That's interesting. Thanks, Gene. Kirsti On 3.1.2012, at 4.30, Eugene Halton wrote:
> Dear Kirsti et al., > > You mention the duck-rabbit image, and the concern Wittgenstein > gave to it. Another missing link between Peirce and Wittgenstein perhaps: the > duck-rabbit illusion was first noted in the context of perception in 1899 by > Joseph Jastrow, who had earlier coauthored the paper “On Small Differences in > Sensation” with Peirce in 1885. > > Gene > > > > > > > > From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On > Behalf Of Määttänen Kirsti > Sent: Monday, January 02, 2012 5:12 PM > To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU > Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Help on a Peirce Quote > > > > Gary, list, > > > > To me, your trichotomics is a fruitful approach. I don't see any basic > disagreement between our views. > > > > To comment your provisional diagram: It may be better to take the case with > the utterer as the first separately from taking the interpreter as the first. > Putting both in the same position in the same diagram I find a bit confusing. > Perhaps making a diagram for both as separate cases (though interrelated, of > course) might be better. > > > > It may well be the case that Peirce did not use the concept of Ground in his > later writings. Still, I can't see any grounds for he abandoning it. - But if > you, or anyone else in the list, knows of some explicit critical comments by > Peirce on the concept, I would be most grateful to know. > > > > Peirce's work during his life presented such a wealth of approaches, so many > of them worked up to details. As I see it, he did not have time to come back > to many, many of the issues taken up earlier. > > > > The triad with Ground as the first in the triad may well be one of the issues > he did not take up in his late > > writings Still, I have given the concept a lot of thought. And studied it in > practice, taking it into use and trying it out. - As I view it, it has a > quite definite place in the architecture of Peirce's system. > > > > Gestalt theory, with its idea of figure and (its) ground were (within its > limited scope) after something similar to what Peirce meant with his concept > of the Ground. But it just amounts to claiming that for every figure there is > a background which makes it possible for anyone to see the figure. - And this > not a trivial matter! - It is a most important philosophical matter. > > > > You, and most listers probably know the concern Wittgenstein gave to the > duck/rabbit picture. One of the examples of being unable to see both > simultaneously, either the one of the other figure just vanishes, when one - > or the other - takes precedence. > > > > Gestalt theory dealt with these kinds of pictures. - There are plenty. > > > > To my knowledge and understanding, Wittgenstein never got any further than to > the understanding that for every figure there is a background, and that the > background always changes. Even if by little and little, and so little that > virtually no one can see it change. Still, it does. > > > > On this philosophical understanding Wittgenstein based his writings on > certainty and on paradigms, the essential part of his later writings. - On > this I am fully convinced, be it or be it not - so far -a generally accepted > view on Wittgenstein. > > > > Peirce does not give so much - if any - attention to the idea of figure and > ground. Still, his concept of Ground is in full accordance with the ideas of > Gestalt theory. But his concept has a vastly broader ground (pun intended), > and vastly broader consequences. > > > > I take your provisional trichotomical diagram as an example. If you take an > utterer as the first, and the sign she or he utters as the second, then the > utterer always has in mind, not only his intention with uttering the sign, > but also all kinds of things she or he knows & understands and assumes the > interpreter also knows & understands. > > In so assuming, she or he may be mistaken. As is often the case, but seldom > totally so. > > > > Mostly, there is a partial understanding. This partial understanding makes > communication both possible and worthwhile. This partial mutual understanding > is what I take Peirce means with the concept of Ground. > > > > Ground is a communal matter. Common ground is the essence (esquisse) and > prerequisite of community and communication. - It is always partial, that is > true. And always so. - But without it, there could not be any community, nor > communication. > > > > To end with an anecdote: About fifteen years ago I started to see both the > duck and the rabbit in the picture. Earlier it had been impossible, the > figures I saw just changed from one to the other. The second step in > experimenting consisted of changing the figure at will. Then I could choose > to see the rabbit or the duck as I chose. > > > > Every now and then I used to take up looking at the duck or the rabbit, as I > chose, as a past time. - Not very often, though. - To my surprise, it once > happened that I saw both, simultaneously. > > > > Within Gestalt theory, it is supposed to be a human universal that these > kinds of figures are seen in an either/or way. - Well, it only takes one case > to to prove an assumption of universality wrong. - Just as it takes only one > case to prove a possibility. > > > > I do not know any drawing with three changing figures. - Well, now that that > think again, I do. It is this very same duck/rabbit picture. Seeing both > simultaneously IS the third figure. > > > > So I change my claim. I do not know any drawing designed for three > alternating and alternative figures. - If anyone knows, I would be very glad > to hear about it. > > > > Best wishes for the still nascent year! > > > > Kirsti > > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L > listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to > lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of > the message. To post a message to the list, send it to > PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
