> >Is it inconstistent for
> > him to say, We have always used these concepts, so we always will?
>
>Yes. The claim that "we have always used these concepts" must, on Hume's
>premises, be itself pointing to "a repetition of similar instances" i.e. to
>the frequent conjoining in experience of (1) "a repetition of similar
>instances", (2) the expectation, "upon the appearance of one event, of its
>usual attendance", and (3) the belief "that it will exist". There are, he
>claims, "no arguments to convince us, that objects, which have, in our
>experience, been frequently conjoin'd, will likewise, in other instances, be
>conjoined in the same manner". So the claim that "we always will" - i.e.
>that "in other instances" the repetition, the expectation and the belief
>will be conjoined - cannot be justified. In the passage I quoted he claims
>that it can be justified, that the conjunction can be shown to be caused by
>"custom or a certain instinct": the sceptic "justly insists ... that nothing
>leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature;
>which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may
>be fallacious or deceitful."
>
>Ted
>--
>Ted Winslow E-MAIL: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Division of Social Science VOICE: (416) 736-5054
>York University FAX: (416) 736-5615
>4700 Keele St.
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