Gary, List: Thank you for posting this listing. It is highly probably the source of my recall of CSP’s usage of the term “ampliative” as the pages in EP 2 contain many many marginal remarks.
The assertions in this lecture focus on the logic of relations / relatives. He rejects Kantian categories and contrasts the notion of Kantian “judgments” with the (mathematical) logic of relatives. On re-reading this section, no other mention of “ampliative” is made. Rather, he continues with the necessary logic of mathematics and the meaning of “term” with respect to an index and the grammar of sentences. One of my concerns with the usage of term “ampliative” relates to the genesis of relations between atoms and molecules. The compositions of individual atoms, each as a singularity of meaning and as a “line of identity” generates a molecule, also a singularity with an extended "line of identity" that incorporates all of the atoms from which it is composed. Meaning. In the logic of chemistry, the antecedent atomic weights of each element and the atomic numbers of every element are added to specify the molecular weight of the consequence and the molecular number of the consequence. This is an adductive logic that is common to all chemical syntheses of molecules from atoms. Because there are many possible ways to organize a set of atoms in space, abductive logic is needed to index the possible organizational arrangements of atoms in molecules that create the specific identity of the molecule. Examples of the meaning of these abstract sentences are adding Hydrogen and Oxygen to form Water and adding Carbon and Oxygen to form carbon dioxide. The reference system for such chemical propositions is the chemical table of elements. The logical calculations are based on the reference values. Thus, the necessary logic of chemistry is directly and quantitatively related the line of identity in CSP graph theory by both adductive and abductive mathematical logic because of the quantitative reference system for all chemical relatives. Obviously, this form of propositional logic is remote from the notation and meaning of “elements” as used in set theory and ALSO in Russell’s assertions linking atomic propositions to molecular propositions. Section IV (p. 220-225) continues with a profound discussion of his views of the meaning of language with relation to his usage of propositional terms. In effect, CSP denies Church’s thesis more than two decades before its assertion! The texts in this manuscript are not consistent with Sowa’s oft-repeated beliefs, at least as I understand them. Cheers Jerry : Thank you for posting this > On Dec 15, 2020, at 6:36 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Jerry, the following paragraph from Harvard Lecture 6 (1903, EP2:218, > CP5.176) might help to explain Peirce’s usage of ampliative (his translation > of Kant’s erweiternde): > > [[ I may presume that you are all familiar with Kant's reiterated insistence > that necessary reasoning does nothing but explicate the meaning of its > premisses. Now Kant's conception of the nature of necessary reasoning is > clearly shown by the logic of relations to be utterly mistaken, and his > distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, which he otherwise and > better terms explicatory (erläuternde) and ampliative (erweiternde) > judgments, which is based on that conception, is so utterly confused that it > is difficult or impossible to do anything with it. But, nevertheless, I think > we shall do very well to accept Kant's dictum that necessary reasoning is > merely explicatory of the meaning of the terms of the premisses, only > reversing the use to be made of it. Namely instead of adopting the conception > of meaning from the Wolffian logicians, as he does, and making use of this > dictum to express what necessary reasoning can do, about which he was utterly > mistaken, we shall do well to understand necessary reasoning as mathematics > and the logic of relations compels us to understand it, and to use the > dictum, that necessary reasoning only explicates the meanings of the terms of > the premisses, to fix our ideas as to what we shall understand by the meaning > of a term. ]] > > Gary f. > > From: Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> > Sent: 14-Dec-20 23:08 > To: Peirce List <[email protected]> > Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued > logic) > > List: > > Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the > usage of “ampliative”, starting with the citation in the Comment Dictionary. > > The Commens dictionary states: > News | Posted 12/03/2017 > Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences > <http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-sciences> > Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the > conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its > premises (Collected Papers 2.623). > > The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and > Hypothesis. > Ampliative does not occur in 2.623 > > Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent > conference where Commens provides the following statement: > > Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the > conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its > premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly > used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be > understood in the title of this workshop. > > (The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.) > > Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence. After all, even a simple > deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises! > > BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. > > The Oxford dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”. (But reasoning is a > general term with many meanings > Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their > premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments > and arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may > yield credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go > beyond our data, in ways that interest us. > > Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP: > > "1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in The Works of the Rev. Hugh > Binning[1] <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/24238>, page 579: > > Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both." > > In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term > “ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the > scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root. > > Jon wrote: >>>> That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative >>>> but merely explicative. > > I continue to maintain that this is problematic. Necessary reasoning in > often ampliative. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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