Mary, List:

To clarify, Peirce's mature mathematical conception of a continuum is
"top-down" in the sense that the whole is real and the parts are *entia
rationis*, as opposed to a "bottom-up" conception in which the parts are
real and the whole is an *ens rationis*. Moreover, the whole is
indeterminate (3ns), while the parts are indefinite (1ns) unless and until
they are deliberately marked off as actual (2ns). I explain this in detail
in my paper, "Peirce's Topical Continuum: A 'Thicker' Theory" (
https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPTC-2.pdf).

Applying this to the entire universe, conceiving it as a *semiosic *continuum,
is my own proposal as an implication of Peirce's thoroughgoing synechism.
In accordance with his speculative grammar, every sign indeed requires
something to be ontologically prior to it, namely, the dynamical object
that determines it. Accordingly, I understand the universe as one immense
sign to be not only a *topical *continuum as described above, but also
a *hyperbolic
*continuum as shown in the diagram below--proceeding from God the Creator
as the Absolute First, its dynamical object in the infinite past; through
every measurable state of the universe as the mediating Third, the sign
itself at any assignable date; toward God completely revealed as the
Absolute Second, its final interpretant in the infinite future.

CSP: The starting-point of the universe, God the Creator, is the Absolute
First; the terminus of the universe, God completely revealed, is the
Absolute Second; every state of the universe at a measurable point of time
is the third. If you think the measurable is all there is, and deny it any
definite tendency whence or whither, then you are considering the pair of
points that makes the absolute to be imaginary and are an Epicurean. If you
hold that there is a definite drift to the course of nature as a whole, but
yet believe its absolute end is nothing but the Nirvana from which it set
out, you make the two points of the absolute to be coincident, and are a
pessimist. But if your creed is that the whole universe is approaching in
the infinitely distant future a state having a general character different
from that toward which we look back in the infinitely distant past, you
make the absolute to consist in two distinct real points and are an
evolutionist. (CP 1.362, EP 1:251, 1887-8)

CSP: In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are
possible.
1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even
ideal. Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point,
has no definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.
2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one
universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the
very same nothingness from which it advances.
3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion;
nature has ideal end different from its origin. (CP 6.582, 1890)


[image: image.png]

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Dec 6, 2023 at 12:03 PM Mary Libertin <mary.liber...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jon,
>
> Your presentation corrects what I consider to be a major misconception.
> The categories are contextual, based on “the relevant relations among
> them.” 1ns and 2ns are not building blocks for 3ns.
>
> But I do have a question about your last paragraph, wherein you describe
> Peirce’s conception of the continuum of existents as “a top-down
> conception.” In what way is the whole “ontologically” prior to its parts?
> You mention that the parts are indefinite, I agree. But I also believe the
> whole is indefinite. A point on a continuum can contain infinity; I think
> Peirce states or implies this in his discussion of continua. In such
> situations, can a part, contextually, as part of a semiotic process,
> semiosis, can a part contain the whole in terms of its “purpose”, a purpose
> which is developing? Is anything ontologically prior in semiosis?
>
> Thanks for your focus on these issues and for any further comments.
>
> Mary Libertin
>
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