peirce papers published at all, given the enormity of his *Nachlass*, >> but the effect on scholars was to make it difficult to follow the >> *development* of Peirce’s ideas. >> >> The chronological order of Peirce’s thought has been partially restored >> by the Peirce Edition Project, but except for the selections included in >> EP2, the project has been stalled for ten years at 1892. I’ve tried to >> contribute to the restoration by using the manuscript images put online by >> Jeff Downard and the SPIN project to produce an online edition of the >> Lowell Lectures of 1903: http://www.gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm . (The >> complete Lowell Lectures have since then been published ( >> https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/552477 ), but unfortunately I can’t >> afford that edition.) Anyway, your work along these lines has been more >> thorough, meticulous and diligent than mine, as exemplified by your >> contributions to peirce-l in recent years. >> >> You and I have our differences, as we’ve discussed onlist over the years, >> but we share the experience of many hours studying and transcribing the >> online images of Peirce’s post-1892 manuscripts. This has given us a sense >> of the *continuity* of Peirce’s thought process — his way of drafting >> and redrafting his exposition of semiotic/logic, frequently approaching >> certain key concepts by considering them from different angles and in >> different contexts. Reading whole manuscripts instead of scattered >> fragments of Peirce, and reading them in the context of their chronological >> order, is an experience that is not available to those who rely mainly on >> the CP edition of his works. It’s as close as we can get to the experience >> of *following* Peirce’s arguments by *thinking along with their process*. >> >> One thing I’ve derived from this experience is a deeper sense of the >> continuity between the processes of semiosis and those of life itself >> (including the *experience* of living). That connection is the main >> subject of my book *Turning Signs* ( >> http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm ), and the central focus of the >> book is the *recursive* and *nonlinear* nature of those processes. >> Peirce did not use those terms, which I’ve drawn from more recent >> developments in science, but I’ve tried to show that he anticipated those >> developments, implicitly if not explicitly. I’ve occasionally tried to >> share this application of Peircean thought on peirce-l — the post you quote >> below was one attempt, drawn from my book — but have pretty much given up >> on that, as there doesn’t seem to be much interest here in such real-world >> (biological/psychological/experiential) applications of Peircean >> semiotic/pragmaticism. I don’t think you are much interested in that >> yourself. >> >> Frankly, the only reason I’m still subscribed to the list is that >> contributions like yours sometimes cause me to rethink (and sometimes >> revise) my use of Peircean concepts in *Turning Signs*. I’m still doing >> that because it has an effect on the way I deal with living in the >> Anthropocene, this moment in which life on planet Earth is going through a >> relatively sudden and drastic transformation — which is the main focus of >> my blog http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ . That shift of interest is my excuse >> for ignoring most of the discussion here on peirce-l. “Communicating an >> idea” sounds like a promising thread, though, and I look forward to seeing >> how it develops. >> >> Gary f >> > -- Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty <https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Fran%C3%A7ois_Raymond_Marty?fbclid=IwAR0N4S-t_avO38YlBYcj_-a2YYcsNvl6joIhTkajX0lMQhV8CXRQjQeXXxQ> semiotiquedure.online ; semioticadura.online ; hardsemiotics.online
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