Helmut, John, List I don’t know if there is a ‘widely accepted definition of consciousness’. I am referring to Peirce’s discussions of the term. I like his differentiation between the immediate and mediate consciousness. Notice that he refers to BOTH types as ‘consciousness’. That is, he doesn’t confine consciousness to the use of a symbolic modelling process.
IF one considers that all that is ‘existential’ functions within a triadic interaction, ie as a Sign, made up of O-R-I [object relation, representamen relation, interpretant relation], then, the immediate consciousness could be better classified as awareness - and we can understand this interaction to be composed of Relations within the mode of Secondness and/or Firstness. That is - I am assuming that consciousness emerges only within the operation of the mode of Thirdness. But certainly, an animal or plant is aware of its surroundings, whether it be the scent of a predator, or, an actual insect eating that plant’s leaves. That is - I am suggesting that Thirdness, that modelling process, functions in plants and animals as well as humans. An animal/plant can analyze or measure the incoming stimulus data from the Object against its internalized model - whether this knowledge base is genetic or learned] and come to an interpretation that ’this is X…and I’d better do Y”. Therefore - since Thirdness is functioning in this interaction - I’d call it consciousness, a mediated consciousness in this example.. So, I don’t think the fruit fly’s interaction is mechanical, but is both awareness [in a mode of 1ns and 2ns] but also, mediated consciousness, ie, in a mode of 3ns!!! But, again, to symbolically model these relations - I think this requires - symbolic methods, eg, mathematics, and language etc - and so far, only humans can do this!! Can a computer be ‘conscious’? It can certainly operate within the modes of 1ns and 2ns - in its most basic mechanical manner. It has a stored knowledge base against which it references incoming data, so, presumably, we’d have to say, this is operating within a mode of 3ns. According to our basic definition - it is ‘conscious’. It can make decisions on ‘what to do’. Can it learn? Apparently - yes. Can it translate its models into symbolic format? Yes. So- what we are talking about, with computers, might be, instead, not consciousness but instead- does a computer have any capacity for morality or ethics? Does it have the capacity to understand the difference between good and evil? I think those are the important questions. Edwina > On Aug 12, 2023, at 5:29 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear John, dear Edwina, dear all, > > is there a widely accepted definition of consciousness? If you say like > "Alex> My concept of consciousness would be an awareness of part of one's > thoughts and ability to reason about it", I think, "awareness" is equally > difficult to define, if not the same anyway. I don´ think it is the delay, > because delay between stimulus and reaction occurs in computers too. Also the > gathering of evidence by fruit flies is not awareness or consciousness, but > rather a purely mechanistic thing, including if-then-routines, like stimuli > rising to a certain level, and in connection with other levels of stimuli, a > reaction is set off. Reads like a computer program to me. But in Alex' quote > there is a kind of iteration, if you don´t say "awareness", but > "representation": The representation is represented. This representation too > is represented, this too, ad infinitum. But here a representation is a > (neural) depiction of a (representational) process. If there are neurons to > depict the infinity of this chain of representation, then the otherwise > infinite process is stopped and depicted/ represented too. I guess, this > stopping requires vagueness, because you can only overlook an infinity, if > you only vaguely represent it. But still I doubt, that this already is > consciousness. I think, a computer might be programmed this way, but I don´t > think it will be conscious then. In Alex` quote there also is the term > "reason". To reason about something, what is that? That is the next problem. > You need a reason to reason. The computer must have needs to have this > reason, and therefore it must have a body that has to be maintained and > sustained. So I think, a computer cannot be conscious, what you need is a > living thing, an organism. So I think, only organisms- with a highly > developed brain- can be conscious or aware, but computers, even robots, not. > > Best, > Helmut > > > Gesendet: Freitag, 11. August 2023 um 22:18 Uhr > Von: "John F Sowa" <[email protected]> > An: [email protected], "Peirce List" <[email protected]> > Betreff: [PEIRCE-L] Why vagueness is important > Dear All, > > This thread has attracted too many responses for me to save all of them. But > Mihai Nadin cited intriguing experimental evidence that fruit flies "think" > before they act (copy below). I also found a web site that says more:about > the experimental methods: > https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2014-05-22-fruit-flies-think-they-act . See > excerpts at the end of this note. > > Ricardo Sanz> My initial question about the difference between > "consciousness" and "awareness" is still there. > > The distinction between consciousness and awareness is very clear: Awareness > can be detected by experimental methods, as in the experiments with fruit > flies. Thinking (or some kind of mental processing) can be detected by a > delay between stimulus and response. But nobody has found any experimental > evidence for consciousness, not even in humans. > > We assume consciousness in our fellow humans because we all belong to the > same species. But we have no way to detect consciousness in humans who have > suffered some kinds of neural impairment. We suspect that animals that > behave like us may be conscious, but we don't know. And there is zero > evidence that computer systems, whose circuitry is radically different from > human brains can be conscious. > > Ricardo> I agree that "vagueness" is an essential, necessary aspect to be > dealt with. But it is not the central one. The central one is "the agent > models its reality". > > Those are different topics. A model of some subject (real or imaginary) is > a structure of some kind (image, map, diagram, or physical system) that > represents important aspects of some subject. Vagueness is a property of > some language or notation that is derived from the model. What is central > depends on the interests of some agent that is using the model and the > language for some purpose. > > Furthermore, vagueness is not a problem "to be dealt with". It's a valuable > property of natural language. In my previous note, I mentioned three > logicians and scientists -- Peirce, Whitehead, and Wittgenstein -- who > recognized that an absolutely precise mathematical or logical statement is > almost certain to be false. But a statement that allows some degree of error > (vagueness) is much more likely to be true and useful for communication and > application. > > Mathematical precision increases the probability that errors will be > detected. When the errors are found, they can be corrected/ But if no > errors are found, it's quite likely that nobody is using the theory for any > practical purpose.. > > Jerry Chandler> You may wish to consider the distinctions between the > methodology of the chemical sciences from that of mathematics and whatever > the views of various “semantic” ontologies might project for quantification > of grammars by algorithms. > > Chemistry is an excellent example of the issues of precision and vagueness, > and it's the one in which Peirce learned many of his lessons about > experimental methodology. Organic chemistry is sometimes called "the > science of side effects" because nearly every method for producing desired > molecules will produce a large number of unwanted molecules.. And minor > variations in the initial conditions may have a huge effect on the yield of > the desired results. Textbooks that describe the reactions tend to be > vague about the percentages because they can vary widely as the technology is > developed.. > > Jerry> What are the formal logical relationships between the precision of the > atomic numbers as defined by Rutherford and logically deployed by Rutherford > and the syntax of a “formal ontology” in this questionable form of artificial > semantics? > > For any subject of any kind, a good ontology should be developed by a > collaboration of .experts in the subject matter with experts in developing > and using ontologies. The quality of an ontology would depend on the > expertise of both kinds of experts. > > Doug Foxvog> Is there some kind of model of the external world in an insect > mind? Sure -- the insect uses such model to find its way back "home". But > does the insect have a model of its own mind? Probably not. > > A Tarski style model may be represented by predicates, functions, and names > of things in the subject matter and two kinds of logical operators: > conjunction (AND) and the existential quantifier (There exists an x such > that...). > > For most applications, subject matter experts typically add images and > diagrams. For people, those images and diagrams make the model easier to > understand. For formal analysis and computing, those images and diagrams > would be mapped to predicates, functions, and names, which are related by > conjunctions and existentially quantified names. > > Doug> We can create an ontology of models such that "mental model" could > designate either #$ModelOfExternalityInAMind or #$ModelOfOnesOwnMind. These > would be different concepts. > > If you consider minds as things in the world, this reduces to the previous > definition. The psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird wrote a book and many > articles about mental models. I cite him frequently in my writings, and I > use the term 'mental model' in the same sense as his publications. > > Alex Shkotin> What relationship exists between consciousness and anticipatory > processes? > > As Michai Nadin wrote, "None;" I agree with his discussion and references. > > Alex> My concept of consciousness would be an awareness of part of one's > thoughts and ability to reason about it. > > But that would only enable the researcher to detect his or her own > consciousness. That method would be useless for a theory about non-human > animals or robots. > > Alex> def consciousness. The ability to generate, modify, and use mental > models as the basis for perception, thought, action, and communication. > > That definition would enable humans to develop theories about human > consciousness. And they do that. But it does not enable humans to observe > and develop theories about consciousness in any non-human things. > > You might make a conjecture about consciousness in apes, since they are very > closely related to humans. . You might extend that conjecture to other > animals, but you can't be certain. And there is no way that you could extend > that conjecture to computer systems, which have no resemblance whatever to > human thinking processes. > > John > > From: "Nadin, Mihai" <[email protected]> > Dear and respected colleagues, > > Always impressed by the level of dialog between the two of you. Sometimes > amused, when the limits of knowledge are reached. Will only quote from a > recent publication (of course, I remain focused on anticipatory processes, a > subject which, so far, did not make it into your conversations): > > Fruit flies 'think' before they act, a study by researchers from the > University of Oxford's Centre for Neural Circuits and Behaviour suggests. The > neuroscientists showed that fruit flies take longer to make more difficult > decisions. > > In experiments asking fruit flies <http://phys.org/tags/fruit+flies/> to > distinguish between ever closer concentrations of an odour, the researchers > found that the flies don't act instinctively or impulsively. Instead they > appear to accumulate information before committing to a choice. > > Gathering information before making a decision has been considered a sign of > higher intelligence, like that shown by primates and humans. > > 'Freedom of action from automatic impulses is considered a hallmark of > cognition or intelligence,' says Professor Gero Miesenböck, in whose > laboratory the new research was performed. 'What our findings show is that > fruit flies have a surprising mental capacity that has previously been > unrecognised. > > ___________________________________ > Excerpts from > https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2014-05-22-fruit-flies-think-they-act > > The researchers observed Drosophila fruit flies make a choice between two > concentrations of an odor presented to them from opposite ends of a narrow > chamber, having been trained to avoid one concentration. > > When the odor concentrations were very different and easy to tell apart, the > flies made quick decisions and almost always moved to the correct end of the > chamber. > > When the odour concentrations were very close and difficult to distinguish, > the flies took much longer to make a decision, and they made more mistakes. > > The researchers found that mathematical models developed to describe the > mechanisms of decision making in humans and primates also matched the > behaviour of the fruit flies. > > The scientists discovered that fruit flies with mutations in a gene called > FoxP took longer than normal flies to make decisions when odours were > difficult to distinguish – they became indecisive. > > The researchers tracked down the activity of the FoxP gene to a small cluster > of around 200 neurons out of the 200,000 neurons in the brain of a fruit fly. > This implicates these neurons in the evidence-accumulation process the flies > use before committing to a decision. > > Dr Shamik DasGupta, the lead author of the study, explains: 'Before a > decision is made, brain circuits collect information like a bucket collects > water. Once the accumulated information has risen to a certain level, the > decision is triggered. When FoxP is defective, either the flow of information > into the bucket is reduced to a trickle, or the bucket has sprung a leak.' > > Fruit flies have one FoxP gene, while humans have four related FoxP genes. > Human FoxP1 and FoxP2 have previously been associated with language and > cognitive development. The genes have also been linked to the ability to > learn fine movement sequences, such as playing the piano. > > 'We don't know why this gene pops up in such diverse mental processes as > language, decision-making and motor learning,' says Professor Miesenböck. > However, he speculates: 'One feature common to all of these processes is that > they unfold over time. FoxP may be important for wiring the capacity to > produce and process temporal sequences in the brain.' > > Professor Miesenböck adds: 'FoxP is not a "language gene", a "decision-making > gene", even a "temporal-processing" or "intelligence" gene. Any such > description would in all likelihood be wrong. What FoxP does give us is a > tool to understand the brain circuits involved in these processes. It has > already led us to a site in the brain that is important in decision-making. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply > All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of > the message and nothing in the body. 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