JAS, List But - Peirce, in 1.412, does indeed very specifically outline how the three categories ‘come into being’ from Nothing. So, contrary to your interpretation, I think it’s quite proper to ‘ascribe this belief’ to him.
As for your arguments about ponens and tollens [both are modus] - if your premises are false due to circularity or ambiguity or.., then the logical validity is totally irrelevant. You can hardly want to ‘prove’ an assertion by its logical format alone; your premises must have value of truth. Otherwise, I could ‘prove’ anything - such as the existence of unicorns and .. If horses exist, then unicorns exist. Horses exist Therefore, unicorns exist. Finally - The ambiguity comes from the merger of ‘possible’ and ’necessary’…which makes the ‘god' argument false. Edwina > On Aug 28, 2024, at 10:01 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > List: > > Regarding #1 below, my point is simply that we can properly ascribe beliefs > to Peirce that he explicitly endorses, such as God being Ens necessarium, > "Really creator of all three Universes of Experience"; and we cannot properly > ascribe contradictory beliefs to him, such as the three universes (and > corresponding categories) being eternal or somehow coming into being from > absolutely nothing. > > Regarding #2 below, the following argument is deductively valid--if both > premisses are true, then the conclusion must also be true. > > P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real. > P2. God is possibly real. > C1. Therefore, God is actually real. > > It is neither circular (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circular_reasoning) nor > question-begging (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question), > because C1 is not already assumed in P1 or P2. Denying the antecedent after > denying the consequent is not a fallacy, it is (as I said) the classical > inference rule called modus tollens > (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollens). Accordingly, the following > argument is also deductively valid. > > If it does not rain then my car will not be wet. > My car is wet > Therefore it did rain. > > If my car is wet because the sprinkler was on, not because it rained, then > the first premiss is false--the argument is still valid, but unsound. > Likewise, the only way that C1 could be false is if either P1 or P2 is false. > > Regarding #3 below, the following argument is also deductively valid. > > P2. God is possibly real. > P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real. > C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real. > > This is (as I said) the classical inference rule called modus ponens > (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_ponens). There is no ambiguity here > because "possibly" has exactly the same meaning in P2 and P3, and > "necessarily" has exactly the same meaning in P3 and C2. Again, the only way > that C2 could be false is if either P2 or P3 is false. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > On Wed, Aug 28, 2024 at 6:56 PM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> List >> >> 1]First - I think you should follow your own advice - about Dynamic >> Interpretants and Immediate Interpretants.I did NOT say that "every >> "individual and current personal reading of Peirce" is equally valid”. >> >> I said that each of us interprets Peirce’s writings, within a semiosic >> triad, particular to their own knowledge base. As to which of these >> interpretations is ‘valid’ - that’s for the ‘community of scholars to >> affirm. Not the individual author of that interpretation. >> >> 2] You wrote this example: >>> P1. If God is not actually real, then God is not possibly real. >>> P2. God is possibly real. >>> C1. Therefore, God is actually real. >> >> This is called the Fallacy of Circular Reasoning, where the conclusion [god >> is actually real] is used as a premise. And also - a version of the Fallacy >> of denying the antecedent. >> >> An example would be: >> If it does not rain then my car will not be wet. >> My car is wet >> Therefore it did rain. [No, the sprinkler was on]. >> >> 3] You wrote this example: >>> P3. If God is possibly real, then God is necessarily real. >>> C2. Therefore, God is necessarily real. >> >> This is in my view, fallacious due to ambiguity, since it merges the two >> terms of ‘possibly’ and ’necessarily’. >> >> Again - these are your BELIEFS- about the universe, god, etc- and no-one is >> going to discuss your beliefs with you… The problem is, I feel, that you >> seem to want to pull Peirce into being a supporter of these beliefs - and >> this mightn’t be warranted. >> >> Edwina > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
