Kirsti writes,

 

[[I do not know any drawing with three changing figures. - Well, now that that 
think again, I do. It is this very same duck/rabbit picture. Seeing both 
simultaneously IS the third figure. ]]

 

You might check out some of the paintings of Octavio Ocampo for examples of 
three separate layers of figure/ground ambiguity. (Some of them can be found in 
a book called Masters of Deception, by Al Seckel.) 

 

However i don’t think that your experience of seeing duck and rabbit 
simultaneously disproves the hypothesis that that these kinds of figures are 
seen in an either/or way. I suppose it does refute it for you, but it can’t be 
a refutation for the whole scientific community, because nobody but you had (or 
could have) that individual experience. Your experiment can’t be replicated by 
others because only your report of it, and not the phenomenon itself, is open 
to public observation. Someone else might report a similar experience as 
“flipping” the figure-ground relationship back and forth so fast that the two 
views appear simultaneous. Would you then challenge their report as inaccurate? 
How would you show the rest of us that yours is more accurate?

 

Anyway, the identification of the composite duckrabbit as third picture does 
not depend on the simultaneity of duck and rabbit views – does it?

 

Gary F.

 

} For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. 
[Wittgenstein] {

 

www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce

 

From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf 
Of Määttänen Kirsti
Sent: January-02-12 5:12 PM



 

Gary, list,

 

To me, your trichotomics is a fruitful approach. I don't see any basic 
disagreement between our views. 

 

To comment your provisional diagram: It may be better to take the case with the 
utterer as the first separately from taking the interpreter as the first. 
Putting both in the same position in the same diagram I find a bit confusing.  
Perhaps making a diagram for both as separate cases (though interrelated, of 
course) might be better.

 

It may well be the case that Peirce did not use the concept of Ground in his 
later writings. Still, I can't see any grounds for he abandoning it. - But if 
you, or anyone else in the list, knows of some explicit critical comments by 
Peirce on the concept, I would be most grateful to know.

 

Peirce's work during his life presented such a wealth of approaches, so many of 
them worked up to details. As I see it, he did not have time to come back to 
many, many of the issues taken up earlier. 

 

The triad with Ground as the first in the triad may well be one of the issues 
he did not take up in his late

writings Still, I have given the concept a lot of thought. And studied it in 
practice, taking it into use and trying it out. - As I view it, it has a quite 
definite place in the architecture of Peirce's system. 

 

Gestalt theory, with its idea of figure and (its) ground were (within its 
limited scope) after something similar to what Peirce meant with his concept of 
the Ground. But it just amounts to claiming that for every figure there is a 
background which makes it possible for anyone to see the figure. - And this not 
a trivial matter!  - It is a most important philosophical matter.

 

You, and most listers probably know the concern Wittgenstein gave to the 
duck/rabbit picture. One of the examples of being unable to see both 
simultaneously, either the one of the other figure just vanishes, when one - or 
the other - takes precedence. 

 

Gestalt theory dealt with these kinds of pictures. - There are plenty.

 

To my knowledge and understanding, Wittgenstein never got any further than to 
the understanding that for every figure there is a background, and that the 
background always changes. Even if by little and little, and so little that 
virtually no one can see it change. Still, it does.

 

On this philosophical understanding Wittgenstein based his writings on 
certainty and on paradigms, the essential part of his later writings. - On this 
I am fully convinced, be it or be it not - so far -a generally accepted view on 
Wittgenstein.

 

Peirce does not give so much - if any - attention to the idea of figure and 
ground. Still, his concept of Ground is in full accordance with the ideas of 
Gestalt theory. But his concept has a vastly broader ground (pun intended), and 
vastly broader consequences. 

 

I take your provisional trichotomical diagram as an example.  If you take an 
utterer as the first, and the sign she or he utters as the second, then the 
utterer always has in mind, not only his intention with uttering the sign, but 
also all  kinds of things she or he knows & understands and assumes the 
interpreter also knows & understands. 

In so assuming, she or he may be mistaken. As is often the case, but seldom 
totally so.

 

Mostly, there is a partial understanding. This partial understanding makes 
communication both possible and worthwhile. This partial mutual understanding 
is what I take Peirce means with the concept of Ground. 

 

Ground is a communal matter. Common ground is the essence (esquisse) and 
prerequisite of community and communication. - It is always partial, that is 
true. And always so. - But without it, there could not be any community, nor 
communication.

 

To end with an anecdote: About fifteen years ago I  started to see both the 
duck and the rabbit in the picture. Earlier it had been impossible, the figures 
I saw just changed from one to the other. The second step in experimenting 
consisted of changing the figure at will. Then I could choose to see the rabbit 
or the duck as I chose. 

 

Every now and then I used to take up looking at the duck or the rabbit, as I 
chose, as a past time. - Not very often, though. - To my surprise, it once 
happened that I saw both, simultaneously. 

 

Within Gestalt theory, it is supposed to be a human universal that these kinds 
of figures are seen in an either/or way. - Well, it only takes one case to to 
prove an assumption of universality wrong.  - Just as it takes only one case to 
prove a possibility.

 

I do not know any drawing with three changing figures. - Well, now that that 
think again, I do. It is this very same duck/rabbit picture. Seeing both 
simultaneously IS the third figure.

 

So I change my claim. I do not know any drawing designed for three alternating 
and alternative figures. - If anyone knows, I would be very glad to hear about 
it.

 

Best wishes for the still nascent year!

 

Kirsti

 


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