Gary R., Gary F., List: GR: My reservations for now: (1) again, I do not see the use of quali-, sin-, and legisense in phenomenology as conflating aspects of it with quali-, sin-, and legisign in logic as semeiotic, but as revealing the underlying influence (which is not a conflation, as 'sense' and 'sign' are two very different concepts) of the ideas and terminology found in phenomenology on those which appear logic as semeiotic;
I did not say that the terminology of "qualisense," "sinsense," and "legisense" conflates phaneroscopy with semeiotic, I said that it *runs the risk of fostering* such conflation. GR: (2) primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add to the already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce. True, but "sinsense" and "legisense" are even more novel (and arguably even more problematic) as terms that Peirce himself never used. With that in mind, consider this passage from his text on the ethics of terminology. CSP: [W]hen a man has introduced a conception into science, it naturally becomes both his privilege and his duty to assign to that conception suitable scientific expressions, and that when a name has been conferred upon a conception by him to whose labors science is indebted for that conception, it becomes the duty of all,--a duty to the discoverer, and a duty to science,--to accept his name, unless it should be of such a nature that the adoption of it would be unwholesome for science; that should the discoverer fail in his duty either by giving no name or an utterly unsuitable one, then, after a reasonable interval, whoever first has occasion to employ a name for that conception must invent a suitable one; and others ought to follow him; but that whoever deliberately uses a word or other symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offense against the inventor of the symbol and against science, and it becomes the duty of the others to treat the act with contempt and indignation. (CP 2.224, EP 2:265, 1903) In short, we should *not *invent new names for conceptions that he (or anyone else) has already introduced into science under other names, unless those original names are "utterly unsuitable." Accordingly, if we wish to preserve "qualisense" from 1909, it should be accompanied by "molition" and "habit-consciousness" as in that same passage, rather than the neologisms "sinsense" and "legisense." On the other hand, if we wish to preserve "-sense" as the consistent root word for all three categories, then we should stick with "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense" from c. 1896. Or I suppose that we could replace "primisense" with "qualisense" as a later and more descriptive alternative, giving us qualisense/altersense/medisense as a trichotomy that is even more suggestive of quality/reaction/mediation applied specifically to consciousness. GF: The hard part of phaneroscopy is not to allow the prior naming of things to interfere with the observation, where Firstness has to be predominant. And that makes it hard to even talk about it. Indeed, this is another way of highlighting the distinction that Gary F. properly (in my view) draws between observation and generalization as tasks of phaneroscopy; or perhaps as tasks of phenomenology as the broader science, with phanersocopy corresponding to observation and trichotomic category theory to generalization. However, since 1ns is predominant in the former and 3ns in the latter, the question arises--in what additional task of phenomenology is 2ns predominant? De Tienne's iconoscopy does not strike me as a good fit here, and in any case, he states plainly in his paper about it ( https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/rssi/2013-v33-n1-2-3-rssi02379/1035282ar.pdf) that he *is not* proposing it as an additional branch in Peirce's classification of the sciences. ADT: This somewhat new word is not intended to point out a flaw in Peirce’s classification of the sciences by demonstrating that we need to add one more science between phaneroscopy and the normative sciences, especially semeiotic. Indeed there is no need to do so. The real intention is to show that, precisely because of the nature of the connection between phaneroscopy and semeiotic, and especially of the transition between phaneron and sign, one needs to surmise that there exists a type of activity that is common to both, that that activity must have to do, as already suggested, with icons and iconic signs, and that a good name for that transitional activity is iconoscopy, that is, the activity of selecting portions of the phaneron for the sake of reducing them to representational unity. ... Iconoscopy is not a science ... . Being transitional, iconoscopy goes on both in phaneroscopy and in semeiotic ... (p. 26) On the other hand, Daniel Campos has written about *mathematical *reasoning requiring three faculties--imagination, concentration, and generalization ( https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236711950_Imagination_Concentration_and_Generalization_Peirce_on_the_Reasoning_Abilities_of_the_Mathematician). As I have pointed out before, phaneroscopy is not *limited *to observation, but also includes imagination as another source of whatever is or could be present to the mind. Put another way, a key difference between mathematics and phaneroscopy is the *addition *of (external) observation to (internal) imagination, which is what makes the latter a *positive *science while the former is not. In any case, according to Peirce, "mathematics requires a certain vigor of thought, the power of concentration of attention, so as to hold before the mind a highly complex image, and keep it steady enough to be observed" (CP 2.81, 1902). Campos suggests that it is equivalent to what Peirce calls "ratiocination" in this other passage. CSP: The main advantages of the study of mathematics consist, on the one hand, in furnishing rules very useful for application to many practical problems, and on the other hand, in disciplining the intellect in three functions. The first of these is mathematical imagination, the power of distinctly picturing to ourselves intricate configurations. The second is ratiocination, or the ability to take up a problem, bring it to a convenient shape for study, make out the gist of it, and ascertain without mistake just what it does and does not involve. The third, and by far the most valuable exercize mathematics affords, even from a utilitarian point of view, lies in generalization, by which we are led to see that what seems at first a snarl of intricate circumstances is but a fragment of a harmonious and comprehensible whole. (R 252:19, no date) Peirce goes on the mention "the severe effort of attention it requires," and as Gary F. noted, mathematical reasoning--drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of things--is the *logica utens* that we employ within phaneroscopy. I suggest accordingly that "the hard part of phaneroscopy" is more a matter of concentration/attention than observation/imagination. The latter is going on all the time, which is the sense in which we are all (at least potentially) phaneroscopists; but *concentrating *on the phaneron and giving it our undivided *attention *without allowing "the prior naming of things [or anything else] to interfere with the observation" is the real challenge. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jun 20, 2021 at 7:29 AM Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > > GR: It may perhaps be more simply stated that for phaneroscopists -- > which, again, Peirce and De Tienne claim that we *all *are (I agree, at > least that we all are *potentially*) -- we are *initially* aware of > our qualisense, sinsense, and legisense, and only later discover how these > entail 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns. > > > JAS: I am inclined to agree with this hypothesis, but it seems to me that > adopting the same prefixes for "-sense" that Peirce appended to "-sign" in > his 1903 taxonomy runs the risk of fostering the conflation of phaneroscopy > with semeiotic, which we have otherwise been strenuously trying to avoid. > However, it is reminiscent of one of his own terminological experiments, > where he instead proposes "primisense," "altersense," and "medisense." > > > Thank you for providing this very interesting and most relevant quotation > (CP 7.5) which I immediately recognized but had forgotten about. While I > see things somewhat differently than you regarding my proposed use of > quali-, sin- and legisense in phenomenology, since, as I see it, using > these prefixes, rather than running "the risk of fostering the conflation > of phaneroscopy with semeiotic" seems to me to bring home at least one > significant way in which discoveries in phenomenology *will find their > application in logic as semeiotic *down. > > On the other hand, I agree with you that the passage you quoted, besides > revealing that Peirce not only saw *three quasi-distinct senses* at work > in the phaneroscopist's encounter with the phaneron but, as you wrote, that > they exhibit Peirce's "characteristic categorial analysis of phenomena [. . > .] such that primisense has only one mode, altersense has two modes, and > medisense has three modes [and that Peirce] explicitly names sensation as > one of the two modes of altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than > 1ns, just as I have been maintaining." > > I completely agree with you that "sensation [is] one of the two modes of > altersense, thus corresponding to 2ns rather than 1ns." Yet, I agreed with > you on this prior to this discussion based on the principle you elucidated. > > My point in noting that something like quali-, sin-, and legisense is > necessary in phaneroscopy was merely to acknowledge the trichonicity that > is *always already* present in our encounters with the phaneron. So, to > answer your question, "do you think [that] replacing > qualisense/sinsense/legisense in your hypothesis with > primisense/altersense/medisense?" might be a preferable option, I'd > *tentatively* answer, "yes." For, and as you wrote, "they retain the > underlying phaneroscopic notions of quality, reaction, and mediation that > Peirce later calls "the purest conceptions" of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns (CP 1.530, > 1903). > > My reservations for now: (1) again, I do not see the use of quali-, sin-, > and legisense in phenomenology as conflating aspects of it with quali-, > sin-, and legisign in logic as semeiotic, but as revealing the underlying > influence (which is not a conflation, as 'sense' and 'sign' are two *very > *different concepts) of the ideas and terminology found in phenomenology > on those which appear logic as semeiotic; (2) > primisense/altersense/medisense are yet three 'novel' terms to add to the > already problematic neologistist terminology employed by Peirce. > > Having said that, it may be that in the exposition and development of > Peirce's phenomenology in the 21st century that such novel terminology is > not a bug, but a (potential) feature. We don't yet have much terminology > for making the necessary distinctions which need to be made if Peircean > phenomenology is to become more than a "science egg." > > [Note: having finished this message, I just read Gary f's which is quite > relevant to this discussion. For now I will only emphasize one of the > points he made: "The hard part of phaneroscopy is not to allow the prior > naming of things to interfere with the observation, where Firstness has to > be predominant. And that makes it hard to even talk about it." > > Best, > > Gary R > > “Let everything happen to you > Beauty and terror > Just keep going > No feeling is final” > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
