List

1]First - I think you should follow your own advice - about Dynamic 
Interpretants and Immediate Interpretants.I did NOT say that "every "individual 
and current personal reading of Peirce" is equally valid”.

I said that each of us interprets Peirce’s writings, within a semiosic triad, 
particular to their own knowledge base. As to which of these interpretations is 
‘valid’ - that’s for the ‘community of scholars to affirm. Not the individual 
author of that interpretation.

2] You wrote this example:

> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real.
> P2. God is possibly real.
> C1. Therefore, God is actually real.

This is called the Fallacy of Circular Reasoning, where the conclusion [god is 
actually real] is used as a premise. And also - a version of the Fallacy of 
denying the antecedent. 

An example would be:
If it does not rain then my car will not be wet.
My car is wet
Therefore it did rain. [No, the sprinkler was on]. 

3] You wrote this example:

> P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real.
> C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real.


This is in my view, fallacious due to ambiguity,  since it merges the two terms 
of ‘possibly’ and ’necessarily’. 

Again - these are your BELIEFS- about the universe, god, etc- and no-one is 
going to discuss your beliefs with you… The problem is, I feel, that you seem 
to want to pull Peirce into being a supporter of these beliefs - and this 
mightn’t be warranted.

Edwina



> On Aug 28, 2024, at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> As it happens, I have recently been studying the writings of Anselm of 
> Canterbury, initially prompted by an online article about his definition of 
> truth as "rectitude" 
> (https://www.theconservativereformer.com/articles/anselm-truth). He applies 
> it not only to statements and opinions, but also to the will, actions, the 
> senses, and the being of things. This is possible because each of these 
> possesses rectitude, and thus is true, just in case it conforms to its 
> God-given purpose, which for any statement or opinion is "signifying that 
> what-is is”--reminiscent of Peirce's assertion, "The purpose of every sign is 
> to express 'fact,' and by being joined with other signs, to approach as 
> nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect 
> Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) 
> would be the very Universe" (EP 2:304, c. 1901).
> 
> As for the so-called ontological argument, a name not coined by Anselm 
> himself, the dismissive summary below is an all-too-common caricature--if it 
> were that simple to refute, then we would not still be discussing it nearly a 
> thousand years after its introduction. For one thing, Anselm was not seeking 
> to "prove" the existence/reality of God to anyone--his original title of 
> Proslogion, the work in which it appears, was Faith Seeking Understanding; 
> and its literary form is that of a lengthy prayer addressed to God himself, 
> not a philosophical treatise aimed at persuading unbelievers. It is an 
> exposition of the concept of God as "that than which nothing greater can be 
> thought," such that anyone who genuinely comprehends it purportedly cannot 
> help but conceive of such a being as real. Presumably, that is why some 
> Peirce scholars have classified his "Neglected Argument" as ontological, but 
> I disagree with them--I consider it to be cosmological, since the hypothesis 
> of God's reality arises as a proposed explanation of the origin and order of 
> our existing universe.
> 
> It turns out that Peirce himself devotes several paragraphs to summarizing 
> Anselm's ontological argument in one of his earliest writings, his sixth 
> Lowell Lecture in 1866 (W 1:446-448); attached are images of those pages from 
> the Internet Archive 
> (https://archive.org/details/writingsofcharle0001peir/page/446/mode/2up). He 
> suggests that the strongest point against it is that "all that a definition 
> says or as a definition can say is not how a thing exists but of what sort it 
> would be if it were to exist," so it "rests upon a confusion between would be 
> and is, between being thought and being"; and that the strongest point in its 
> favor is "That an ideal of a God is required to bring our general conceptions 
> to unity is admitted on all hands. And that ideal God would not be such 
> unless it were regarded as having existence and therefore it constitutes a 
> hypothesis of a real God and as this hypothesis is required in every state of 
> Cognition, its truth is constituted thereby."
> 
> More recent commentators have often sought to translate Anselm's ontological 
> argument into formal modal logic, and Andrzej Biłat even offers this 
> "simplest relevant version" that does not require any modal operators 
> (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-020-02908-5).
> 
> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real.
> P2. God is possibly real.
> C1. Therefore, God is actually real.
> 
> P1 and P2 both seem quite plausible, and C1 follows from them by modus 
> tollens. However, P1 is logically equivalent to this less plausible 
> formulation.
> 
> P1a. If God is possibly real, then God is actually real.
> 
> The underlying idea is that God is defined as necessary being, so if God is 
> real in some possible world, then God is real in every possible world, 
> including the actual world. This is more accurately expressed as follows.
> 
> P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real.
> C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real.
> 
> C2 follows from P2 and P3 by modus ponens, and C1 can then be derived from C2 
> in accordance with modal axiom T--if God is necessarily real, then God is 
> actually real--which is uncontroversial and corresponds directly to Peirce's 
> permission in the Gamma part of Existential Graphs to convert any oddly 
> enclosed broken cut into a solid cut. However, P3 is even less plausible than 
> P1a. The heart of the matter is revealed by these formulations that are 
> logically equivalent to P3.
> 
> P3a. God's reality is either necessary or impossible.
> P3b. God is not both possibly real and possibly not real.
> 
> In summary, the persuasiveness of such modal ontological arguments boils down 
> to finding it more plausible that God's reality is necessary than that it is 
> impossible, and/or finding it more plausible that God is possibly real than 
> that God is possibly not real. An upshot of P3b is that what Gary Mar calls 
> "notional agnosticism" 
> (https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1563&context=faithandphilosophy),
>  where God's reality is treated as contingent, is not a rational alternative 
> given the definition of God as Ens necessarium.
> 
> Finally, it will surprise no one who is paying attention that I flatly reject 
> the self-defeating claim that every "individual and current personal reading 
> of Peirce" is equally valid. Otherwise, I could assert that he was a devout 
> confessional Lutheran Christian, and no one could challenge me--not even by 
> providing multiple quotations where he blatantly contradicts such a 
> description. Our proper goal when reading his texts, or those of any other 
> author, is to conform our individual dynamical interpretants to the final 
> interpretant of those texts--how an infinite community would understand them 
> after infinite investigation. The first step is making sure that our 
> individual dynamical interpretants are consistent with the immediate 
> interpretant of those texts--the meaning of the words themselves in 
> accordance with their definitions, rules of grammar, context, etc., i.e., 
> "what his own words plainly assert." This is the sense in which logic as 
> semeiotic is a normative science.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2024 at 6:49 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> Helmut, List 
>> 
>> Just a further point about your reference to Anselm - who uses the 
>> ontological argument to ‘prove’ the existence of God. I consider this a 
>> circular argument [ and thus, invalid] - ie, to declare that ’IF the 
>> greatest possible being exists in the mind, THEN it must also exist in 
>> reality…ie..the Cartesian notion of a ‘clear and distinct idea’. And the 
>> concepts of an a priori necessary causality  But, after all, this 
>> ontological argument can be used to prove the existence of anything - even 
>> unicorns and witches.
>> 
>> As for JAS’s sentence -  This is not "my reading of Peirce," it is what his 
>> own words plainly assert.” - No- any conclusion any of us come to - since 
>> Peirce is no longer here - has to be derived from our personal reading of 
>> Peirce. There is no such thing as ‘his own words plainly assert’, There is 
>> only what our individual and current personal reading of those words 
>> conclude.
>> 
>> Edwina
> <Peirce 1866 - Lowell Lecture VI on Anselm.pdf>_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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