Thanks, Jon, for transcribing that part of R 284, which I didn’t have time to 
search out yesterday. It’s similar to his detailed procedural and pragmatic 
‘definition’ of lithium in the “Syllabus” (EP2:286):

CSP: “The peculiarity of this definition,— or rather this precept that is more 
serviceable than a definition,— is that it tells you what the word lithium 
denotes by prescribing what you are to do in order to gain a perceptual 
acquaintance with the object of the word.”

His use of the word “precept” in this context is very apt because the 
prescription precedes the perception of the object. This reinforces the 
contrast between the two principles identified by André De Tienne as guiding 
the classification of sciences, and the difference between preceding in 
principle and preceding in procedure. It’s interesting that Peirce describes 
the application of such a precept as “more logical” than the textbook 
definition of lithium as “that element whose atomic weight is 7 very nearly.” 

I think you’re quite right to correct the (rather lame) final sentence of my 
post as you did. Bellucci’s paper on phaneroscopic analysis brings out the 
complexity of the relations among the sciences of mathematics, logic and 
phaneroscopy, where the hierarchical order is clear enough but the practice of 
each of these sciences involves the others procedurally. The special difficulty 
in phaneroscopy is in gaining “perceptual acquaintance” with the phaneron, 
because (as Peirce says) it’s right in front of you all the time, and that 
makes it very hard to see! The procedure he prescribes (for the “subtilizing 
logician” is to try to think of anything that is not phaneral (according to the 
verbal definition of the phaneron), because the impossibility of doing that is 
immediately obvious. This again shows the circularity of scientific method, 
because the concept of the phaneron must precede the procedure (and so on).

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 15-Jul-21 20:46
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: This leaves open the question of how to classify the science--if it is a 
science--which enables us to “settle” what the phaneron is.

 

Perhaps we can find the answer to that question by consulting what Peirce wrote 
right before claiming to have just "settled what the phaneron is" as quoted 
below.

 

CSP: But, come, let us survey the whole field, the broad expanse of all that is 
before the mind in any way whatever, and see what forms of undecomposable 
elements, can be detected there. Perhaps somebody may inquire whether I mean 
the ideas themselves, or the objects they present. Such an inquirer is 
altogether off the track. The objects that are presented are before the mind, 
are they not? If the ideas are not the objects presented, then since you speak 
of them, they are in some sense before your mind too, even if instead of 
observing, you make the hypothesis that ideas different from the objects are 
before the mind, although it may be that nothing is really before your mind but 
the objects. Even then, these ideas are supposed, and as such are before the 
mind. Suppose there be a mere tinge of melancholy, of annoyance, or of joy, 
which brings no additional object but only colors the objects that are before 
the mind independently of the color. Still, in some sense this color is before 
the mind. All that is imagined, felt, thought, desired, or that either colors 
or governs what we feel or think is in some sense, before the mind. The sum 
total of it all I will name the phaneron. If I am asked whether I limit myself 
to what actually is at this indivisible instant before the mind or include all 
that ever was or will be before any mind or whether I mean something 
intermediate, or if I am asked whether I admit anything absolutely 
inconceivable, or am asked any such hard questions, the answer is that I have 
made my meaning plain enough to the eye of common-sense. The phaneron embraces 
all that is present to the mind. This same subtilizing logician who asks these 
questions, to which I as a logician myself can make no sort of objection and 
stand ready to follow him in his subtilizing, I give the answer: First exercize 
every care not to include in the phaneron anything that never enters your head 
at all and after exercizing the utmost scrupulosity in this respect, if there 
is any question whether a given thing belongs to the phaneron or not, carefully 
state the question in writing & set down after it the answer, Yes. Thus, "Is a 
self-contradictory object included in the phaneron? Yes." (R 284:40-41[37-38], 
c. 1905)

 

This strikes me as more of a stipulated definition than a result of scientific 
inquiry. Our mere ability to ask whether X is included in the phaneron is 
sufficient to entail that X is included in the phaneron.

 

GF: Bellucci appears to argue that it is the logic of relatives, taking a cue 
(as it were) from the idea of valency generalized from the science of chemistry.

 

Bellucci's claim in the linked paper is not that the logic of relatives settles 
what the phaneron is, but rather that it is "by means of the logic of relatives 
that Peirce can establish that the elements of the Phaneron have valence" (p. 
3). He later adds, "The logic of relatives is mathematical logic, and therefore 
is 'hardly to be reckoned' as a part of logic proper. What the logic of 
relatives teaches us concerning the primitive forms of relations is a 
mathematical, not a logical, truth. ... The preliminary investigation of 'what 
is possible' is provided by the logic of relatives" (p. 4). Accordingly, it 
corresponds to #2 in the "procedural order" rather than #1.

 

Moreover, I suggest that applying the logic of relatives in this way is using 
principles adapted from mathematics within phaneroscopy.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Thu, Jul 15, 2021 at 8:26 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

André De Tienne: “a science that happens to make use of a principle formulated 
in a more abstract science … may provide that prior science with corrective 
feedback, reasons to revise generalizations, and reasons to redesign formal 
possibilities. Thus, a science may also be said to precede another science if 
the latter provides such a critical and validating feedback in return.” (slide 
17)

GF: Apparently a science may precede another not only in this hierarchical 
sense but also in a procedural sense:

CSP: “Having thus settled what the phaneron is, we have to undertake the 
examination [of] its indecomposable constituents. But before undertaking the 
actual work of observation, it is indispensable that we should begin by 
considering what is possible for otherwise we would be exploring without any 
definite field to explore. We should idly wonder without accomplishing 
anything.” (MS 284, p. 39, c. 1905, as quoted by Francesco Bellucci — the 
emphasis is his — in 
https://www.academia.edu/11664897/Peirce_on_Phaneroscopical_Analysis).

GF: The procedural order here is:

1.      settling “what the phaneron is”
2.      “considering what is possible” [by means of a formal or mathematical 
logic?]
3.      “undertaking the actual work of observation” [i.e. phaneroscpic 
observation]

This leaves open the question of how to classify the science — if it is a 
science — which enables us to “settle” what the phaneron is. Bellucci appears 
to argue that it is the logic of relatives, taking a cue (as it were) from the 
idea of valency generalized from the science of chemistry.

Gary f.

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