Jack, list,
A proof must resist all "If"s. Can it resist the following, quite weird "If"? There are evolution experiments with computers. Program parts with the ability to interact and to learn are implemented in a virtual, let´s say, matrix. If these program parts would develop an intelligence comparable to our´s, would they see, that they are just program parts consisting of ones and zeroes? Maybe not? And maybe we are such program parts? Maybe on a quantum computer? I hope not, but what if? Then nothing would be in itself, nothing would be real, all would be an illusion. Like the buddhists say, they like it that way, I don´t. But, by them, the suspicion is there. But might it be proven, if it was so, or disproven if it wasn´t?
Best
Helmut
Gesendet: Sonntag, 11. Juni 2023 um 16:29 Uhr
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "s...@bestweb.net" <s...@bestweb.net>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Von: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
An: "Peirce-L" <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, "s...@bestweb.net" <s...@bestweb.net>
Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.
That is, there either is an object which can be cognized as it is in itself, or there is an object in itself which can never be cognized as it is in itself.
I set myself the task, then, of proving the necessary inference that the object as it is in itself cannot be cognized (this was not something I had intended to do, it merely came, naturally, as it were, from a series of related, but not precisely the same, necessities [academic/personal).
I take the canon, as it were, then, as a structure. And it - the in itself - will either live or die by its necessity of explaining (necessarily) those core elements of the human sciences/arts which I am empirically setting about re-arranging. For example, poverty of stimulus, within an already extant analysis cannot be - insofar as I can see/logically prove - except that the thing in itself is (and that poverty of stimulus is, now, proven, to me, here, I mean, is not in doubt [within a Peircean assonant framework, too]).
Thus, I wish to avoid all bickering - honestly, and we are all perhaps guilty of that from time to time - but the minor details here are major categorical issues which explicate the very nuance which thus ignites the very realm of inquiry we all aspire to.
Best
Jack
From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 6:02 AM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 6:02 AM
To: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jack, Jeff, Jon, John Shook, List,
Peirce had a very high regard for Kant. The disagreement about the Ding-an-sich or noumenon is based on just one fundamental principle: whether there is any aspect of the universe that is inherently unknowable.
Peirce was willing to admit that there were some things or some aspects of observable things that were unobservable by human senses because they were too big, too small, too far away, or unobservable by human senses. However, he had over a century more information about the possibilities of scientific methodology (or his own methodeutic and pragmaticism).
He would admit (with Kant) that some aspects of things might be unobservable by the science of his day. But he would not admit that there was anything that could never be known by whatever scientific methods could be developed in the future.
I believe that is all you have to say. Just leave it as an open question. Science has made enormous progress in the century after Peirce, but there are still huge amounts of unknown aspects about any living thing from a bacterium on up. There is no point in wasting time and paper (or electrons) in arguing about the details.
John
From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: 6/10/23 8:42 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: 6/10/23 8:42 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Additionally:
"There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all actual impressions through which I am affected by objects." -Kant: (§9)).
"There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely if it contains nothing else except the form of sensibility, which in me as subject precedes all actual impressions through which I am affected by objects." -Kant: (§9)).
The above is what Peirce calls a diagrammatic icon insofar as Kant's thesis recurs, isomorphic, with respect to the below:
If the representation of the thing (in itself) contains only the physical form of the thing (in itself) as "representation/copy", then we may understand precisely why it is that Peircean Semeiotic, vis-a-vis generation/determination of interpretants and objects, which, structurally, correspond precisely to the below - via Marty's various writings, diagrams, though he might not agree regarding the necessity of its (in itself) incognizable essence. I.e., Kant is right: the thing in itself cannot be cognized and our cognitions, feelings/thoughts, are always derivational representations of the physical world (copies - never the thing in itself but always necessarily of it):
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-----------------
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
1O' - O - 2O'
-----------------
H1[O']; H2[O'] - O(in itself).
Contains 1O', 2O', to each, of the object as it is in itself, only the form, which is necessarily divergent (individuated) of the physical thing (in itself).
Contains 1O', 2O', to each, of the object as it is in itself, only the form, which is necessarily divergent (individuated) of the physical thing (in itself).
------------------------------------------------------------------
This is diagrammatically recursive. It is of the continua, but only can be understood if you understand the necessity of the thing in itself as never cognizable. Our cognitions are of the forms of physical things, never of the physical things - objects - as they are in themselves: this is impossible. As for cognition, so too, for feeling. We can approximate - objectively - certain qualities insofar as humans are capable of so doing and this is "objectivity". It is subjective, and that is the necessitation of "consensus". Hume is right, with respect to "fire": that you must learn, subjectively, that it burns you. Kant is right with respect to the thing in itself: that you can experience the quality associated with fire, feeling or thought, matters of fact/associations of ideas, thus necessitates the metaphysical "price": that the quality is as it is to us but necessarily, now, is beyond all our experiences, physical, of it.
Now, I honestly - in the Peircean ideal (of infinite inquiry which I take to be ideal) - know that I have proven the Kantian thesis. That the thing in itself is necessarily true and that we never can feel/think beyond the formal derivation of the thing in itself. It is metaphysical necessity insofar as it, in itself, stands beyond the cognitive/feeling but also, it must be understood, that there is no cognitive/feeling except that the derivational forms, as representations/copies, are of the essence (as it is in itself).
I will publish my thesis at length - soon - but within it are myriad empirical proofs, logical, philosophical, physic (assonance), and so on. It - the in itself necessity - is not something you can forego (the "price" which is no "price" at all: it opens the door to inquiry, it bars nothing).
Best,
Jack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 1:07 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 1:07 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jon, John, list,
There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in itself. The object as thing must be in itself beyond all possible cognition and experience.
Now, two "individual representations" of the "same" object: H1[1O'])O(H2[2O']
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-----------------
)=experience, necessarily mediated, thus "representation/frame". "(" is but the corollary.
-----------------
Now, all H1 to all possible Os = sui generis, the same structure.
All H2 to all possible Os = sui generis, the same structure.
All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition never can be as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very derivational "source" of the "copy/representational". It can be no simpler than that.
The very fact of difference is necessities by the conditions of existence (as Kant says). This means that we can understand individuality, even reproduction, insofar as we posit the thing in itself and its necessity. Cogito is aposteriori relative to this: to the very conditions for the possibility of existence (which we understand only through the physical appearance of things, represented to us/by us/through us, but necessarily not as they are in themselves even within these representations: cognitions which are object-derivational, never "object [thing] as it is in itself".
Peirce cannot posit the generation of interpretants/objects which correspond to semeiotic except that the above is true. It isn't possible for Peircean Semeiotic to be coherent except that thing in itself exists beyond all possible cognition. We can cognize that the thing in itself necessarily is, but we can never cognize what/how said thing (in itself) is in itself. For as we cognize any object, Peirce understands via [individual] representational modalities, we refract this individually - as many times as you like - wherein we make "copies" (representational) of the "object" as it is in itself which can only happen if it is in itself. Thus, axiomatic never alters.
The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never derive the same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing. We may approximate something like consensus: fire is hot. Every person would seem to concur. But the capacity to agree, here, is necessitated by concurrence of individual experience of an objective quality which has to exist beyond the subjective representation of it.
1:The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself.
2:However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give
them two different representations of object 1.
JAS:
1: The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself.
2: However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1.
Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily differentiated representation of the "same" object. What difference is there between these "two different representations" and the Kantian "copies" in the above?
"no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them."
Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily independent of that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error people are making here.
I mean, what is direct perception if via direct perception "different [individual] perspectives" necessitate "[individual] representations" of the same object? How does that differ from the thing in itself?
Consider:
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-----------------------
Two perspectives, direct, but necessarily "individual" (thus mediated) of the "object":
"-- H1)O(H2 --".
"-- H1)O(H2 --".
Now, two "individual representations" of the "same" object: H1[1O'])O(H2[2O']
If "two different [people] do not perceive two different "copies" of [the object "O"], but [each] directly perceive the very same object [O] [as it is in] itself, then, how are "two different representations" [individual] of the "same" object, therefore necessitated?
For if the object is in itself, you can see, structurally and logically, why it is that Peirce's entire schema works. But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations" which differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual perspectives and faculties").
For if the object is in itself, you can see, structurally and logically, why it is that Peirce's entire schema works. But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations" which differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual perspectives and faculties").
Peirce is unwilling to pay the Kantian price but insofar as I can tell his entire schema cannot work, at all, (which it does, btw), unless you understand the necessity of that price (and thus I understand his admission of it, whether people agree or not, as his own understanding of Kant as actually accurate).
I have traced the nuance precisely, in longer form, yet to be published, as to where Peirce goes categorically wrong. That I will be happy to share. It is very nuanced. So nuanced as to be diaphanous. Thus, it's hardly a sin. It's a mind-boggling topic and whilst he was trained from an early age, and his semiotic remains the best, that training doesn't necessarily work in your favor if you need to think outside the box. Now that he did think outside the box is evident: but he is wrong insofar as he says you can cognize the thing in itself. It's just not true.
Jack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Warning
This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe.
Jack, List:
John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1. Nevertheless, their resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair."
Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other representations are identical to the external things being perceived, cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal effect) is the normative measure of representational "success."
I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and helpful.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is sound (that's not the purpose here).interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics when it comes to general terminology.bestjack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>; Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)John, Jon, list,
We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant).Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this:
Premise 1: An object exists.
Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist.
Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity.
Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects.
Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion?ChatGPTBased on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be:
Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions.
This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception.
I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough.Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd like @Jon Alan Schmidt to weigh in (not on knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left out for now I think).I just remember @robert marty and @Edwina Taborsky (among others) telling me of such things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in itself's in(cognizablility).BestJack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Warning
This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe.
Jack, List:
John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1. Nevertheless, their resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair."
Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other representations are identical to the external things being perceived, cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal effect) is the normative measure of representational "success."
I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and helpful.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is sound (that's not the purpose here).interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics when it comes to general terminology.bestjack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>; Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)John, Jon, list,
We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant).Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this:
Premise 1: An object exists.
Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist.
Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity.
Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects.
Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion?ChatGPTBased on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be:
Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions.
This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception.
I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough.Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd like @Jon Alan Schmidt to weigh in (not on knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left out for now I think).I just remember @robert marty and @Edwina Taborsky (among others) telling me of such things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in itself's in(cognizablility).BestJack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 1:07 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Sunday, June 11, 2023 1:07 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Jon, John, list,
There is no Peircean Semeiotic, whatsoever - without the Kantian thing in itself. The object as thing must be in itself beyond all possible cognition and experience.
Now, two "individual representations" of the "same" object: H1[1O'])O(H2[2O']
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-----------------
)=experience, necessarily mediated, thus "representation/frame". "(" is but the corollary.
-----------------
Now, all H1 to all possible Os = sui generis, the same structure.
All H2 to all possible Os = sui generis, the same structure.
All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" or "represented" ("copied", Kant says) and thus, within cognition never can be as they are in themselves for the in itself is the very derivational "source" of the "copy/representational". It can be no simpler than that.
The very fact of difference is necessities by the conditions of existence (as Kant says). This means that we can understand individuality, even reproduction, insofar as we posit the thing in itself and its necessity. Cogito is aposteriori relative to this: to the very conditions for the possibility of existence (which we understand only through the physical appearance of things, represented to us/by us/through us, but necessarily not as they are in themselves even within these representations: cognitions which are object-derivational, never "object [thing] as it is in itself".
Peirce cannot posit the generation of interpretants/objects which correspond to semeiotic except that the above is true. It isn't possible for Peircean Semeiotic to be coherent except that thing in itself exists beyond all possible cognition. We can cognize that the thing in itself necessarily is, but we can never cognize what/how said thing (in itself) is in itself. For as we cognize any object, Peirce understands via [individual] representational modalities, we refract this individually - as many times as you like - wherein we make "copies" (representational) of the "object" as it is in itself which can only happen if it is in itself. Thus, axiomatic never alters.
The thing/object exists to/for people, but as individuals, we never derive the same "copy" of the thing, even the same thing. We may approximate something like consensus: fire is hot. Every person would seem to concur. But the capacity to agree, here, is necessitated by concurrence of individual experience of an objective quality which has to exist beyond the subjective representation of it.
1:The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself.
2:However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give
them two different representations of object 1.
JAS:
1: The two different [humans] do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself.
2: However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1.
Right, but all they perceive, all we perceive, is necesarily differentiated representation of the "same" object. What difference is there between these "two different representations" and the Kantian "copies" in the above?
"no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them."
Yes, but those things we cognize - physical - are necessarily independent of that cognition. In themselves. That's the categorical error people are making here.
I mean, what is direct perception if via direct perception "different [individual] perspectives" necessitate "[individual] representations" of the same object? How does that differ from the thing in itself?
Consider:
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-----------------------
Two perspectives, direct, but necessarily "individual" (thus mediated) of the "object":
"-- H1)O(H2 --".
"-- H1)O(H2 --".
Now, two "individual representations" of the "same" object: H1[1O'])O(H2[2O']
If "two different [people] do not perceive two different "copies" of [the object "O"], but [each] directly perceive the very same object [O] [as it is in] itself, then, how are "two different representations" [individual] of the "same" object, therefore necessitated?
For if the object is in itself, you can see, structurally and logically, why it is that Peirce's entire schema works. But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations" which differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual perspectives and faculties").
For if the object is in itself, you can see, structurally and logically, why it is that Peirce's entire schema works. But if the object is cognizable as it is in itself, (thus not in itself at all, in the Kantian sense), then there are no "copies" qua "representations" which differ according to individuality (according to "different perceptual perspectives and faculties").
Peirce is unwilling to pay the Kantian price but insofar as I can tell his entire schema cannot work, at all, (which it does, btw), unless you understand the necessity of that price (and thus I understand his admission of it, whether people agree or not, as his own understanding of Kant as actually accurate).
I have traced the nuance precisely, in longer form, yet to be published, as to where Peirce goes categorically wrong. That I will be happy to share. It is very nuanced. So nuanced as to be diaphanous. Thus, it's hardly a sin. It's a mind-boggling topic and whilst he was trained from an early age, and his semiotic remains the best, that training doesn't necessarily work in your favor if you need to think outside the box. Now that he did think outside the box is evident: but he is wrong insofar as he says you can cognize the thing in itself. It's just not true.
Jack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Warning
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Jack, List:
John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1. Nevertheless, their resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair."
Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other representations are identical to the external things being perceived, cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal effect) is the normative measure of representational "success."
I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and helpful.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is sound (that's not the purpose here).interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics when it comes to general terminology.bestjack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>; Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)John, Jon, list,
We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant).Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this:
Premise 1: An object exists.
Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist.
Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity.
Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects.
Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion?ChatGPTBased on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be:
Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions.
This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception.
I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough.Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd like @Jon Alan Schmidt to weigh in (not on knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left out for now I think).I just remember @robert marty and @Edwina Taborsky (among others) telling me of such things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in itself's in(cognizablility).BestJack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 11:09 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject:[EXTERNAL] [PEIRCE-L] Objects and Perception (was God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself))
Warning
This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is safe.
Jack, List:
John Shook's assessment of your latest argumentation is spot-on. The two different perceiving objects do not perceive two different "copies" of object 1, they both directly perceive the very same object 1 itself. However, their different perceptual perspectives and faculties give them two different representations of object 1. Nevertheless, their resulting perceptual judgments (initial cognitions) about object 1 might very well be the same, e.g., "That is a yellow chair."
Again, no one is claiming that perceptions, cognitions, and other representations are identical to the external things being perceived, cognized, or otherwise represented; and no one is disputing that those external things exist independently of those perceptions, cognitions, or other representations of them. The sign is not its dynamical object, nor does it affect its dynamical object. Instead, the dynamical object determines the sign to determine a dynamical interpretant (actual effect), and the degree to which the latter matches the final interpretant (ideal effect) is the normative measure of representational "success."
I am honestly not sure what you mean by "the interpretant/object generative which is here proven" and "the structural premise of much 'interpretant generation' in Peirce," but I hope that this is relevant and helpful.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:37 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:
edit: i did draw the conclusion for it, my mistake. but i think it is sound (that's not the purpose here).interpretant generation ala Peirce and dynamical objects is really what I'm after here (people's understanding of it). synthetising Kant and Peirce and I know a lot of each, but my knowledge of the second pales in specifics when it comes to general terminology.bestjack
From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
Sent: Saturday, June 10, 2023 9:30 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; s...@bestweb.net <s...@bestweb.net>; robert marty <robert.mart...@gmail.com>; Edwina Taborsky <edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>
Subject:Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] RE: God and the Universe (was The Thing In Itself)John, Jon, list,
We all agree, I think, that thing in itself exists (though we disagree as to systematicity - whether we can know it or not, i.e., Peirce/Kant).Just wanted list's opinion, generally, on this:
Premise 1: An object exists.
Premise 2: Two other perceiving objects exist.
Premise 3: These two perceiving objects perceive the same object (object 1) differently due to subjectivity.
Premise 4: Two "copies" of the form of object 1 exist in each of the perceiving objects.
Premise 5: These copies cannot be the object 1 as it is in itself, as they are copies. what is the conclusion?ChatGPTBased on the premises you provided, the conclusion would be:
Conclusion: The copies of object 1 perceived by the two perceiving objects cannot be the object itself as it exists independently of their perceptions.
This conclusion follows logically from the premises and highlights the distinction between the perceived copies of object 1 and the object itself. It suggests that the perceived copies are subjective representations or experiences of the object rather than being identical to the object as it exists independently of perception.
I didn't draw a conclusion for it (the machine) this time. It got there by itself. Learning, obviously, but true enough.Now, whether we agree or disagree about the knowability of the thing in itself, we can all surely agree about the interpretant/object generative which is here proven, also, in Peircean semeiotic? Isn't the above the structural premise of much "interpretant generation" in Peirce? Here I'd like @Jon Alan Schmidt to weigh in (not on knowability of the thing in itself, as we may never agree on that - I say no, you say yes, in ideal, or practically, that's fair enough, best left out for now I think).I just remember @robert marty and @Edwina Taborsky (among others) telling me of such things (and JAS has, himself, with Gangle, Colapietro, et al) gone into the mechanics of this extensively. Would just wonder what people make of it from within the Peircean semeiotic, now, not so much as to thing in itself's in(cognizablility).BestJack
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