Dear Gary, Since language only has meaning within contexts, change the context and you are likely to change meaning altogether. Ambiguity and vagueness are the enemies of clarity; Peirce's concept of terminological ethics is one of his main contributions to philosophy and the extension (and purpose) of his semeiotic. Torkild Thellefsen discusses meaning from a Peircean perspective in his new book. He points out that the word, X-ray, has a much deeper and more complete meaning to a physician than it does to nonprofessionals, who in their fundamental ignorance may nevertheless think they well know what X-rays mean and do. E. David Ford also explains the need for effective definitions in his book, Scientific Method for Ecological Research. Those who do not engage in so-called "ethical terminology" risk being misunderstood-or worse.
Regards, Phyllis _____ From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Gary Moore Sent: Friday, May 11, 2012 8:24 AM To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Subject: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS To whom it may concern: In trying to muddle through the storm tossed flotsam and jetsam of John Deely's explanation of Peirce's "The Ethics of Terminology" I have discovered the only slightly less over-involved muddle of Peirce's original. There is the plea for a special terminology as opposed to popular terminology or language. The justification of this is 'precision'. But such 'precision' needing a special terminology whether to a greater or lesser degree divorced from popular language simply sets up a 'privileged' standpoint of using language that is not judged by the actual rough and tumble usage of real language in real usage. This is not 'precision', this is mystification. The success or failure of any idea what-so-ever is its usage in ordinary discourse. Once established on that plain where an approximate but real general understanding is achieved, then one can seek precision of precisely those terms as really used in a living language. That is the only viable and workable definition of intellectual clarity. This is primary to the notion of a real 'teacher', that is, someone who really transfers understanding in normal language to a student that can actually apply it. I may misunderstand what Peirce and Deely are doing, but the historical attribution of ideas they seem to demand is like incorporating the entire and unabridged Oxford Dictionary of the English Language into one's discourse just to start with. And then the demand to be able to read the 'crystal clear' Latin that is the intellectual ground of our 'philosophical' terms instead of the "muddy" English they are always translated into is contradictory and self-defeating. How many of you teach your classes in Latin and have only textbooks in Latin? None. Therefore there has to always be an equivalence given of the Latin term that can be absorbed into normal English usage. What is the point at all of Aquinas' Latin clarity if it can only be found in Latin, however supposedly easy the language is to learn? I have already discovered the tremendous differences of English understanding of the Latin, and these differences are proposed by people immensely better trained in Latin than I could ever be, but who have tremendous differences in translations from people equally qualified. So knowledge of Latin that stays in Latin is unavailable in English. I find the simple translation of Latin terms with their notable variations can easily absorb the understanding of the Latin term into English. And accreditation of blocks of new and unusual thought, however expressed, is rarely not properly given to their originators. The complete history of each term is a special endeavor for specific purposes, and is called for in obvious circumstances where it can mean different things in popular discourse. But "popular understanding" is the only prize worthwhile, that one always aims for because even for someone coming from Aristotle or Aquinas and stumbling into Peirce is not going to learn anything gross or net from specialized terms that violate common usage in one way or another, requiring a gross relearning of the English or Latin language to obtain a microscopic net award. Maybe this is the bane of all of Peirce's work. The purpose of language is to communicate. If one is unfamiliar with a word, it can be looked up in a common source, not prized out from a secret, private source. There is no value in the later course. If it is justified by its greater precision, then that 'precision' will very soon be lost again if so specialized. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
