Helmut, List: HR: For a theist God is the creator, for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind.
As I have documented with exact quotations previously ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-09/msg00208.html), by his own testimony Peirce was a theist, not a pantheist nor a panentheist. He professed to believe that God is the real and personal creator of the entire universe from nothing, such that the latter is neither identical to God (pantheism) nor somehow within God (panentheism). To be clear, I am not suggesting that one must likewise be a theist in order to be a Peircean with respect to other aspects of his thought, just pointing out what his own explicitly stated position on the relation between God and the universe actually was. A quasi-mind is a kind of sign, and Peirce maintained that the entire universe is a sign--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). In accordance with his definition of a sign, this would require the universe to be determined by a dynamical object that is external to it, independent of it, and unaffected by it; and also to have a final interpretant that it *would *determine under ideal circumstances, namely, in the infinite future after infinite investigation by an infinite community. What might these correlates be? CSP: The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time is the third. (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8) God the Creator is the dynamical object of the universe as a sign, and God completely revealed is its final interpretant. In other words, God's purpose in creating the universe is to reveal Himself more and more definitely. CSP: The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an infinitely incomprehensible object, although every hypothesis, as such, supposes its object to be truly conceived in the hypothesis. This leaves the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself; namely, as vague but as true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit. ... Thus, the hypothesis will lead to our thinking of features of each Universe as purposed; and this will stand or fall with the hypothesis. Yet a purpose essentially involves growth, and so cannot be attributed to God. Still it will, according to the hypothesis, be less false to speak so, than to represent God as purposeless. (CP 6.466, EP 2:439-440, 1908) Since the growth associated with this purpose "cannot be attributed to God," it must instead be attributed to the universe--specifically, the growth of concrete reasonableness as the *summum bonum*, what esthetics identifies as the only intrinsically admirable ideal. The corresponding ethical imperative is to engage in sincere inquiry using methods that will advance our knowledge of the universe as a sign and of God the Creator as its dynamical object, and to cultivate habits of deliberate conduct accordingly. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jun 8, 2023 at 3:51 PM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Jeffrey, List, > > I guess there are two ways of classification: Creation and observation. > Both make things. Creation is primary and produces the crude thing, the > universal ground of it, like a first sketch. The thing may then be further > specified (individuated) by observation. For a theist God is the creator, > for a pantheist the universe is, and for an atheist chance and natural > selection (evolution) is. I think that Peirce was a pantheist or maybe > panentheist, because he said, that the universe has a quasi-mind. In any > case, i think, that no thing is caused by itself, because it exists due to > one or more of these institutions. I think a universal is generated by the > universe. A human is generated by evolution, but evolution is controlled by > the universe (by its laws). Is an individuated thing then set free, so it > exists in itself? I wouldn´t say so, because it still is dependent on the > universe`s laws. But a human can decide what to do by him/herself. So, is > free will a thing in itself? And, in physical inanimate nature, is chance > one? Chance and free will are not things you can touch, but concepts. But > chance has existed before individuals capable of having concepts have > existed, and chance is proven by chaos theory. But it still is a concept of > the universe. So it is not in itself, but in the universe. > > I think, to decide, whether you may speak of a thing in itself, it may be > helpful to test, if the itself-aspect of a thing can be prescinded, > discriminated, or dissociated from a thing, and if the product of one of > these Peircean processes then is a part of reality, and therefore a thing > too. I can´t do that (too abstract for me). Perhaps one of you can do that? >
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