[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

[Charles F Rudder]

Gary, Ben, Jim, list,   Thanks, Gary, for calling attention to the possible connection between yours and my Inner and Outer distinction that, until you mentioned it, had not occurred to me, and for reminding me of the location of my "as if" post.  Not sure that I follow you close enough to compare our notions, in lieu of a comparison, I am elaborating on some thigs I have said in light of possibly taking a run later at a comparison later on.   I use the word “semiosis” in reference to sign processes or the activity of human and possibly other sentient beings mediated by signs, and the word “semiotic” or theory of signs in reference to analyses of sign processes.  That is, I take semiosis as the subject of semiotic.  My saying that there are two semiosical triads is to say that as I understand Peirce, his analysis (semiotic) reveals that sign processes (semiosis) embody two interrelated but distinguishable triads, the triad (Interpreter – Sign – Object) that accounts for the existence of signs and the triad (Interpretant – Sign – Object) that accounts for how signs acquire and determine their significant effects.  I understand Peirce to say that anything suited to be a sign becomes a sign when and only when it is interpreted as a sign.  The world is not littered with signs waiting to be interpreted, but with things suited to becoming and being signs if and when they are interpreted as signs.  In short, involuntary and deliberate acts of interpretation or representation bring signs qua signs into existence.  Apart from Interpreters or Representers involved in acts of interpretation or representation there would be no signs, and, hence, no Interpretants.    I understand Peirce to say in “New Elements” that, interpreted or uninterpreted, anything suited to be an Index when interpreted as an Index will be interpreted as being just the Index that it is suited to be.  I take this to mean both that anything suited to be an Index is not, but would become, an Index when it is interpreted as an Index and just the Index that it is suited to be (its connection to an object makes its Dynamical Object nonnegotiable).  Uninterpreted as an Index, what is absent from anything suited to be an Index that is required for it to be and function as a sign is an Interpretant which determines and embodies the Semiosical Object of the sign that must be furnished either, like Ben’s response to seeing smoke that an artist might have represented Iconically, more or less directly by an Interpreter’s interpreting it as an Index, or indirectly by its being represented as an Index in and by a Symbol that differs from Icons and Indices by its determining its Interpretant.  Peirce goes on to say in “New Elements” that being interpreted is part of what must be included in anything’s being suited to be a Symbol.  Uninterpreted, anything suited to be some kind of sign may be suited to be an Icon or Index, but it is not suited to be a Symbol.  Acts of Interpretation or Representation (re-presentation) do not, as with Icons and Indices, interpret or represent things always already suited to be Symbols, but actually participate in suiting things to be Symbols.   As I presently see it, the contribution of acts of representation to suiting things to be Symbols is to the Interpretant.  Together with the sign’s contribution to determining its Interpretant, acts of representation participate in determining the Interpretants of Symbols and, hence, to some degree, “complete” them.  The Symbol’s determining its interpretant for an Interpreter occurs together with the Interpreter’s contribution.  [I am thinking here of signs and not replicas of signs such as instruction manuals.]  Symbols manifest a “vagueness” that varies according to the ratio, so to speak, of the Interpreter’s to the Sign’s contribution to determining its Interpretant.  The symbolic interpretations of the performance of a play among various members of the audience will vary considerably as a consequence of their Interpretants being to a considerable degree idiosyncratically determined by the Interpreters.  The symbolic interpretations of mathematicians reviewing an original proof of a theorem, the Interpretants of which are to a greater degree determined by the form of the argument, will vary considerably less.  [I would say that Ben’s “Recognition” is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreter’s contribution to its determination.]   What I have outlined above is at least obliquely related to my speculation on the Inner and Outer Worlds at the end of my “as if” post.  The Outer World furnished with objects in themselves interacts with the Inner World furnished with conscious, actively responsive and responding beings (mind or quasi-mind—a FIRST) whose response (collectively) and responses (particularly and singularly) to the interaction (a SECOND) bring a Third Semiosical World into being wherein, relative to the First World (what is first for us is not first for Nature), Second World objects in themselves furnish Dynamical Objects for the Signs that inhabit the Third World while the responses of First World beings furnish their Interpretants – Semiosical Objects.   One further speculation:   When Ben first joined the list and introduced his “fourth,” I responded by saying something to the effect that I have wondered if it might make sense to think that there may be something ontologically antecedent to Peirce’s Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  I have always found the similarities and differences between “Unity” as such and Qualitative suchness which either manifests or participates in Unity, and between Unity as such and Continuity which also either manifests or participates in a Unity that differs from the Unity of Firstness, somewhat ambiguous.  In thinking about the possibility of my First World, Second World, and Third World (which, by the way, is in no way influenced by my study of Karl Popper), I keep running into the possibility of a ONE WORLD embodying the First and Second Worlds together with the evolution of the Third World.   Charlies    On Mon, 21 Aug 2006 10:24:45 -0400 Gary Richmond <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: Benjamin Udell wrote: Object and signs are roles. They are logical roles, and their distinction is a logical distinction As I see it,  it's not that simple because of the dynamical object, the fact of inter-communication as well as internal inference, etc. Charles may mean something somewhat different from what I'm taking his two semiosical triads to be referring to (I hope he'll comment further on them at some point), but I'll show how I see the two through an example diagramming them in relationship to each other. [Btw, I would  recommend an analysis Charles posted 12/1/05--his "as if" post--in which he considers certain Peircean passages which brought him to his inner/outer notion] This is admittedly only a very preliminary analysis and I may see things differently as I consider the two triads further (I may be conflating some of the inner and outer aspects, or not connecting them properly--it appears, not surprisingly, to be a very complex relationship indeed) outer semiosical triad: The sign in this case is a particular line spoken in a particular production of Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing by a particular actor at one outdoor performance in a New York City park. |>  The audience members hearing it spoken are these (selected) interpreters: (a) a young acting student who is studying the given role, (b) an 8 y.o. child attending her first live play, (c) a Spanish speaking man without much English language skills dragged to it by his girlfriend. (d) the director of the play The dynamical object is whatever meaning/emotion Shakespeare, the actor, the director mean to convey/express in that line, through its delivery, etc. However this sign as reflected in semiotic processes of the various audience members are naturally very different semioses ( a, b, c and d) at the moment of their each hearing and "following the meaning" of the line: inner semiosical triad [read 1/2/3]: 1. The sign is pretty much whatever the line spoken is heard as (given educational backgrounds, language skills, the coughing of someone next to one interpreter, a thought of the need to pay a bill at just that moment) and what each takes it to mean, possibly accompanying thoughts, etc. 1/2/3 |>  3. The  interpretant also will be very different for each (much could be said about the various interpretants, but not in this diagram!) 2. The  immediate object varies considerably for each (you'll have to imagine what this might entail, but there is enough difference to suggest what I have in mind) Although this is perhaps different from how Charles sees the two relating, I connected them in the following way in a recent post [this kind of analysis "back and forth" between two communicators within the context of a real world of experience is also Peirce's approach in the "Stormy Day" letter to William James which, btw, has  pertinence to the present discussion] outer semiosical triad:  .   .   inner semiosical triad: .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .  sign sign:   .    .   .   .   .   .   .   .   .  |> interpretant |> interpreter .   .   .   .   .   .     immediate object dynamical object Well, whether or not this particular analysis will hold, the point is to connect the sign with the inferences of living, breathing, thinking, feeling, human intelligences (Man as symbol) and as this occurs in the world of experience where object and sign are not just roles. As for the individual as he is involved in these complex patterns of semioses: CP 7.583  We have already seen that every state of consciousness [is] an inference; so that life is but a sequence of inferences or a train of thought. At any instant then man is a thought, and as thought is a species of symbol, the general answer to the question what is man? is that he is a symbol.  . . Ben gives the inference process as a fourth element. 1. multi-objective optimization process ~ ~ 3. cybernetic process 2. stochastic process ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. inference process But there is no need for a fourth semeiotic element to explain such inference in the way of looking at matters as suggested by 7.583. Gary --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED]   --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com