I will not answer this article on PEN-L in order to keep the peace, but I have plans to answer it on Swans, an online publication. When it appears, I will announce the url.

At 03:09 PM 10/11/2003 -0400, you wrote:
<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20031027&s=henwood>

Collapse in Cancün
by DOUG HENWOOD

[posted online on October 10, 2003]

The mid-September failure of the World Trade Organization's
ministerial conference in Canc¨n was widely cheered on the left. A
Global Exchange (GX) press release described it as a "failure...for
the giant transnational corporations that are manipulating the trade
agenda to engineer a power grab that will dramatically reduce the
strength of democratically elected government." GX's Kevin Danaher
celebrated a new alliance between NGOs and Third World governments,
spurred on by protesters snipping open the fences insulating the
delegates.

I love the movement behind those protests and consider myself part of
it. I was in Seattle in December 1999 and contributed to this
magazine's coverage. It was one of the most exhilarating weeks of my
life. Finally, the abstractions of global capitalism had a home
address where protests could be sent. But after the wreckage at
Cancün, we need to think about a few things.

As the results of the ministerial show, the WTO was never really the
institution its critics said it was. From the outset, it wasn't
really dominated by big capital in the rich countries. It's a
one-country, one-vote system, like the UN's General Assembly. The
rich countries, especially the United States, don't like this
arrangement. They prefer the Security Council, with its big power
vetoes. The United States is especially fond of the structure of the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, where votes are weighted
roughly by GDP, giving the United States a 17 percent share of the
vote and an effective veto. The rich countries finance the various
institutions in revealing ways. At the Bank and Fund, both salaries
and headcounts are high. The WTO has a small staff that's engaged in
industrial action over pay and working conditions. As Columbia
University economist Jagdish Bhagwati points out, the WTO's entire
budget is smaller than the IMF's travel budget.

What might a weaker WTO mean? There was no sign of disappointment
coming from the Bush Administration: US Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick was quite optimistic after the talks collapsed. Zoellick
hopes to induce a regime of what he calls "competitive
liberalization," with countries eager for access to US markets
fighting among themselves to please Washington. The US government is
happy to negotiate separate deals with individual countries; it's
always going to be the stronger party in any bilateral conversation.
A weaker WTO will only stimulate the Bush Administration's
unilateralist lusts. One of the organizers of the Cancün
demonstrations told me people in the streets knew that what they were
doing would strengthen the United States, but they wanted to damage
the WTO regardless.

There are some contradictions within the coalition listed in the GX
release. Big capital may want to grab power from elected governments,
but it's a little odd to set governments (good) against the WTO
(bad). After all, the trade ministers themselves are representatives
of those elected governments. If those governments can't be trusted
to do good things through the WTO, why should they be trusted to do
good things on their own? Surely the records of most national
governments are less than inspiring.

Not all governments are thoroughly awful; there are even a few good
ones, like--one still hopes despite IMF- and market-friendly
policies--Lula's in Brazil. Along with China and India, Brazil was
one of the leaders of the Group of 21 (which has since expanded to
twenty-two), the alliance that challenged the rich countries and
brought the talks to deadlock. The G22 (or, as some are now saying,
the G20+) objected to US and European Union insistence on
liberalizing investment and government procurement rules and to the
rich countries' refusal to reduce their agricultural subsidy programs.

In two appearances in New York--before a labor-friendly audience at
the Cornell Club and before the ruling class at the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR)--Lula emphasized his efforts to build links
among the "developing countries," starting with his South American
neighbors and moving on to Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The
potential members of Lula's alliance have different interests and
inhabit different roles in the world economy, but it's a move that
could upset a few apple carts.

Lula spoke not only of trade deals but of deeper technological,
political and cultural links among the Southern countries as well.
Before the labor audience, he likened international politics to labor
negotiations: One worker alone is nothing, but with a union, workers
can challenge the boss. And he emphasized how it was important in
those fights with the boss not to hang your head but to act strong
and proud. (The next morning, Lula kept the CFR audience waiting for
more than half an hour; an annoyed Mort Zuckerman was overheard
complaining to Paul Volcker, "But I have an 11 o'clock meeting!") No
doubt Zoellick would not be pleased to see Brazil and its twenty-one
colleagues pressing their case within the WTO; better that it be
marginalized by the game of competitive liberalization.

One of the 22's demands was that richer countries reduce their
domestic farm subsidies and open up to G22 agricultural exports. At
the same time, farmers in South Korea, a relatively rich country,
were among the most vigorous of the protesters, with some activists
praising the suicide of Lee Kyung-hae, who raised cattle on a small,
snowy mountain plot. The only thing that kept the farm going was
trade barriers; once Seoul opened up to Australian beef imports, the
enterprise was doomed. Rice and other crops are grown on similarly
difficult land; crops are expensive and often of low quality. Only
vigorous protection makes such agriculture viable. But those are
exactly the kinds of barriers the G22 want dismantled. Yet in protest
discourse, the Korean farmers and the G22 were treated as part of the
same struggle.

Which raises a question: What is progressive about using public
resources to support farming on cold, snowy, mountainous land? Isn't
the benefit of trade exactly to address something like this? South
Korea isn't an impoverished country whose population is dominated by
a peasantry that would be ruined by opening up to food imports--it
makes cars and cell phones. Why shouldn't South Korea import food?

When you say things like that, it's often assumed that you want to
turn over world agriculture to Monsanto and Cargill. It's as if the
only two choices in the world were an embattled tradition and big
agribusiness, as if it were impossible to reimagine technology and
trade in more humane, progressive ways. Korean farmers and NGOs also
complain about subsidies paid to US and EU farmers, which provide
cheap food that can be dumped on high-cost producers. They have a
point; it's perverse that rich-country subsidies--which heavily
benefit big agribusiness by cheapening raw inputs--drive Korean
farmers to suicide rather than feed the world's hungry. But are
"progressives" against rich-country farm subsidies? It's not
something activists like to talk about, and they have no clear answer
to the question.

The movement that had its coming-out party in Seattle rarely speaks
about the economic arrangements it would like to see. It's quick to
say "No!" (a reflex I'm pretty accomplished at myself). It's often
quick to invoke language defending national sovereignty and
self-reliance when we should really be looking for a more egalitarian
and cooperative world, of which trade can be an important part. It's
too quick to read international economic relations as part of a
general "race to the bottom" that doesn't really exist. Wages in the
United States are higher than when NAFTA took effect, and incomes
have also been rising in Western Europe and much of Asia, regions
that are deeply involved in world trade. The most troubled part of
the world is Africa, a continent that is substantially
underrepresented in global trade and capital flows. That's not at all
to say that freer trade is always better; it is to say that we need
to think and talk more carefully about these things.

Of course, the political and emotional urge behind the "No!" is the
desire to protect people and nature from the traumas that typically
come with capitalist development. But erecting barriers to trade may
be the wrong strategy. Instead of tariffs and import restrictions,
which can pit workers in rich countries against those in poorer ones
(is it OK to put a Brazilian steelworker out of work to preserve an
American job?), why not generous income support and retraining? Why
not shift the focus from protecting the job to protecting the worker?

----

Doug Henwood, a Nation contributing editor, edits the Left Business
Observer. His latest book, After the New Economy, is just out from
the New Press.

Louis Proyect, Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org




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