Gary, Tori, List: A very brief response before departing on a extensive trip.
1. The term 'mechanism' is used in both physics and chemistry but the meanings are radically different. Mechanism in chemistry and biology are not expressed in sense of "information processing" and may involve a huge number of encodings and decodings of primary information - for example, the notion of "the mechanism of reproduction" could span pre-gestational, gestational and post-gestational sequences of processes. The codes of life routinely handle such "mechanisms". 2. Biosemiotic systems are always poised to act, it is more than a tendency, it is a necessity. Now, the consequence to the biosemiotic system of receiving the sign / signal may be nothing more than a trivial perturbation or it may as dramatic as the risk of the "fight or flight" category. Context. 3. Tori sentences : > What I don't understand is what Jerry means by this: a living system > "acquire[s] signs from its current situation." Jerry presents this as the > argument he rejects, but I don't know whose argument that is or what it means > to acquire signs from the current situation. I also can't conceive of "the > mere mental" that doesn't involve physical action at some level, > electro-chemical reactions and selection processes. A deep communications problem here. I am not rejecting an argument that I have presented. Every biosemiotic system has sensory systems that are genetically designed (encoded) to respond to the external world. The capacity of sensory systems varies widely - dogs smell, owl / eagle vision, etc. I used the term "mere mental" because human experience is vastly richer than merely our mental response to a situation or circumstance. Consider the individual who mentally enjoys the experience of rich foods and alcohol in excess. The chemical experience of such foods and alcohol in excess have health consequences not directly associated with the pleasures of eating. I do not have time to address the more complicated issue of "universal language". I personally do not believe in "universal languages" and firmly reject the claims of physicists that they have somehow describes 'universal laws'. (Such claims arise from ignorance of the nature of inductive reasoning in mathematics. Induction is not magic, it is an intensional extension of the ostension of symbols.) Indeed, I published a paper postulating the existence of several separate and distinct logic symbol systems which use the same symbols with different ostension in the different systems. In simple terms, the human genetic system is capable of "multi-tasking" with various formal symbol systems and translating among the distinctive codes. For example, it is not rare to find linguist that translate among 10 or more grammars and styles of utterances. Molecular biologists translate among four symbol systems - genetics, biochemistry, mathematics (physics) and their mother tongue. I gotta run now. Hope this clarifies the hurried note a bit. Cheers Jerry On Aug 17, 2011, at 7:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Tori, Jerry, list, > > While you are quite right, Tori, that one shouldn't comment on a paper of > which one's only read the abstract, still one ought to be able to comment on > the Abstract; and even if, as in your post, you found the comment (of Jerry) > more interesting than it was. So, to make amends, I will order the copy of > Semiotica in which Fabbrichesi's article appears and read it (even though > your 'translation' of "universal language" as "universal semiosis" seems to > me a bit too generous, not to mention unlikely, Tori, given the Leibniz > association Fabbrichesi makes). > > Of course the point you were trying to make, Jerry, was exactly what was of > most interest to Tori, and should have been to me. But I apparently had such > a negative reaction to the title of Fabbrichesi's paper and to it's Abstract, > that it suggested to me a quite intolerably wrong way to interpret Peirce. Of > course this is not for a moment to suggest that there is only one 'right' > way, but that some approaches appear to me to be, well, anti-Peirce (not > creatively criticizing him but, rather, willfully opposing exactly what his > thinking could pragmatically contribute to the resolution of certain problems > in, for example, biosemiotics). > > Sometimes one ought to read a paper because someone whom you respect > recommends it. So, since I very much respect you and your work, Jerry, I will > attempt to move past the Abstract and try to get to your point, your > "idiosyncratic view of teleology." > > But, before discussing your ideas, Jerry, I'd like to remark, Tori, that I > think that you are right on target in noting that "languages are certainly > not universal, as they evolve in time and in environments, but the mechanisms > underlying semiosis may well be, and probably are, universal. By mechanisms I > just mean the different ways habit-taking sets in, by different kinds of > association and selection [emphasis added by me]." > > So, bouncing off your rather profound idea: As I'm beginning to understand it > in relation to biosemiotics, such habits as lead to predictable > behavior/conduct would seem to be of two distinct types, although they both > partake of all virtually all the characters of habituation, apparently, such > as habit-taking/breaking, a kind of reality in futuro, etc., etc. > Nonetheless, one of these two might be characterized as natural (the "laws of > nature"); the other might be considered as artificial or, perhaps, > conventional (languages, disciplines, arts, customs, etc. ). So, despite > their both being ways of habituation, "inborn" and "acquired" habits may be > clearly distinguished. See, esp., "Peircean habits and the life of symbols," > Eliseo Fernandez, 2011 > http://www.lindahall.org/services/reference/papers/fernandez/Peirce_habits.pdf > > So bridging that distinction represents an extraordinary challenge for > biosemiotics, and I would rather that it take it up rather than argue for a > kind of dualism in the matter. Moving now to Jerry's ideas in the post: Tori, > you wrote: > > VA: . . . I agree with the idea that action is essential to Peirce's > semiotics; interpretants are responses to representamen as signs of objects. > The effect of such responses either confirms the object or doesn't. Therefore > I see no reason to object to Jerry's comment that a living system must "ACT > on the signification of the signals in such a manner AS TO PROSPER" if > prospering can mean the continuation or improvement of its models of the > world. > > GR: I certainly agree with you and Jerry that a living system must "act" if > it is to prosper. This tendency to act results in all the life processes, it > would seem. And even before this--before life processes--there are the > "constraining effects of tendencies upon tendencies." Fernandez gives this > example: "A wine glass remains similar to itself thanks to a happy balance of > intermolecular forces. The same is true for processes or systems of > interacting things: ("Peirean habits. . .," Fernandez). Continuing: > > TA: . . . What I don't understand is what Jerry means by this: a living > system "acquire[s] signs from its current situation." Jerry presents this as > the argument he rejects, but I don't know whose argument that is or what it > means to acquire signs from the current situation. I also can't conceive of > "the mere mental" that doesn't involve physical action at some level, > electro-chemical reactions and selection processes. > > GR: I too have difficulty understanding your meaning here, Jerry, so I hope > you'll comment on this. What is "the argument [you] reject," Jerry. You wrote: > > JC: This necessity for action separates traditional biosemiotics from > semiotics, chemistry from physics, perplexity from complexity. In human > societies, this includes the genesis and sustaining of the community, the > common social and cultural structures inherited from the past generations. In > short, the problem is not one in which a sign generates an infinite ingress > into further signs, but rather that the living system creates actions from > the signs. > > GR: So, while I attempted to argue above that while I agree that there is a > distinction to be made between the kinds of habits (viz, natural or > conventional), in contradistinction to what I just quoted you as writing > above, Jerry ( namely, "that the living system creates actions from the > signs") it would seem to me that Fernandez is correct in holding that it is > the tendency to take habits which results in the processes of living systems. > "Tendency," in Peirce, is category 'First." > > Finally, I very much appreciate both of you (and the list) "putting up with" > my occasional spontaneous displays of excessive intellectual passion when it > seems to me that there might be an attempt to undermine what is strong and > potentially helpful in Peirce's semeiotic and pragmatism occurring (of course > this does not I think that Peirce's ideas--any more than Aristotle's--are his > own, have not, for example, evolved into such ideas as those being > entertained in biosemiotics, need to be critiques within that discipline, > etc.) > > Best, > > Gary > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > ``````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` > 718 482-5700 > > >>> "Victoria N. Alexander" <[email protected]> 8/17/2011 8:41 AM >>> > Jerry, Gary, list, > > I should not comment on a paper when I've only read the abstract, but I > wonder if ROSSELLA FABBRICHESI's "universal language" idea might be > translated into "universal semiosis" with better effect. Languages are > certainly not universal, as they evolve in time and in environments, but the > mechanisms underlying semiosis may well be, and probably are, universal. By > mechanisms I just mean the different ways habit-taking sets in, by different > kinds of association and selection. > > Jerry's summary of the paper is more interesting to me than the author's > abstract. (I had to look up "ostension.") I agree with the idea that action > is essential to Peirce's semiotics; interpretants are responses to > representamen as signs of objects. The effect of such responses either > confirms the object or doesn't. Therefore I see no reason to object to > Jerry's comment that a living system must "ACT on the signification of the > signals in such a manner AS TO PROSPER" if prospering can mean the > continuation or improvement of its models of the world. That all seems clear > enough. What I don't understand is what Jerry means by this: a living > system "acquire[s] signs from its current situation." Jerry presents this as > the argument he rejects, but I don't know whose argument that is or what it > means to acquire signs from the current situation. I also can't conceive of > "the mere mental" that doesn't involve physical action at some level, > electro-chemical reactions and selection processes. > > I think I said this before, but overall what JR's paper does for teleology is > this. An argument in an essay is, obviously, teleological insofar as it was > written by an author with an object in mind (notwithstanding > deconstructionism, but that's a whole other aside). However, his focus on > the spontaneity of the signs themselves and the agency of the signs > themselves makes an essay a little more like a sign system in nature that > doesn't have an author and still conveys a meaning. > > Tori > > > ________________________________________________ > Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D. > Dactyl Foundation > 64 Grand Street > New York, NY 10013 > 212 219-2344 > > > > > > > > On Aug 16, 2011, at 2:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > >> List, Jerry, Tori, >> >> (a) Signs, in the Peircean sense, are not mere signals. According to Peirce, >> they have the living quality (feeling) that gave life to the cosmos from the >> get go (either that or one is going to have to (1) take a theological >> stance, which Peirce decidedly does not, or (2) the advent of complex >> organization systems, life, for prime example, remains a great mystery >> (which, of course, in a sense it is--but not a dualistic and mechanical >> one!) The triadicity of Peirce's theory, especially his valency theory, >> allows for that kind of evolutionary bifurcation which (from the standpoint >> of teleology and self-organization), and as Ilya Prigogine titles one of his >> books, can create "order out of chaos' (it might not, of course, as all >> evolutionary "experiments" aren't successful by a long shot). >> >> (b) Your phrase, the "necessity to act separates the mere mental from the >> existential" represents, to my way of thinking, exactly the dualism which >> Peirce was at pains to overcome, so I guess we're back to a kind of >> materialism--a reduction to the 'existential'. It seems to me that a number >> of scientists still seem stuck in that dualism (which treats mind as an >> epiphenomenon). >> >> Re: Fabbrichesi's abstract: >> >> (a) The very title of the paper suggests a bias, that this "inconspicuous. . >> . tradition" represents some sort of "scripture" (whatever that means). >> >> (b) The project of "discovering a universal language" is something which >> Peirce strongly and decisively argues against (sources forthcoming if >> desired). >> >> (c) Peirce's Existential Graphs represent an important part of the second of >> the logical trivium, as you put it, Jerry, namely, critical logic. They are >> hardly the whole or even the most of it, as Fabbrichesi seems to suggest. >> Indeed, the third part of it, speculative rhetoric (also called >> methodeutic, or theoretical rhetoric, or semiotic rhetoric, etc.), called by >> Peirce the "most living" branch of semeiotic, is exactly prepared for by >> theoretical grammar (not linguistic grammar, btw) and critical logic. So, >> the most one might claim is that Existential Graphs represent an important >> aspect of "logic as logic" (another expression for Peirce uses for critical >> logic). >> >> (d) In sum, Fabbrichesi seems not to "sustain" anything regarding Peirce's >> theories of logic as semeiotic, continuity, teleology, evolution--all >> directed toward a view of semiosis concerned not at all with "discovering a >> universal language" but, rather, with inquiring into how order develops out >> of chaos. >> >> Thus, I tend to agree with Soren Brier when he writes: "I believe that the >> biosemiotics that Sebeok. . . developed on a Peircean theorectical basis can >> be applied as a framework for integrating the various ontological levels of >> description. Within such a framework we further need to develop a theory of >> possible interactions among. . . levels and types of causality [something >> like Brier's five levels of reality, namely: 1. the quantum vacuum fields, >> 2. the physical level, 3. the chemical level (information), 4. the level of >> the semiotics of living systems', 5. human semiosis. GR] . . . (Soren >> Brier, Cyber Semiotics: Why Information is Not Enough, 430). >> >> I should add that I am finding Brier's and Noth's suggestion that there are >> "protosemiotic" relations as well as semiotic ones helpful. Indeed, the >> informational interactions at the chemical level would seem to be exactly >> this kind of relation. Yet, as Brier suggests, these levels need to "be >> understood within a framework of Peircian bisosemiotics that introduces a >> theory of pure feeling, the law of mind and meaning, into its basic >> ontology." Reductionism in science doesn't, of course, allow for any such >> thing. >> >> So, following Brier, I think we need to develop "an inclusive heterarchy, in >> that the natural habits--which we call laws--are the broadest and most >> universal ordering principles. Basically, these habits create order" (Brier, >> 439). This creating of order out of chaos is a principal thrust of Peirce's >> scientific project which Fabrrichesi appears to grossly misrepresent. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary >> >> >> >>> Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> 8/16/2011 1:02 PM >>> >> >> >> (Edited for parallelism in third sentence of the second paragraph.) >> >> List, Gary, Tori: >> >> Below is an abstract that does not mention the term 'teleology', but, in >> fact, IMHO and idiosyncratic philosophy, gets to the heart of the issues of >> ostension. Much is to be learned by comparing the current paper under >> discussion to this paper by Rossella Fabbrichesi. >> >> One ought to consider that any living system must not only acquire signs >> from its current situation, but also ACT on the signification of the signals >> in such a manner AS TO PROSPER. This necessity to act separates the mere >> mental from the existential. This necessity for action separates traditional >> biosemiotics from semiotics, chemistry from physics, perplexity from >> complexity. In human societies, this includes the genesis and sustaining of >> the community, the common social and cultural structures inherited from the >> past generations. In short, the problem is not one in which a sign generates >> an infinite ingress into further signs, but rather that the living system >> creates actions from the signs. >> >> Idiosyncratically Yours >> >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> >> >> >> Iconic thought and diagrammatical scripture: >> Peirce and the Leibnizian tradition >> ROSSELLA FABBRICHESI >> Abstract >> I will sustain in this article that Peirce can be seen as the last great >> representative >> of that inconspicuous but persistent tradition that, from the thirteenth to >> the seventeenth century, spent its energies on discovering a universal >> language. >> His project of Existential Graphs is in fact grounded on the isomorphism >> among a Sheet of Assertion, in which Graphs-signs are drawn, a Mind, with its >> thoughts-signs, and the Universe, with its facts-signs. In the same sense, >> Leibniz >> worked on his Characteristica Universalis, seen as a general Encyclopedia >> or alphabet of human thoughts, and a pictum mundi amphitheatrum. >> Keywords: Peirce; Leibniz; existential graphs; Characteristica Universalis; >> universal language; icon >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of >> the message. To post a message to the list, send it to >> [email protected] >> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L >> listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to >> [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of >> the message. 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