Dear Helmut,
It's one of the occupational hazards of the classifying mind
that one can start out consciously characterizing aspects of
real situations and end up unwittingly thinking we've gotten
everything under the sun sorted into mutually exclusive bins.
Once the idols of compartmentality and the illusions of autonomous
abstraction get their hold on our minds it is almost impossible to
reconstitute or synthesize what we've torn asunder, if only in our
own minds. The ounce of prevention here is always keeping in mind
that from which all abstractions are abstracted, living experience.
Regards,
Jon
On 8/3/2020 1:54 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
List,
with regard to this thread, but also to the classification of sciences, but also
all inquiry, signs, objects, I am thinking about the distinction of analysis
versus synthesis. To tell, whether a science, a sign, an inquiry is analytical
or synthetical, I??d say, we have to tell whether the inquirer / interpreter is
part or sufferer of the object or not. If he*she is not, he*she may have
theoretc control over it, and the inquiry is analytical in the sense of "divide
et impera". Analysis is virtual division. If the inquirer on the other hand is
part or sufferer of the object, the object controls her*him to some extent, and
the inquiry has to be partly synthetical.
If a biochemist analyses some protein, it is analytic inquiry. If the climate
change is the object, it is mostly synthetic inquiry. I think you can classify
sciences or branches of sciences that way. Physics and chemistry are mostly
analytic. Ecology, psychology, theology, metaphysics are mostly synthetic.
Semiotics is kind of both, I think.
I think, it is helpful, to analytically and synthetically look at the ways
analysis and synthesis are subsequentially done. I think, many possibilities for
fallacies are opening up, if analysis and synthesis are alternated in the wrong
way, without me knowing yet, what in this respect a wrong and a justified way
would be.
I think, for example, that natural fallacy is something like that: First
analysing a phenomenon, and then synthesizing the analysed parts as a rule.
In mathematics, a synthesis has to be corrobated by a proof. In other sciences,
this is not so easy.
To keep my post Peirce-related, here a quote from the Commens Dictionary:
"
1906 | The Basis of Pragmaticism | EP 2:372-3
/Two meanings of the term ???philosophy???/ call for our particular notice. The
two
meanings agree in making philosophical knowledge positive, that is in making it
a knowledge of things real, in opposition to mathematical knowledge, which is
knowledge of the consequences of arbitrary hypotheses; and they further agree in
making philosophical truth extremely general. But in other respects they differ
as widely as they well could. For one of them, which is better entitled (except
by usage) to being distinguished as /philosophia prima/ than is ontology,
embraces all that positive science which rests upon familiar experience and does
not search out occult or rare phenomena; while the other, which has been called
/philosophia ultima/, embraces all that truth which is derivable by collating
the results of the different special sciences, but which is too broad to be
perfectly established by any one of them. The former is well named by Jeremy
Bentham???s term /cenoscopy/ [???], the latter goes by the name of /synthetic
philosophy/.
"
Best,
Helmut
03. August 2020 um 18:17 Uhr
[email protected]
*wrote:*
Jon et al.,
The basic point of my post was that the interpreter of a sign can keep its
/dynamic/ object ???in view??? only by means of the /indexical /function of the
sign, which connects it to actual /experience/. Diagrammatic signs are not so
good at that.
The relevance to John's original post, as i see it, is this: if theorematic
reasoning is /only /a /mathematical/ procedure, it leaves out the /experiential
/element of Peirce's methodology and his pragmatism.
Mathematics is not a positive science, meaning that it involves no actual
experience (other than the experience of doing mathematics, in which the
universe of discourse is entirely imaginary). All positive sciences (including
phaneroscopy, logic and semiotic) deal with what Peirce calls /real relations/
as opposed to /relations of reason/ (CP 1.365, for instance). A proposition in a
positive science thus must employ a genuine Index
<http://gnusystems.ca/TS/snm.htm#gndx>, as opposed to a degenerate index such as
???the letters attached to a geometrical or other diagram??? (EP2:172).
Gary f.
-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]>
Sent: 3-Aug-20 11:35
To: Peirce List <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Pragma, Pragmata, Pragmatitude!
Dear Gary, All ...
I was obviously having a lot more fun with words in those days ...
sigh, good times ... the point of it all being I always see the
whole complex of meanings associated with the Greek root "pragma,
pragmata" through the more threadbare veil of the Latin "object".
That complex contains all the senses of aims, concerns, ends, goals,
intentional objects, and purposes we tend to express more obliquely
through the use of "object" to mean "objective". Still, the latter
use does have some currency in cybernetics, operations research,
and systems theory, so it's a handy sense to keep in mind.
Cf: Liddell & Scott
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dpra%3Dgma
Regards,
Jon
unicode test: ????????????
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