Ricardo wrote:
>
> Marx seems a lot closer to the social constructivism that
> dominates much of undergraduate sociology today than Hegel. The
> Kantian/Hegelian concept of self-determination was transformed in
> his hands into a practical-laboring actitivity. He also thought that
> humans are constructed by a determinate set of social relations,
> and that humans can be re-constructed, which was taken to mean
> by many followers that those who know what is good for everyone
> else have the right to reconstruct the deceived "masses". Che
> called this reconstructed self the "new man". But if Hegel was
> right, modern humans will never tolerate any such constructions
> except under terms which they have set for themselves (in a
> democratic setting).
Marx has appropriated idea of "practical-laboring activity" as
self-determination from Kant and Hegel.
"We presuppose labour in a form in which it is an exclusively human
characteristic. A spider conducts operations which resemble those of the
weaver, and a bee would put many a human architect to shame by the
construction of its honeycomb cells. But what distinguishes the worst
architect from the best of bees is that the architect builds the cell in his
mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour process, a
result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the
beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of
form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purpose in those
materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode
of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will
to it." Capital, vol. 1, pp. 283-4
"By right we ought only to describe as art, production through freedom, i.e.
through a will that places reason at the basis of its actions. For although
we like to call the product of bees (regularly built cells of wax) a work of
art, this is only by way of analogy; as soon as we feel that this work of
theirs is based on no proper rational deliberation, we say that it is a
product of nature (of instinct).
"If, as sometimes happens, in searching through a bog we come upon a bit
of shaped wood, we do not say, this is a product of nature, but of art. Its
producing cause has conceived a purpose to which the plank owes its form.
Elsewhere too we should see art in everything which is made, so that a
representative of it in its cause must have preceded its actual existence
(as even in the case of bees), though without the effect of it even being
capable of being thought. But if we call anything absolutely a work of art,
in order to distinguish it from a natural effect, we always understand by
that a work of man." Kant, Critique of Judgement (Bernard translation),
p.145-6
"Man is not only immediate and single, like all other natural things; as
mind, he also reduplicates himself, existing for himself because he thinks
himself. He does this, in the first place, theoretically, by bringing
himself into his own consciousness, so as to form an idea of himself. But
he also realizes himself for himself through practical activity. This he
does by reshaping external things, by setting the seal of his inner being
upon them, thereby endowing them with his own characteristics. Man's
spiritual freedom consists in this reduplicating process of human
consciousness, whereby all that exists is made explicit within him and all
that is in him is realized without. Here not only artistic making but all
human behaving and explaining whether in the forms of political and moral
action, religious imaginative awareness, or scientific knowledge--has its
ground and necessary origin." (Hegel, Aesthetics, pp.�3-4)
As I suggested in an earlier post, Marx treats "relations of production" as
key to the development of "freedom" in the Kant/Hegel sense. Prior to the
"end of history" these relations are less than fully compatible with such
development ("less than fully compatible" does not mean wholly incompatible
with any positive development, however; the developmental process is
"dialectical").
This is in no small part because they involve coercion - it is the kind and
degree of coercion entailed in their relations of production that identify
the successive "stages" in this process.
The relations necessary for the full development of individual autonomy are
completely free of coercion.
In the third thesis on Feuerbach, Marx explicitly rejects the "materialism"
which excludes any role for self-determination and which implicitly
underpins the idea that "good" people can be "constructed" through
coercive imposition.
"The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the
educator must himself be educated. This doctrine must, therefore, divide
society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.
"The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as
revolutionary practice."
The nature of "autonomy" is such that individuals can only attain it through
their own efforts. This is, by the way, also the ultimate insight to which
Goethe's Faust is brought by his own process of "bildung".
I work that millions may possess this space,
If not secure, a free and active race.
Here man and beast, in green and fertile fields,
Will know the joys that new-won region yields,
Will settle on the firm slopes of a hill
Raised by a bold and zealous people's skill.
A paradise our closed-in land provides,
Though to its margin rage the blustering tides;
When they eat through, in fierce devouring flood,
All swiftly join to make the damage good.
Ay, in this thought I pledge my faith unswerving,
Here wisdom speaks its final word and true,
None is of freedom or of life deserving
unless he daily conquers it anew.
With dangers thus begirt, defying fears,
Childhood, youth, age shall strive through strenuous
years
Such busy, teeming throngs I long to see,
Standing on freedom's soil, a people free.
Then to the moment could I say:
Linger you now, you are so fair!
Now records of my earthly day
No flight of aeons can impair -
Foreknowledge comes, and fills me with such bliss,
I take my joy, my highest moment this.
Faust, Part 2, pp. 269-70 (Penguin translation by Philip Wayne)
Ted Winslow
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