Peirce used the word "formal" in a couple of senses, the first of which is closer to its general meaning of "concerned with form", and here he can mean either the forms of objects or the forms of syntax, whereas the tradition following Russell tends to focus on syntax exclusively. In that sense of "formal", Peirce's concept of logic as formal semiotic would incorporate both the syntactic or proof-theoretic forms of Russell and the semantic or model-theoretic forms of Tarski.
But Peirce also used the word "formal" in another, more specialized sense, in which it became the practical equivalent of "normative". In that sense, his definition of logic as formal semiotic places logic within the sphere of the normative sciences, where it normally belongs. Jon CC: Arisbe, Inquiry, Conceptual Graphs, Peirce List -- facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ mwb: http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey knol profile: http://knol.google.com/k/Jon-Awbrey# policy mic: www.policymic.com/profile/show?id=1110 oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
