Bill, Jim, list, >[Bill] I pretty well agree with the following two paragraphs [by Jim, much >further down now -- Ben]. I'd like to make some friendly amendments, however. > I don't think one sign carries more evidential weight than another, but then >I'm not clear on what you mean because I don't understand how abstraction is >related nor what your conception of it is in the sentences below. Do you mean >a visual experience of a the tree is more particularized in terms of data than >the visual or auditory experience of the word tree? To say one of those is >more or less abstract than the other seems strange to me.
>[Bill] What I miss in your post, and in Ben's response, is a fuller >recognition of *usage* in sign function. You get to it at the end of first >paragraph below, in connection with abstraction, but you need to put it to >use at a more basic level. >[Bill] I agree that all we know (or know that we know) is mediated by signs, >including trees. We never apprehend the existential object we call "tree." For my part, I'd need some more examples of what you mean by usage in sign function. I think you may be setting the bar too high for what constitutes apprehension of an existential object. If we never can apprehend an existent object, then we never can apprehend any existent signs of it, either. We apprehend an existent object as something which tends to withhold much of itself from us, some of it actual but hidden beneath surfaces, some of it hidden in potency. Some things which are not parts of the object can still be signs about the object. Creating or destroying those things does not, per se, augment or diminish the object. So they are not parts of the object. Some things which _are_ parts or samples of the object, can also be signs about the object. Whether the aspect or face of it which is patent to us is the object perspectivally viewed or is a sign about the object, is a matter of whether we are asking about the greater object a question on the basis of the patent aspect as a sign about it. In respect of such question, the patent aspect is a sign. "Semiotic object," "sign," etc., are roles in logic and inquiry, roles assigned in terms of inquirial relationships arising in the study of the given subject matter. >[Bill] We have only instances of signs of "treeness," which are not emitted by >trees, but which we learn to use as signs. Our information processing system >rather favors abstraction. The apprehension of a concrete object means 'intending' it as unabstracted, and means not intending some abstraction of it. It does not mean actually possessing all that information; it doesn't mean being able to make the tree's constituents all dance like puppets. It means possessing the relevant information for the given purpose, and it means that the object figures large enough to be counted as an object and as a significant source of semiotic determination. "Apprehension" is a bit vague of a word, or I would risk more on the question of actual contact with the object. You take the object as it comes to you -- nature's abstraction is not your abstraction. "Abstraction" & decay are everywhere -- with matter and thermodynamics, everything is imperfectly represented in a sense. An object's parts are imperfectly represented to one another. How can it even be an object? If we flatly equate info-decrease, abstraction in every possible sense, and representation, then we will have let deep and fecund parallels become a wash of self-defeating skepticism, swirling down logical drains of infinite regressions, leading to...gee, I wish I could think of a way to continue this senetence. Anyway, now, if we want to generalize this beyond the concrete, it is still a question of forming a recognition of the thing, as it is, for what it is, in its establishedness and in its questions. The inverse of abstraction is to educe or produce information such that, in a sense, one has increased information, added it in. It may have been there implicitly, but it appears as novel. Life invests its world with variegated valuations, and these valuations are based in reality, yet depend on life for their meaning or being anything at all. Anyway, this "inverse of abstraction" corresponds to such processes as calculation, coding, extrapolation, curve-fitting, and image reconstruction, and to insight, understanding, and interpretation, the generation of the content of inference, if not the recognition, the actual inference to a conclusional judgment on the basis of confirmatory or corroboratory particulars. Abstraction usually means taking some info from an object and, in that sense, reducing the information, and forming a separate representation of the object, one intended not as interpretive of some other representation but rather as a representation taken "straight from life," a representation meant to occasion interpretation rather than to complete it -- although semiosis could be shown to be at least unconsciously operative such that said representation is already an interpretant; a representation developed in order to determine specific interpretations practically contains those interpretations (e.g., W.C. Williams' _White Mule_ is not "slice-of-life realism.") And it is a representation which is intended as separate from its object. None of this means continuing to use said abstraction as a representation of that specific object. Anyway, though it involves a reduction of information, there are differences. -- There is a kind of abstraction which characterstically abstracts some info from an object without increasing or decreasing information by opening or closing questions -- "five oranges, three other oranges, 5+3=8." -- There is a "sampling" kind of abstraction which characteristically abstracts appearances, qualities, etc., and decreases information in the course of abstraction, by focusing on questions some of which had already been closed and are now reopened -- "how often do oranges appear on trees? -- forget the oranges trees that you know about, do a fresh study from which we can project estimates for the whole countryside." -- There is an "eliminate the details," "ceteris paribus" kind of abstraction which characteristically increases information in the course of abstraction, by closing questions which were open -- e.g., "The horseflies won't affect the horses, no outside factor will affect any horse and its odds of winning the race." -- There is a kind of abstraction which characteristically does both (and which sometimes is physically enforced in controlled experiments), to isolate certain things in order to learn other things, some of which are supposedly "already known," while holding other factors equal. That which both adds and removes information to and from the object -- bangs it out & polishes it up -- seems to correspond to objectification -- the formation of an imaginary or conceptual or sensory or perceptual object. (I distinguish sense and perception in the manner of their two respective cultivated forms, intuition and 'wisdom' (not the philosophical kind -- instead, shrewdness, foresight, percipience, & familiarity.) And thass my two cents' worth on that. It's late, I'm tired, and dollars to doughnuts I make everybody tired! So I'll stop here, just noting that I don't mean experience as something apart from semiosis, and noting that, for lay people, a tree is not the product of our use of sensory data, but is instead just a tree in a very "thus I refute Berkeley" kind of way. We know objects in their effects, and sometimes those effects come through so loud and clear, and so near, that the effects might as well be the object, especially when we in turn act back upon the object and it is thereby affected. Is the parallax view assembled out of the two optical images, or are the two optical images its degenerate ghosts? At some point it put itself together out of them, but it is now one integral thing. Learning to play guitar, one's fingers initially feel uncoordinated, one goes through elaborate steps, this finger here, that finger there, keep those two in place, etc. But then a single force comes to move through those fingers, a single grip through five fingers, etc. Things come together such that we legitimately treat the everyday objects, whatever they "really" are, as having all the legitimacy and status of the real things, all such legitimacy needed for almost any practical purpose. So I take it that the pragmaticist view is that they are the real things. Best, Ben >[Bill] The psychologist George Miller has a delightful essay called "The Magic >Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two" which toys with the research finding that our >short term memory can only deal with seven items, plus or minus two, at a >time. If you think about that, and how we process a sentence, such as "The >boy threw his ball into the forest where it rolled to the foot of a tree" you >have conclude that our dealing with concepts is not richly particularized. We >really don't (can't) get involved in the particulars of signs; they exist as >possibles, potentials of the processing, but not as actuals. That is, we may >take for granted the ball was round, tree had branches, roots and >leaves--possibly of the Oak type. I tend to think in terms of "contextual >potentials." For example, if I ask you if you've ever been to Siberia, and >you haven't, you don't have to search your memory for the experience of not >being there. It's simply not a potential of your information context. >[Bill] To speak of experiencing a tree as an object apart from semiosis seems >to me to speak of a transcendental experience; the tree is not the source of >signs, but the product of them. There are some very disciplined ascetics in >the traditional Orient who lay claim to "pure" experience and I believe some >of them. For the rest of us lay persons, a tree is the product of our use of >sensory data in the creation of signs and constructs. We have to learn to use >sensory data to have any meaningful experiences; even a purely aesthetic >experience--should such a event occur--could never be purely sensory. It >would be merely chaotic. No matter now effortless semiotics may seem, signs >are a product of usage. So is "experience" to the extent that it is anything >more than meaningless variance in some kind of sensorium. >[Bill] As for verification, it seems to me that is the heart of pragmaticism: >verification occurs as we operationally determine that a diamond will scratch >more things than it is scratched by. While that is a truth relative to the >operation, within the operation it is an absolute. In my mind the pragmatic >maxim means that we approximate truth to the point where whatever variances >may occur make no difference to the operation performed. In other words, we >get a consensus or a congruence good enough or close enough that the >differences don't make a difference. That is certainly the case in >communication; there is no better possibility. >>[Jim] I think all our conceptions and knowledge of our experience is through >>signs. That, for us, all the world is signs. But I will concede that in >>certain situations for certain purposes some signs carry more evideniary >>weight (both literally and figuratively) than others. Not all signs are >>equally abstract. The sign that we typically call a tree in the forest is >>less abstract than the sign we typically call the word tree. The word tree >>has abstracted most of the form from the substance of the tree growing in the >>forest. To mistake one sign of a tree for another is a mistake we make at >>our own peril. But to suppose that reality is neatly divided into objects >>and signs of those objects is I think a mistake that Peirce was trying to >>correct. So called concrete objects are no more real than their abstract >>cousins. Nor vice versa. One emphasizes substance the other orm -- each >>has its place but there exists neither pure substance nor pure form. And >>ultimately both form and substance are conceptualized only through signs. >>The distinction between a sign and an object is a matter of usage not a >>distinction that by which god has carved up reality. One man's sign is >>another man's object. The distinction between signs and objects is closer to >>the distinction between verbs and nouns than folks suppose. It's a matter of >>usage. >>[Jim] For some purposes we prefer the more abstract object of a sign. For >>other purposes we prefer the more concrete objects of signs. For example it >>is easier to speak of or think about how to build a house out of abstract >>trees than to actually do the the trial and error of using less abstract >>trees. Conversely it is much easier to live in a house built of the more >>substantial variety of trees. I might add too that our conception of a tree >>in the forest is more problematic and abstract than we generally suppose. >>What for example is the difference between a grasses, bushes and trees --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
