<< Subj:         jhurd_newparty: Important German Documents On Kosovo (fwd)
 Date:  5/8/99 11:48:42 PM Eastern Daylight Time
 From:  [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David L. Wilson)
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 IMPORTANT INTERNAL DOCUMENTS FROM GERMANY'S FOREIGN OFFICE
     REGARDING PRE-BOMBARDMENT GENOCIDE IN KOSOVO
                     Collected by
  International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

 1:  Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at Mnster, March 11,
     1999 (Az: 13A 3894/94.A):

  "Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have neither been nor are now exposed
  to regional or countrywide group persecution in the Federal
  Republic of Yugoslavia." (Thesis 1)

 2:  Opinion of the Bavarian Administrative Court, October 29, 1998
     (Az: 22 BA 94.34252):

  "The Foreign Office's status reports of May 6, June 8 and July 13,
  1998, given to the plaintiffs in the summons to a verbal
  deliberation, do not allow the conclusion that there is group
  persecution of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. Not even regional
  group persecution, applied to all ethnic Albanians from a specific
  part of Kosovo, can be observed with sufficient certainty. The
  violent actions of the Yugoslav military and police since February
  1998 were aimed at separatist activities and are no proof of a
  persecution of the whole Albanian ethnic group in Kosovo or in a
  part of it. What was involved in the Yugoslav violent actions and
  excesses since February 1998 was a selective forcible action
  against the military underground movement (especially the KLA) and
  people in immediate contact with it in its areas of operation. ...A
  state program or persecution aimed at the whole ethnic group of
  Albanians exists neither now nor earlier."

 3:  Intelligence report from the Foreign Office, January 12, 1999 to
     the Administrative Court of Trier (Az: 514-516.80/32 426):

   "Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to
   Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is still
   not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like
   Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict
   period, continued on a relatively normal basis." The "actions of
   the security forces (were) not directed against the
   Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against the
   military opponent and its actual or alleged supporters."

 4:  Intelligence report from the Foreign Office January 6, 1999 to
     the Bavarian Administrative Court, Ansbach:

   "At this time, an increasing tendency is observable inside the
   Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of refugees returning to their
   dwellings. ... Regardless of the desolate economic situation in
   the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (according to official
   information of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 700,000 refugees
   from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzogovina have found lodging since
   1991), no cases of chronic malnutrition or insufficient medical
   treatment among the refugees are known and significant
   homelessness has not been observed. ... According to the Foreign
   Office's assessment, individual Kosovo-Albanians (and their
   immediate families) still have limited possibilities of settling
   in those parts of Yugoslavia in which their countrymen or friends
   already live and who are ready to take them in and support them."


 5.   Report of the Foreign Office March 15, 1999 (Az:
      514-516,80/33841) to the Administrative Court, Mainz:

  "As laid out in the status report of November 18, 1998, the KLA has
  resumed its positions after the partial withdrawal of the (Serbian)
  security forces in October 1998, so it once again controls broad
  areas in the zone of conflict. Before the beginning of spring 1999
  there were still clashes between the KLA and security forces,
  although these have not until now reached the intensity of the
  battles of spring and summer 1998."

 6.  Opinion of the Administrative Court of Baden-Wrttemberg,
     February 4, 1999 (Az: A 14 S 22276/98):

  "The various reports presented to the senate all agree that the
  often feared humanitarian catastrophe threatening the Albanian
  civil population has been averted. ... This appears to be the case
  since the winding down of combat in connection with an agreement
  made with the Serbian leadership at the end of 1998 (Status Report
  of the Foreign Office, November 18, 1998). Since that time both the
  security situation and the conditions of life of the
  Albanian-derived population have noticeably improved. ...
  Specifically in the larger cities public life has since returned to
  relative normality (cf. on this Foreign Office, January 12, 1999 to
  the Administrative Court of Trier; December 28, 1998 to the Upper
  Administrative Court of Lneberg and December 23, 1998 to the
  Administrative Court at Kassel), even though tensions between the
  population groups have meanwhile increased due to individual acts
  of violence... Single instances of excessive acts of violence
  against the civil population, e.g. in Racak, have, in world
  opinion, been laid at the feet of the Serbian side and have aroused
  great indignation. But the number and frequency of such excesses do
  not warrant the conclusion that every Albanian living in Kosovo is
  exposed to extreme danger to life and limb nor is everyone who
  returns there threatened with death and severe injury."

 7: Opinion of the Upper Administrative Court at Mnster, February
     24, 1999 (Az: 14 A 3840/94,A):

  "There is no sufficient actual proof of a secret program, or an
  unspoken consensus on the Serbian side, to liquidate the Albanian
  people, to drive it out or otherwise to persecute it in the extreme
  manner presently described. ... If Serbian state power carries out
  its laws and in so doing necessarily puts pressure on an Albanian
  ethnic group which turns its back on the state and is for
  supporting a boycott, then the objective direction of these
  measures is not that of a programmatic persecution of this
  population group ...Even if the Serbian state were benevolently to
  accept or even to intend that a part of the citizenry which sees
  itself in a hopeless situation or opposes compulsory measures,
  should emigrate, this still does not represent a program of
  persecution aimed at the whole of the Albanian majority (in
  Kosovo)."

  "If moreover the (Yugoslav) state reacts to separatist strivings
  with consistent and harsh execution of its laws and with
  anti-separatist measures, and if some of those involved decide to
  go abroad as a result, this is still not a deliberate policy of the
  (Yugoslav) state aiming at ostracizing and expelling the minority;
  on the contrary it is directed toward keeping this people within
  the state federation."

  "Events since February and March 1998 do not evidence a persecution
  program based on Albanian ethnicity. The measures taken by the
  armed Serbian forces are in the first instance directed toward
  combatting the KLA and its supposed adherents and supporters."


               ------ Translators Notes ------
 As in the case of the Clinton Administration, the present regime in
 Germany, specifically Joschka Fischer's Foreign Office, has
 justified its intervention in Kosovo by pointing to a "humanitarian
 catastrophe," "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" occurring there,
 especially in the months immediately preceding the NATO attack. The
 following internal documents from Fischer's ministry and from
 various regional Administrative Courts in Germany spanning the year
 before the start of NATO's air attacks, attest that criteria of
 ethnic cleansing and genocide were not met. The Foreign Office
 documents were responses to the courts' needs in deciding the status
 of Kosovo-Albanian refugees in Germany. Although one might in these
 cases suppose a bias in favor of downplaying a humanitarian
 catastrophe in order to limit refugees, it nevertheless remains
 highly significant that the Foreign Office, in contrast to its
 public assertion of ethnic cleansing and genocide in justifying NATO
 intervention, privately continued to deny their existence as
 Yugoslav policy in this crucial period. And this continued to be
 their assessment even in March of this year. Thus these documents
 tend to show that stopping genocide was not the reason the German
 government, and by implication NATO, intervened in Kosovo, and that
 genocide (as understood in German and international law) in Kosovo
 did not precede NATO bombardment, at least not from early 1998
 through March, 1999, but is a product of it.

 Excerpts from the these official documents were obtained by IALANA
 (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms) which
 sent them to various media. The texts used here were published in
 the German daily junge welt on April 24, 1999. (See
 http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/011.shtml as well as the
 commentary at http://www.jungewelt.de/1999/04-24/001.shtml).
 According to my sources, this is as complete a reproduction of the
 documents as exists in the German media at the time of this writing.
 What follows is my translation of these published excerpts.
       -  Eric Canepa Brecht Forum, New York April 28, 1999


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  David L. Wilson  *  212-674-9499  * <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
      The main enemy is at home. -- Karl Liebknecht, 1914
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