List, Irving, John et. al., Sluga (Frege against the Booleans; Notre Dame
Journal of Formal logic 1987)) places great emphasis upon the priority
principle in Frege, which stresses that the judgement is epistemically,
ontologically, and methodologically primary. He tries to show that Frege
thought that Schroder's view exhibited a bias towards the methodological
primacy of concepts by drawing on Schroder's Introductory parts of the Algebra
of Logic. I think the central claim of the Sluga paper is that this supposed
bias of the Booleans towards abstraction and the treatment of concepts as
extensions of classes leads to a confusion over the relation between "abstract"
or "pure" logic and predicate logic. How this is, is not always easy to see,
but the segmenting of the judgement relation does seem to lead to a problem in
seeing the abstract logic as a special case of predicate logic. How serious any
of this is I don't know. For instance, Mitchell took issue with a "Mr. Peirce"
for speaking of a "universe of relation" instead of a "universe of class
terms." (Studies in Logic; Johns Hopkins 1883) Maybe Peirce was vaguely aware
of something which the products of analysis would end up obscuring.
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