Doesn't Peirce resolve the issue of universal language by conceding our utter fallibility and at the same time affirming a realist position, leaving us with a common sense approach that more or less says beyond babel there are indeed universals, discovery and articulation of which is the purpose of living? Have a nice extended trip!
On Wed, Aug 17, 2011 at 11:26 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < [email protected]> wrote: > Gary, Tori, List: > > A very brief response before departing on a extensive trip. > > 1. The term 'mechanism' is used in both physics and chemistry but the > meanings are radically different. Mechanism in chemistry and biology are not > expressed in sense of "information processing" and may involve a huge number > of encodings and decodings of primary information - for example, the notion > of "the mechanism of reproduction" could span pre-gestational, gestational > and post-gestational sequences of processes. The codes of life routinely > handle such "mechanisms". > > 2. Biosemiotic systems are always poised to act, it is more than a > tendency, it is a necessity. Now, the consequence to the biosemiotic system > of receiving the sign / signal may be nothing more than a trivial > perturbation or it may as dramatic as the risk of the "fight or flight" > category. Context. > > 3. Tori sentences : > > What I don't understand is what Jerry means by this: a living > system "acquire[s] signs from its current situation." Jerry presents this as > the argument he rejects, but I don't know whose argument that is or what it > means to acquire signs from the current situation. I also can't conceive of > "the mere mental" that doesn't involve physical action at some level, > electro-chemical reactions and selection processes. > > > A deep communications problem here. I am not rejecting an argument that I > have presented. > Every biosemiotic system has sensory systems that are genetically designed > (encoded) to respond to the external world. The capacity of sensory systems > varies widely - dogs smell, owl / eagle vision, etc. > > I used the term "mere mental" because human experience is vastly richer > than merely our mental response to a situation or circumstance. Consider the > individual who mentally enjoys the experience of rich foods and alcohol in > excess. The chemical experience of such foods and alcohol in excess have > health consequences not directly associated with the pleasures of eating. > > I do not have time to address the more complicated issue of "universal > language". I personally do not believe in "universal languages" and firmly > reject the claims of physicists that they have somehow describes 'universal > laws'. (Such claims arise from ignorance of the nature of inductive > reasoning in mathematics. Induction is not magic, it is an intensional > extension of the ostension of symbols.) Indeed, I published a paper > postulating the existence of several separate and distinct logic symbol > systems which use the same symbols with different ostension in the different > systems. In simple terms, the human genetic system is capable of > "multi-tasking" with various formal symbol systems and translating among the > distinctive codes. For example, it is not rare to find linguist that > translate among 10 or more grammars and styles of utterances. Molecular > biologists translate among four symbol systems - genetics, biochemistry, > mathematics (physics) and their mother tongue. > > I gotta run now. Hope this clarifies the hurried note a bit. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > On Aug 17, 2011, at 7:34 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Tori, Jerry, list, > > While you are quite right, Tori, that one shouldn't comment on a paper of > which one's only read the abstract, still one ought to be able to comment on > the Abstract; and even if, as in your post, you found the comment (of Jerry) > more interesting than it was. So, to make amends, I will order the copy of > *Semiotica *in which Fabbrichesi's article appears and read it (even > though your 'translation' of "universal language" as "universal semiosis" > seems to me a bit too generous, not to mention unlikely, Tori, given the > Leibniz association Fabbrichesi makes). > > Of course the point *you* were trying to make, Jerry, was exactly what was > of most interest to Tori, and should have been to me. But I apparently had > such a negative reaction to the title of Fabbrichesi's paper and to it's > Abstract, that it suggested to me a quite intolerably wrong way to interpret > Peirce. Of course this is not for a moment to suggest that there is only one > 'right' way, but that some approaches appear to me to be, well, anti-Peirce > (not creatively criticizing him but, rather, willfully opposing exactly > what his thinking could pragmatically contribute to the resolution of > certain problems in, for example, biosemiotics). > > Sometimes one ought to read a paper because someone whom you respect > recommends it. So, since I very much respect you and your work, Jerry, I > will attempt to move past the Abstract and try to get to *your* point, > your "idiosyncratic view of teleology." > > But, before discussing your ideas, Jerry, I'd like to remark, Tori, that I > think that you are right on target in noting that "languages are certainly > not universal, as they evolve in time and in environments, but the > mechanisms underlying semiosis may well be, and probably are, universal.*By > mechanisms I just mean the different ways habit-taking sets in, by > different kinds of association and selection *[emphasis added by me]." > > So, bouncing off your rather profound idea: As I'm beginning to understand > it in relation to biosemiotics, such habits as lead to predictable > behavior/conduct would seem to be of two distinct types, although they > both partake of all virtually all the characters of habituation, > apparently, such as habit-taking/breaking, a kind of *reality in futuro*, > etc., etc. Nonetheless, one of these two might be characterized as * > natural* (the "laws of nature"); the other might be considered as * > artificial* or, perhaps, *conventional* (languages, disciplines, arts, > customs, etc. ). So, despite their both being ways of habituation, > "inborn" and "acquired" habits may be clearly distinguished. See, esp., > "Peircean habits and the life of symbols," Eliseo Fernandez, 2011 > http://www.lindahall.org/services/reference/papers/fernandez/Peirce_habits.pdf > > So bridging that distinction represents an extraordinary challenge for > biosemiotics, and I would rather that it take it up rather than argue for a > kind of dualism in the matter. Moving now to Jerry's ideas in the post: > Tori, you wrote: > > VA: . . . I agree with the idea that action is essential to Peirce's > semiotics; interpretants are *responses* to representamen as signs of > objects. The *effect *of such responses either *confirms* the object or > doesn't. Therefore I see no reason to object to Jerry's comment that a > living system must "ACT on the signification of the signals in such a > manner AS TO PROSPER" if prospering can mean the continuation or improvement > of its models of the world. > > GR: I certainly agree with you and Jerry that a living system must "act" if > it is to prosper. This *tendency to act* results in all the life > processes, it would seem. And even before this--before life processes--there > are the "constraining effects of tendencies upon tendencies." Fernandez > gives this example: "A wine glass remains similar to itself thanks to a > happy balance of intermolecular forces. The same is true for processes or > systems of interacting things: ("Peirean habits. . .," > Fernandez). Continuing: > > TA: . . . What I don't understand is what Jerry means by this: a living > system "acquire[s] signs from its current situation." Jerry presents this as > the argument he rejects, but I don't know whose argument that is or what it > means to acquire signs from the current situation. I also can't conceive of > "the mere mental" that doesn't involve physical action at some level, > electro-chemical reactions and selection processes. > > GR: I too have difficulty understanding your meaning here, Jerry, so I hope > you'll comment on this. What is "the argument [you] reject," Jerry. You > wrote: > > JC: *This necessity for action separates traditional biosemiotics from > semiotics, chemistry from physics, perplexity from complexity. In human > societies, this includes the genesis and sustaining of the community, the > common social and cultural structures inherited from the past generations. > In short, the problem is not one in which a sign generates an infinite > ingress into further signs, but rather that the living system creates > actions from the signs. * > ** > GR: So, while I attempted to argue above that while I agree that there is a > distinction to be made between the *kinds *of habits (viz, natural or > conventional), in contradistinction to what I just quoted you as writing > above, Jerry ( namely, "*that the living system creates actions from the > signs") *it would seem to me that Fernandez is correct in holding that it > is the tendency to take habits which results in the processes of > living systems. "Tendency," in Peirce, is category 'First." > > Finally, I very much appreciate both of you (and the list) "putting up > with" my occasional spontaneous displays of excessive intellectual passion > when it seems to me that there might be an attempt to undermine what is > strong and potentially helpful in Peirce's semeiotic and pragmatism > occurring (of course this does not I think that Peirce's ideas--any more > than Aristotle's--are his own, have not, for example, evolved into such > ideas as those being entertained in biosemiotics, need to be critiques > within that discipline, etc.) > > Best, > > Gary > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > ``````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````````` > 718 482-5700 > > >>> "Victoria N. Alexander" <[email protected]> 8/17/2011 8:41 AM >>> > Jerry, Gary, list, > > I should not comment on a paper when I've only read the abstract, but I > wonder if ROSSELLA FABBRICHESI's "universal language" idea might be > translated into "universal semiosis" with better effect. Languages are > certainly not universal, as they evolve in time and in environments, but the > mechanisms underlying semiosis may well be, and probably are, universal. By > mechanisms I just mean the different ways habit-taking sets in, by different > kinds of association and selection. > > Jerry's summary of the paper is more interesting to me than the author's > abstract. (I had to look up "ostension.") I agree with the idea that action > is essential to Peirce's semiotics; interpretants are *responses* to > representamen as signs of objects. The *effect *of such responses either > *confirms* the object or doesn't. Therefore I see no reason to object to > Jerry's comment that a living system must "ACT on the signification of the > signals in such a manner AS TO PROSPER" if prospering can mean the > continuation or improvement of its models of the world. That all seems > clear enough. What I don't understand is what Jerry means by this: a > living system "acquire[s] signs from its current situation." Jerry presents > this as the argument he rejects, but I don't know whose argument that is or > what it means to acquire signs from the current situation. I also can't > conceive of "the mere mental" that doesn't involve physical action at some > level, electro-chemical reactions and selection processes. > > I think I said this before, but overall what JR's paper does for teleology > is this. An argument in an essay is, obviously, teleological insofar as it > was written by an author with an object in mind (notwithstanding > deconstructionism, but that's a whole other aside). However, his focus on > the spontaneity of the signs themselves and the agency of the signs > themselves makes an essay a little more like a sign system in nature that > doesn't have an author and still conveys a meaning. > > Tori > > > ________________________________________________ > Victoria N. Alexander, Ph.D. > Dactyl Foundation > 64 Grand Street > New York, NY 10013 > 212 219-2344 > > > > > > > > On Aug 16, 2011, at 2:41 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > List, Jerry, Tori, > > (a) Signs, in the Peircean sense, are not mere signals. According to > Peirce, they have the living quality (feeling) that gave life to the cosmos > from the get go (either that or one is going to have to (1) take a > theological stance, which Peirce decidedly does not, or (2) the advent of > complex organization systems, life, for prime example, remains a great > mystery (which, of course, in a sense it is--but not a dualistic and > mechanical one!) The triadicity of Peirce's theory, especially his valency > theory, allows for that kind of evolutionary bifurcation which (from the > standpoint of teleology and self-organization), and as Ilya Prigogine titles > one of his books, can create "order out of chaos' (it might not, of course, > as all evolutionary "experiments" aren't successful by a long shot). > > (b) Your phrase, the "necessity to act separates the mere mental from the > existential" represents, to my way of thinking, exactly the dualism which > Peirce was at pains to overcome, so I guess we're back to a kind of > materialism--a reduction to the 'existential'. It seems to me that a number > of scientists still seem stuck in that dualism (which treats mind as an > epiphenomenon). > > Re: Fabbrichesi's abstract: > > (a) The very title of the paper suggests a bias, that this "inconspicuous. > . . tradition" represents some sort of "scripture" (whatever that means). > > (b) The project of "discovering a universal language" is something which > Peirce strongly and decisively argues against (sources forthcoming if > desired). > > (c) Peirce's Existential Graphs represent an important part of the second > of the logical trivium, as you put it, Jerry, namely, critical logic. They > are hardly the whole or even the most of it, as Fabbrichesi seems to > suggest. Indeed, the third part of it, speculative rhetoric (also called > methodeutic, or theoretical rhetoric, or semiotic rhetoric, etc.), called by > Peirce the "most living" branch of semeiotic, is exactly *prepared for* by > theoretical grammar (not linguistic grammar, btw) and critical logic. So, > the most one might claim is that Existential Graphs represent an > important aspect of "logic as logic" (another expression for Peirce uses for > critical logic). > > (d) In sum, Fabbrichesi seems not to "sustain" anything regarding Peirce's > theories of logic as semeiotic, continuity, teleology, > evolution--all directed toward a view of semiosis concerned not at all with > "discovering a universal language" but, rather, with inquiring into how > order develops out of chaos. > > Thus, I tend to agree with Soren Brier when he writes: "I believe that the > biosemiotics that Sebeok. . . developed on a Peircean theorectical basis can > be applied as a framework for integrating the various ontological levels of > description. Within such a framework we further need to develop a theory of > possible interactions among. . . levels and types of causality [something > like Brier's five levels of reality, namely: 1. the quantum vacuum fields, > 2. the physical level, 3. the chemical level (information), 4. the level of > the semiotics of living systems', 5. human semiosis. GR] . . . (Soren > Brier, *Cyber Semiotics: Why Information is Not Enough*, 430). > > I should add that I am finding Brier's and Noth's suggestion that there are > "protosemiotic" relations as well as semiotic ones helpful. Indeed, the > informational interactions at the chemical level would seem to be exactly > this kind of relation. Yet, as Brier suggests, these levels need to "be > understood within a framework of Peircian bisosemiotics that introduces a > theory of pure feeling, the law of mind and meaning, into its basic > ontology." Reductionism in science doesn't, of course, allow for any such > thing. > > So, following Brier, I think we need to develop "an inclusive heterarchy, > in that the natural habits--which we call laws--are the broadest and most > universal ordering principles. Basically, these habits create order" (Brier, > 439). This creating of order out of chaos is a principal thrust of Peirce's > scientific project which Fabrrichesi appears to grossly misrepresent. > > Best, > > Gary > > > >>> Jerry LR Chandler <[email protected]> 8/16/2011 1:02 PM >>> > > > (Edited for parallelism in third sentence of the second paragraph.) > > List, Gary, Tori: > > Below is an abstract that does not mention the term 'teleology', but, in > fact, IMHO and idiosyncratic philosophy, gets to the heart of the issues of > ostension. Much is to be learned by comparing the current paper under > discussion to this paper by Rossella Fabbrichesi. > > One ought to consider that any living system must not only acquire signs > from its current situation, but also ACT on the signification of the signals > in such a manner AS TO PROSPER. This necessity to act separates the mere > mental from the existential. This necessity for action separates traditional > biosemiotics from semiotics, chemistry from physics, perplexity from > complexity. In human societies, this includes the genesis and sustaining of > the community, the common social and cultural structures inherited from the > past generations. In short, the problem is not one in which a sign generates > an infinite ingress into further signs, but rather that the living system > creates actions from the signs. > > Idiosyncratically Yours > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > > *Iconic thought and diagrammatical scripture:* > *Peirce and the Leibnizian tradition* > *ROSSELLA FABBRICHESI* > *Abstract* > *I will sustain in this article that Peirce can be seen as the last great > representative* > *of that inconspicuous but persistent tradition that, from the thirteenth > to* > *the seventeenth century, spent its energies on discovering a universal > language.* > *His project of Existential Graphs is in fact grounded on the isomorphism* > *among a Sheet of Assertion, in which Graphs-signs are drawn, a Mind, with > its* > *thoughts-signs, and the Universe, with its facts-signs. In the same > sense, Leibniz* > *worked on his Characteristica Universalis, seen as a general Encyclopedia > * > *or alphabet of human thoughts, and a pictum mundi amphitheatrum.* > *Keywords: Peirce; Leibniz; existential graphs; Characteristica > Universalis;* > *universal language; icon* > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > [email protected] > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > [email protected] with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body > of the message. 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