Claudio, Jim and others
I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some
time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines.
In French language we have a phrase "Appellation d'Origine Controlee"
(A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the
level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the
phrasing would have to be "Protected Designation of Origin" (P.D.O.). I
am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue.
I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is :
among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of
them is the First, the Second and which is the Third?
Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering.
Bernard
Claudio Guerri a ¨crit :
Jim, List,
I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes:
1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be
capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274)
and
2. "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the
object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281
Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third ] as an apparent
contradiction.
I have to give up trying to understand the subtle differences in
English between capital "First" and little "third"... but even so,
something sounds also meaningfull there (even for an Italian leaving
head upside-down in Argentina)...
Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a
sing by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through
signs, etc. etc... (see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...),
signs can not be a 'definitive-something', or all Peirce's effort
could get lost in his most ineresting aspect: the emphasys on
relations instead of on taxonomies.
On the other side, every sign can be considered in it's 3 aspects (or
better 9, or 27, or 81, since, only 3 is mostly a very rough cut into
'reality'... that resists symbolization -Lacan-).
In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The sign is considered a
little third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's most outstanding
aspect to fulfill the task of mediation. Only the symbolic aspect is
considered here, by using the verbal language (which is lineal and
sequential -de Sassure-). Auke's diagrams (or other diagramms too...)
could show the same statement without 'erasing' the other two aspects
of the different signs involved, just by enphasysing with color the
outstanding parts involved in this statement. Here we have a graphic
example (forgive me Ben, the outcome could not be uglyer):
In quote 1 the sign is considered in it's most complex-difficult
aspect, the capital First, which envolves the pure POSSIBILITY, the
quali-quantitative-elemental-abstract-knowledge that "opens" the
logical 'power' of that sign. The most valuable value of any sign is
to know and to be aware (by the 'interpretant') of it's 'firstness'.
In that 'possible FIRST' we have the clue of what comes logically 'after'.
Signs "grow" (historically) from thirdness to firstness, in opposition
of the logical order.
Jim Piat says: "...all signs (which are thirds) are also firsts
because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because
they exist and have effects. But *signs are neither mere Firsts nor
mere Seconds*". (bold is mine)
Each coherent statement, in verbal language, should be constructed
logically like quote 2 by relating 1ness, 2ness and 3ness (not
necessarily in this order) of three different signs. This parts
have not to be explicit in the verbal text. The signs are not mere
Firsts nor mere Seconds nor mere Thirds, but the verbal language can
give or construct this (terrible) impression. (like in the traditional
bad example: the weathervane IS an index...)
Jim Piat says: "...I do think Peirce meant for his three trichotomies
of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are
clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be
the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his
first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as
either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy
addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means
of qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention;
and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can
represent either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me
this suggest a* three by three matrix of sign aspects* based on
Peirce's categories." (bold is mine)
There is already some research done in this direction, for applied
semiotics. The outcome is what I called the "Semiotic Nonagon". It is
a diagrammatic-icon, an operative model that can be used with great
advantage in qualitative research, but it is NOT an explanation of
Peirce's logic-phylosophical proposal. Peirce would probably die again
if he sees it as a diagram of his ideas. In fact he drew the
'triangle' of the 10 classes but never the 9adic matrix. Peirce's
proposal could be probably schetched in hiperspace with the help of
computer sciences... but probably, it would not be easy to 'use' for
applied semiotics...
As fare as I know Max Bense (he probably was the first) already draw
this 3x3 matrix in the 60's, some other scholars used it too, just to
show all 9 aspects in some order. But they never gived the diagram a
possibility to be a tool. I learned it from Magariños de Morentin in
1973 and have develloped it for the use in Architecture, design in
general, and qualitative marquet research with great practical success.
We had already some explanation and discussions in the List on that
subject... not too much success, I have to say...
On the other hand (and just repeating Peirce), I think that diagrams
(good for applied semiotics) could help to emprove the knowledge
around Peirce's theoretical proposal... I see too much discussion
"turning around in the void"...
Like the triadic approach teaches us, an isolated "First" can not
exist fare from Second and Third... on the contary, as already
stated... symbols grow...
Best
Claudio Guerri
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED] <mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
<mailto:peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu>>
Sent: Friday, June 23, 2006 8:10 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
> Ben wrote:
>
>
>>>Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!
>
>>> 66~~~~~~~~~~
>>> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such
genuine
>>> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be
capable of
>>> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same
triadic
>>> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.*
>>> ~~~~~~~~~~99
>
> Dear Ben, Folks--
>
> Yes, but Peirce also wrote (chapter 20 Trichotomic of The Essential
Peirce
> Vol 1 page 281 line two of paragraph two) that "A sign is a third
> mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented".
>
> So I find this confusing. A Peircean categorical third is not a
> caterogical first. A first relates only to iself. There is
firstness of
> thirdness but a third is not a first. In my understanding a sign is
> pre-eminently a third. Yet, Peirce obviously does say above that a
sign is a
> First that stands in such a genuinely triadic relation to a second
and so
> on. What do you make of this? I find it contradictory to speak
of mere
> firstness functioning as thirdness. The quality of thirdness makes
sense to
> me but firstness (as a Peircean category) in a triadic relation to
> secondness seems to me a contradiction. So I think we need to seek a
> different intepretation of Peirce when he say a sign is a First
which stands
> in such genuine triadic relation to a second...
>
> Yes, all signs(which are thirds) are also firsts because they have
> qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have
> effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds.
Furthermore,
> no First (as a mere first in Peirce's categorical sense) stand in
triadic
> relations to anything because to stand in a triadic relation is the
essence
> not of firstness but of thirdness. That's the line of thinking
that leads
> me to believe Jean-Marc has a point -- at least in so far as the
> interpretation of this particular quote is concerned.
>
> The above notwithstanding, I do think Peirce meant for his three
> trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs
which to me
> are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the
> foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first
> trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either
> hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy
addresses the
> ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative
> similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third
> trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere
> quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by
three
> matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories.
>
> As Joe cautions, Peirce's classifications of signs were a work in
progress.
> All the more so for my own limited understanding of Peirce.
>
> * I'm working from Peirce's discussion "Three Trichotomies of Signs" as
> presented on page 101 of Justus Buchler's _Philosophical Writings of
Peirce_
>
> Best,
> Jim Piat
> ---
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