> >Is it inconstistent for
> > him to say, We have always used these concepts, so we always will?
>
>Yes. The claim that "we have always used these concepts" must, on Hume's
>premises, be itself pointing to "a repetition of similar instances" i.e. to
>the frequent conjoining in experience of (1) "a repetition of similar
>instances", (2) the expectation, "upon the appearance of one event, of its
>usual attendance", and (3) the belief "that it will exist". There are, he
>claims, "no arguments to convince us, that objects, which have, in our
>experience, been frequently conjoin'd, will likewise, in other instances, be
>conjoined in the same manner". So the claim that "we always will" - i.e.
>that "in other instances" the repetition, the expectation and the belief
>will be conjoined - cannot be justified. In the passage I quoted he claims
>that it can be justified, that the conjunction can be shown to be caused by
>"custom or a certain instinct": the sceptic "justly insists ... that nothing
>leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature;
>which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may
>be fallacious or deceitful."
>
>Ted
Are you making an argument that Hume falls into a self-reference
paradox, just as postmodernists do, using the idea of causal
necessity (nature or custom or discourse in the case of
postmodernists necessarily & invariably causes/determines our habits
of inductive inference of causal relations) in his effort to argue
that the idea of causal necessity cannot be justified by reason?
What justifies Hume's belief that nature or customs _cause_ our
habits of inductive inference? Hume might shrug & say, "yes, there
is contradiction, but you see, I can't help it, & neither can you."
Not a satisfactory answer, but Hume can't do better than this, I
think.
Yoshie
