(Sally is having some challenges migrating to a new email system - JLRC) From: <sa...@ucr.edu> Date: October 6, 2011 1:48:42 AM EDT To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Cc: sally.n...@ucr.edu Subject: Re: [peirce-l] “Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic”
Dear Jerry, I'm having email trouble (again) in migrating to a new system, so apologies for the brief response. First, I have to express thanks and relief that you gave the social sciences question to Gene. Second (and seriously), I would pass the buck on the Wittgenstein question to Michael J. DeLaurentis, if he is lurking out there, as his response to my post indicated plainly to me that he would have a much more interesting response to your question than I could come up with. Also, Gene and Gary F. would be far better respondents on this if they would be willing to do so. However, since you asked me directly, my main association between Wittgenstein and the quotes you presented would be to Wittgenstein's comments on "aspect- seeing" in relation to Peirce's idea of prescinding. The ability to shift perspectives in relation to an (empirical) object and to discern various characters in isolation from one another that could not in actuality be dissociated from one another was a topic of interest to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein was also interested in the phenomenon of intention, of course, as it related to thought and as it was and wasn't clearly evidenced in language use. When Peirce speaks of what symbols are "meant to express" in the final quote from Lowell Lecture IX, he sounds vaguely like one of Wittgenstein's interlocutory voices, setting up a plausible perspective, before problematizing it in further elaboration. I have found Peirce's systematicity (as evident in the triadic relations the quotes in the main present) to be a basic difference between Peirce's semiotic and the writings of the later Wittgenstein at least (I have no competence to discuss Wittgenstein's Tractatus and his other early writings, which may in some ways be understood to show a greater similarity to Peirce's formal logic). Perhaps others can find a relation there, however. In my reading of the later work, however, Wittgenstein does not seem to be motivated, at base, by questions that I would call semeiotic in orientation. Despite all of his work on the subject of language, he really isn't interested, at heart, in identifying exactly how it is that the signs of language accomplish their representational work, and he resists generalizing in this regard, which is just what Peirce is set on doing. Wittgenstein does wrestle with semeiotic processes, of course (on a regular basis even and often with great subtlety), but it is nearly always a means to other ends, a way to get at other philosophical questions. So, in high contrast to what JR has said about Peirce and how 90% of his work is dealing with semeiotics (I'm so sorry--one of the maddening things about my current email situation is that I can't consult any other emails while I'm in the process of writing one, so I may well have paraphrased this inexactly), 90% of Wittgenstein's work is not like this, at least not with regard to its most fundamental, guiding interests. I fear this is digressing way to far afield from the content of this paper--apologies if so. Best, Sally --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
