Gary F, List, I know I'm not alone in wishing that more of Peirce's correspondence were published sooner than later. It seems to me that occasionally certain matters appear more clearly -- as simply or more directly -- expressed in that informal medium than in papers published or in draft form. For example, in the letter to James from which you posted an excerpt today we read:
CSP: The standards of certainty must be different in different sciences, the principles to which one science appeals altogether different from those of the other. From the point of view of logic and methodical development the distinctions are of the greatest concern. Phenomenology has no right to appeal to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, logic must be founded on phenomenology. One can, of course, disagree with him in this matter; but it is clear that this is indeed Peirce's view: *logic* (as semeiotic) *is necessarily "founded on phenomenology" and not vice versa*. And, of course, in this particular case the view expressed in the letter is supported by other more formal writings. Somewhat less frequently one finds a passage in a letter of his which can give one pause. For example, in this very same letter he comments: CSP: I am not sure that it will do to call this science *phenomenology* owing to Hegel's *Phänomenologie* being somewhat different. But I am not sure that Hegel ought not to have it named after his attempt. Now some, for example JAS, might argue that as this was not his published view, and since he both expresses uncertainty in the matter as well as ultimately settling on 'phaneroscopy' as the preferred name of the science he's developing, that we too should call Peirce's science (or 'science egg') *phaneroscopy.* Yet, in the ethics of terminology an important point is being made here by Peirce, namely, that the *origina*l attempt to develop this *sort* of phenomenology (even if it is "somewhat different") was, in fact, Hegel's. Well, as you no doubt know, I tend to imagine that a fully developed Peircean phenomenology will quasi-necessarily have branches, and that *if* this eventually comes to be the case that it would make some sense -- even in terms of the ethics of terminology just commented on -- to refer to the entire science as *phenomenology*, and only the first methodological branch of it as *phaneroscopy*. But I say this only in passing as I also am eager to see what direction the slow read goes now that there does appear to be some progress towards agreement on at least certain principles. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Tue, Aug 24, 2021 at 4:44 PM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon A.S., John S., list, > > Perhaps we are making some progress in this reading of ADT’s talk, if John > is ready to admit that Peirce’s phenomenology is *a separate science* > from mathematics, that it occupies a place in the hierarchy below > mathematics *but above all other sciences*, and that its focus on > *experience* makes it *different from any other science*. (I think you > must be ready to admit this, John, since you took it as an insult when I > said that you *haven’t* admitted it before!) > > GF (previously): Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly > clear that the key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after > he renamed it “phaneroscopy”) is *experience*. > > JAS: Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of > *experience > *is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, > experience is strictly *cognitive *(i.e., semiosic) and *involuntary*, > constraints that do not apply to the phaneron as a whole. > > GF: Yes, the time has come for examining the relation between *experience* > and *the phaneron*. André mentions in slide 32 (already posted) that “the > term *phaneron* was coined in late October 1904 after an exchange with > William James.” To provide more context for this discussion, I’ll post here > some excerpts from that “exchange,” quoting those parts of the letter to > James (CP 8.286-301) where Peirce writes explicitly about phenomenology. > > > > CSP: … As I understand you, then, the proposition which you are arguing is > a proposition in what I have called *phenomenology,* that is, just the > analysis of what kind of constituents there are in our thoughts and lives, > (whether these be valid or invalid being quite aside from the question). It > is a branch of philosophy I am most deeply interested in and which I have > worked upon almost as much as I have upon logic. It has nothing to do with > psychology. … > > Perhaps the most important aspect of the series of papers of which the one > you send me is the first, will prove to be that it shows so clearly that > phenomenology is one science and psychology a very different one. I know > that you are not inclined to see much value in distinguishing between one > science and another. But my opinion is that it is absolutely necessary to > any progress. The standards of certainty must be different in different > sciences, the principles to which one science appeals altogether different > from those of the other. From the point of view of logic and methodical > development the distinctions are of the greatest concern. Phenomenology has > no right to appeal to logic, except to deductive logic. On the contrary, > logic must be founded on phenomenology. Psychology, you may say, observes > the same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not *observe* the same > facts. It looks upon the same world; — the same world that the astronomer > looks at. But what it *observes* in that world is different. Psychology > of all sciences stands most in need of the discoveries of the logician, > which he makes by the aid of the phenomenologist. > > I am not sure that it will do to call this science *phenomenology* owing > to Hegel's *Phänomenologie* being somewhat different. But I am not sure > that Hegel ought not to have it named after his attempt. … > > My “phenomenon” for which I must invent a new word is very near your “pure > experience” but not quite since I do not exclude time and also speak of > only *one* “phenomenon.” > > > > GF: The “new word” he invented was, of course, “phaneron.” To contrast it > with Peirce’s usage of “experience,” the first thing I’d say is that > “phaneron” refers to the collective total of whatever is or (can be) > *experienced*, rather than the *experience* itself (considered as > something that happens or occurs to a “subject of experience”). But Peirce > also says that the practice of phenomenology/ phaneroscopy itself does not > assume a distinction between *experience* and *what is experienced*, or > between “subjective” and “objective” experience — or, as he put it > elsewhere, between *consciousness *and the “*contents of consciousness.*” > > Anyway, we’ll have to sort this out in more detail later, with direct > quotations if necessary. We will no doubt continue to get alternative > interpretations posted by others, who are welcome to post them, but unless > they are based directly on something Peirce actually wrote about the > subject, I don’t see much point in arguing for or against them. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> *On > Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 24-Aug-21 13:00 > *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31 > > > > Gary F., List: > > GF: Slide 31, following up on slide 30, make it perfectly clear that the > key word in Peirce’s work on phenomenology (before and after he renamed it > “phaneroscopy”) is *experience*. > > Nevertheless, as André finally acknowledges, "this understanding of > *experience > *is not equivalent to what will become the phaneron." For Peirce, > experience is strictly *cognitive *(i.e., semiosic) and *involuntary*, > constraints that do not apply to the phaneron as a whole. > > > > CSP: But for philosophy, which is the science which sets in order those > observations which lie open to every man every day and hour, experience can > only mean the total cognitive result of living, and includes > interpretations quite as truly as it does the matter of sense. Even more > truly, since this matter of sense is a hypothetical something which we > never can seize as such, free from all interpretative working over. (CP > 7.538, 1899) > > > > CSP: What is experience? It is the resultant ideas that have > been forced upon us. We find we cannot summon up what images we like. Try > to banish an idea and it only comes home with greater violence later. > Hence, we find the only wisdom is to accept, at once, the ideas that sooner > or later we must accept; and we even go to work solicitous to find out what > are the ideas which are going ultimately to be forced upon us. Three such > ideas are the three categories; and it will be wise to pitch overboard > promptly the metaphysics which preaches against them.(CP 4.318, 1902) > > > > CSP: Experience of the unexpected forces upon us the idea of duality. Will > you say, "Yes, the idea is forced upon us, but it is not directly > experienced, because only what is within is directly experienced"? The > reply is that *experience *means nothing but just that of > a cognitive nature which the history of our lives has forced upon us. It is > *indirect*, if the medium of some other experience or thought is required > to bring it out. Duality, thought abstractly, no doubt requires the > intervention of reflection; but that upon which this reflection is based, > the concrete duality, is there in the very experience itself. (CP 5.539, c. > 1902-3) > > > > The second quotation mentions the three categories as "ideas which are > going ultimately to be forced upon us," confirming that phaneroscopy is > concerned with experience; and the third quotation distinguishes between > *direct *experience and *indirect *experience, which we specifically > discussed in a List thread more than two years ago ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-05/msg00215.html). As I > eventually summarized my thinking back then ( > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-05/msg00241.html) ... > > > > JAS: I suggest that Experience is the *cumulative *cognitive result of > the *involuntary *process of semeiosis in which thought *Retroductively > *creates > Perceptual Judgments by prescinding predicates and abstracting subjects > from the *continuous* flow of perception, which has no *real *parts. > Every Perceptual Judgment thus purports to represent *Direct *Experience of > an Object or event, and when the latter is interpreted as an Instance of a > Sign, the Perceptual Judgment *also *purports to represent *Indirect > *Experience of > the Object determining that *other *Sign. > > > > Hence, the phaneron certainly *includes *all experience, both direct and > indirect, but it "is not limited to what is *forced *upon us; it also > embraces all that we most capriciously conjure up" (NEM 3:834, 1905). > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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