Edwina, List, ET: I am not going to deal with the concept of god - since I consider it a belief that one either accepts or rejects, and thus, outside the realm of scientific or even logical examination. [the logic tends to be circular] - but some of your phrases made me think of Peirce’s foundational argument for pragmaticism: GR: And yet Peirce wrote not infrequently of God (so capitalized) and not only in A Neglected Argument. And, of course, Peirce, an extraordinary logician and scientist, believed in God and thought that a scientific metaphysics could prove his hypothesis of the reality of God. (I no longer write 'Him' for God, for I consider that a word more suitable for theology than for religious metaphysics).
ET (quoting Peirce): “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conc eption of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object [5.438]. GR: In the N.A. and elsewhere Peirce discusses the potential *pragmatic *benefits to humanity of a belief in God should it be proved, linking such belief to practical outcomes, intellectual satisfaction, moral grounding, and more. "If God Really be.. . in view of the generally conceded truth that religion, were it but proved, [it] would be a good outweighing all others. . ." (in the N.A.) CSP ET: To me, this means that, as Peirce pointed out with his support of objective idealism rather than idealism [ 6.24], that reality requires at some time, a movement into discrete existentially or ‘really being'. That is, the universe does not operate within only the generalities of Thirdness [ or even the qualities of Firstness] but requires Secondness. GR: As I have argued here, perhaps somewhat differently than JAS and, possibly differently from Peirce, the Blackboard analogy in the last of the 1898 Cambridge Lectures suggests to me that 'before' the putative 'Big Bang' that an ur-continuity allowed for a omnipotent and omniscient being, viz., God, to 'scribe' all three Universal categories upon that proto-cosmic 'blackboard'' these, then, in Gottes Zeit these burst forth into the trichotomic semiotic cosmic being which is our Universe. As has been repeatedly argued here by me and others, that 'nothing' preceding the putative (for me, alleged) Big Bang is *not* the empty "nothing of negation" (as Peirce phrases it), but rather is an open and indeterminate state of primordial generative possibility: everything in general; nothing in particular: 'ideas' for a universe yet to be. On the primordial blackboard is 'scribed' those characters or 'ideas' (Peirce says, 'Platonic ideas') which out of an infinite number of characters will together form the building blocks of this, our, Universe. (Btw, to refer to 'Platonic ideas' is not to suggest that Peirce was a Platonist but merely to suggest, as Peirce does, out of an infinite number of these universal forms, only some will serve in the structuring of *this *cosmos. In the proto-cosmos they are real, but not existent). ET: I understand the term of ‘reality’ as a reference to the general mode of organization - and thus, conclude that this ‘general’, though real in the sense that it is not a subjective or intellectual [ human] concept cannot be ‘real’ unless articulated within actualities. GR: In my understanding, Peirce means by reality not "the general mode of organization" (that would tend to reduce reality to existence). Rather: "The real is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you." But you are surely right in suggesting that for most practical purposes this asymptotic agreement in the long run on any given Truth of Reality requires an existential world. But precedes the creation of the world -- the universe -- is unique. By saying "God is really creator of all three universes," Peirce expresses his metaphysical view that in which God is the origin of everything, 1ns, possibility, 2ns, actuality, and 3ns, law, and is necessary for there to be cosmic coherence and unity. ET: That is - hypotheses remain abstract concepts - and thus, in the human species which alone uses symbolic concepts, GR: But you yourself have argued that Peirce held a rather expansive view of Mind, seeing it as present not only in human symbolic thought, but also in natural processes and patterns. Mind can be found wherever there's a tendency to form habits or to act in ways that produce regularity. And it is this viewpoint which I consider to be the basis of *objective idealism*. You have occasionally offered Peirce's examples of bees building hives and and crystals growing in structured forms. So, in short, Mind is present in any process where habits or regularities develop (including evolutionary development which involves the change in habits and so involves 1ns along with 2ns and 3ns). In a semiotic universe pervaded by a trichotomy of sign relations, nature can even exhibit forms of representation: bees can ' interpret” the environment to build hives or to find food, and crystals can 'interpret” chemical conditions to grow in structured ways, some proving essential to life processes. But again, the case of the Reality of God is unique and extraordinary. Peirce writing that "God is really creator of all three universes" is not only attributing the creation of all three universal categories to God but commencing his argumentation (in the N.A.) with the necessary reality of a Ens Necessarium as a testable hypothesis which he outlines in that article (and its Additmaents) and so confronts your assertion that "these concepts if left as such without any movement into scientific empiricism, remain confined to their rhetorical ideology" E.T. Of course it is possible to find Peirce's argumentation in the N.A. unpersuasive and some scholars have. Still, the N.A. is meant to initiate a unique investigation into the Reality of God and its argumentation seems to me solid enough, Yet, as you know, I have found other work by Peirce conducive to a view of the cosmos as panentheism and so concluded my lengthy post of 9/18 outlining that viewpoint thusly: In a word, a panentheistic vision, particularly with its emphasis on the cosmos as an *integral sign* (*uni*verse) which is in turn an *evolving complexus of signs*, offers an argument for both theists and atheists to find common ground. It allows for a view of reality that is suffused with meaning, structured by logic, and compatible with scientific inquiry, while also retaining space for religious awe and wonder. This approach can serve as a bridge, fostering dialogue and understanding across traditionally opposing worldviews. -ET: [Certain beliefs] can, of course, become dangerous, as they did in the medieval Christian era of which claims, heresy, inquisitions. GR: Well, Peirce -- and we critical thinking postmoderns -- are far past that (although there are plenty people in the world who aren't and who, for example, have turned even the ethical principles of Christianity -- such as brother-/sisterly love, inclusion, compassion, mercy, forgiveness, humility, justice etc. -- on their heads. On the other hand, I have witnessed in recent years an overgeneralization of the *worst* of religion -- and not only as it currently appears in some forms of Christianity, but also in Judaism, Islam, Hinduism. Meanwhile, dictators, tyrants, and would-be autocrats get 'off the hook' relatively speaking. I personally know many good Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus. But, as a book by Kathleen Nott put it many years ago, the problem is that "The Good Want Power," where 'want' here means 'lack'. Meanwhile, there are indeed many deluded religionists. ET; My point is that Peirce’s work is founded on pragmaticism and objective idealism and thus - I don’t see how outlines describing purely idealist concepts fit in with this work. GR: I have tried to address your point as well as I could in my comments above. I doubt that I will have convinced you of many -- if any -- of my points. Best, Gary R On Fri, Oct 25, 2024 at 9:59 AM Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Gary R, List > > I am not going to deal with the concept of god - since I consider it a > belief that one either accepts or rejects, and thus, outside the realm of > scientific or even logical examination. [the logic tends to be circular] - > but some of your phrases made me think of Peirce’s foundational argument > for pragmaticism: > > “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, > you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception > of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object [5.438]. > > To me, this means that, as Peirce pointed out with his support of > objective idealism rather than idealism [ 6.24], that reality requires at > some time, a movement into discrete existentially or ‘really being'. That > is, the universe does not operate within only the generalities of Thirdness > [ or even the qualities of Firstness] but requires Secondness. > > I understand the term of ‘reality’ as a reference to the general mode of > organization - and thus, conclude that this ‘general’, though real in the > sense that it is not a subjective or intellectual [ human] concept cannot > be ‘real’ unless articulated within actualities. > > That is - hypotheses remain abstract concepts - and thus, in the human > species which alone uses symbolic concepts, these concepts if left as such > without any movement into scientific empiricism, remain confined to their > rhetorical ideology. One can maintain them as such [ ie, the > belief/hypothesis of the reality of bad luck numbers] . Or one can move > them into the empirical realm of testing [ the acknowledgment that bacteria > exist and cause illness]. > > Or- if left as hypotheses/beliefs - They can, of course, become dangerous, > as they did in the medieval Christian era of which claims, > heresy, inquisitions. > > My point is that Peirce’s work is founded on pragmaticism and objective > idealism and thus - I don’t see how outlines describing purely idealist > concepts fit in with this work. > > Edwina > > > > > > > > On Oct 24, 2024, at 3:53 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Helmut, Jon, List, > > HR: ". . .there is the "distinction of being thought and really being" > GR: Peirce claims that this is not the case for God. CSP: ". . . it may > be said that the distinction of *being thought* and *really being* does > not exist in the case of deity. . ." For after all 'God' is 'o*ur* God' > even if one conceives of God cosmically as both Jon and I do. > > And it is fairly easy to imagine a far distant point in humankind's > history where there was *no* thought of God (no abduction: 'there is > God') despite God's timeless Reality. > > And the definition of God as "Ens Necessarium" is, after, a hypothetical > one, and Peirce's God in 'A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God' is a > hypothetical God. You can imagine in that essay that Peirce imagines that a > future scientific metaphysics might make some headway towards proving his > hypothesis. That certainly seems to be what Jon is up to. > > HR: ". . . the truth exists before, or without being "constituted". . ." > GR: *Reality* is such as it is no matter what anyone, or any group (even > of scientists), or any community or society thinks it is. But the Truth of > Reality is discovered along the way (as it is paradigmatically discovered > in science), but in the long run or, rather, asymptotically approached. > > HR: "[is there simply an] announcement of achieved knowledge? > GR: All knowledge is fallible. But there are some things which seem fairly > scientifically secured, for example, that water is H2O. But that 'certain > truth' could possibly be overturned in some future rigorous investigation. > Peirce once suggested that even 1 + 1 = 2 might not necessarily hold up in > future far reaching investigation. > > HR: I mean, God existed before organisms capable of "thought" existed, or > not? > GR: Despite the necessity of the use of the word 'is' even when discussing > God, Peirce made it clear that to say that God 'exists' is fetishistic. God > is not an existential 'thing' like other 'things' in the universe. God, > however *is* 'Real. Now what is meant by saying 'God is Real' is another, > far reaching discussion. > > What I personally think that Peirce is getting at is that a 'real > definition' of God -- Peirce's definition being, 'Ens Necessarium' -- is > required to get the investigation going. > > I might add that while Jon and I disagree on certain significant points > relating to religious metaphysics, we are both attempting to approach the > topic scientifically. So was Peirce, of course. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > > >
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