Jerry, the following paragraph from Harvard Lecture 6 (1903, EP2:218, CP5.176) might help to explain Peirce’s usage of ampliative (his translation of Kant’s erweiternde):
[[ I may presume that you are all familiar with Kant's reiterated insistence that necessary reasoning does nothing but explicate the meaning of its premisses. Now Kant's conception of the nature of necessary reasoning is clearly shown by the logic of relations to be utterly mistaken, and his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, which he otherwise and better terms explicatory (erläuternde) and ampliative (erweiternde) judgments, which is based on that conception, is so utterly confused that it is difficult or impossible to do anything with it. But, nevertheless, I think we shall do very well to accept Kant's dictum that necessary reasoning is merely explicatory of the meaning of the terms of the premisses, only reversing the use to be made of it. Namely instead of adopting the conception of meaning from the Wolffian logicians, as he does, and making use of this dictum to express what necessary reasoning can do, about which he was utterly mistaken, we shall do well to understand necessary reasoning as mathematics and the logic of relations compels us to understand it, and to use the dictum, that necessary reasoning only explicates the meanings of the terms of the premisses, to fix our ideas as to what we shall understand by the meaning of a term. ]] Gary f. From: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> Sent: 14-Dec-20 23:08 To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic) List: Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the usage of “ampliative”, starting with the citation in the Comment Dictionary. The Commens dictionary states: News | Posted 12/03/2017 <http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-sciences> Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its premises (Collected Papers 2.623). The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and Hypothesis. Ampliative does not occur in 2.623 Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent conference where Commens provides the following statement: Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be understood in the title of this workshop. (The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.) Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence. After all, even a simple deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises! BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. The Oxford dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”. (But reasoning is a general term with many meanings Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments and arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may yield credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go beyond our data, in ways that interest us. Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP: "1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in The Works of the Rev. Hugh Binning <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/24238> [1], page 579: Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both." In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term “ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root. Jon wrote: That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative but merely explicative. I continue to maintain that this is problematic. Necessary reasoning in often ampliative. Cheers Jerry
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