I agree with you on this, Jim. I am wondering if Ben really thinks that there is any such cognitive acquaintance. I had thought he was simply misstating whatever point he was trying to make and didn't intend that. I am looking forward to his answer on that.
Joe ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 12:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate Ben Udell wrote: >>That signs and interpretations convey meaning, not experience or >>acquaintance with their objects, is not only Peirce's view but also the >>common idea of most people. For instance, most people might agree that >>expertise can sometimes be gained from books about their subject, but they >>will disagree that experience with the books' subjects can be gained from >>books. There is good reason for this. The expertise consists of conveyable information from books. The experience involves dealing with and learning about the objects of experience in situations with actual consequences. Even in math, when you stop to think about it, you notice a big difference between reading about math problems and working those math problems yourself. >> Dear Ben, Thanks for another helpful and interesting post! You seem to be saying that we can have two types of aquaintance with objects. Either we can experience objects directly without the mediation of signs or we can experience the meaning of objects (but not the entirety of the objects themselves) through signs. Before continuing I want to make sure I'm understanding you on this point. Does your notions of direct aqauintance with objects (unmediated by signs or the process of representation) provide one with knowledge of the objects meaning? Is it your view that even without signs (or the process of representation) that experience would be meaningful to us? Is it your view that that signs and the process of representation are (merely) tools for comunicating or thinking about our experience but are otherwise not required for experience to be meaningful? Personally I don't think Peirce meant that we can conceive of objects without engaging in representation. We may have aquaintance with objects in the same sense that two billiard balls are aquainted when they collide but this is not triadic aquaintance for the billiard balls and conveys no meaning to them. For me, all meaningful experience is triadic and representational. That one conception of an object is taken as foundational for a particular discussion does not priviledge that object as the "real object" but merely as the object commonly understood as the criteria against which the validity of assertions will be tested. Its as though the discussants were saying that the object ultimately under discussion is "that one over there" or "the one described in this sentence" or whatever -- but hopefully always one which all participants to the discussion have at least in theory equal access. The issue of what constitutes a collateral object rests less on the distinction between direct aquaintance vs aquaintance through signs but one of private vs public access to the object. A useful collateral object is one to which all discussants have equal access. The question being raised by collateral experience is really one of public vs private experience. The question is not whether the collateral object is known through representation or somehow more directly through dyadic aquaintance because (in my view) all meaningful experience (even so called direct experience) is mediated through signs. The difference between reading about something and doing it is not a matter of representational vs non representational aquaintance but between two different representations of the same object. There are folks who can read about pro football who can not play it and there are folks who can play pro football who can not read. Representation of experience is required for both activities. The common object represented is neither the football-done nor the football-read but the quality of football that is common to and inheres in both. Some of the habits acquired in mastering one respresentation or conception are not the same as required for mastering the other. I don't mean for these last two paragraphs above to leap frog your answers but more as guides to what is troubling me and what I mean by my questions. Thanks again for your comments, Ben. I am still studying them, but want to make sure I'm understanding you as I go. Making sure I understand your distinction between direct aquaintance and sign mediated aquaintance seems an important lst step. Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.3/395 - Release Date: 7/21/2006 -- Internal Virus Database is out-of-date. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.3/395 - Release Date: 7/21/2006 --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [email protected]
