was: RE: [PEN-L] Mark Jones Was Right
In the midst of a well-thought-out essay, Julio Huato writes:
> Appropriating someone else's resources by force can only backfire
on the essential logic of capitalist production and accumulation. And it is
in this essential logic -- rather than in imperialist parasitism -- where it
lies the remarkable ability of capitalist economies to return more wealth to
the wealthy.<
Capitalism always involves a contradiction between capital's interest (the long-term
interest of the capitalist class as a whole) and those of competing individual
capitalists. (One might liken this contradiction to the "public goods problem" of
orthodox economics, though of course there's another contradiction that's more
important, that between classes. So it's a "collective goods problem" for the
capitalists.) The "accumulate accumulate" drive of capitalism may fit with the
interests of capital, but are expressed in the competition of many capitals, each
struggling to survive by expanding, by seeking new profit opportunities, grabbing old
ones from other capitalists, etc.
No-one really knows what capital's interest is exactly -- until after the fact. The
Clintonoids seemed to be trying to pursue this goal, but intelligent capitalists (or
rather their hired thinkers) could disagree. The proposed collective interest often
goes against the interests of powerful capitalist blocs. (Consider the idea of a steep
tax on gasoline to encourage conservation. It helps capital -- and has been instituted
in W. Europe -- but hurts (or threatens to hurt) many particular sectors.) So, in
practice what dominates capitalist political practice is the welter of different
particularistic capitalist interests competing in the markets, the legislatures, the
courts, and the executive branches (mediated by the various consitution-mandated
structures). Shifting coalitions of different blocs -- sometimes allied with
non-economic interest groups, non-capitalist interest groups, etc. -- determine the
concrete expression of politics.
To some extent, protecting existing property rights of capitalists is shared among all
of the power-blocs, so that even particularistic "special interest" competition avoids
undermining those rights. However, there are key exceptions, where even capitalist
property rights are violated. Exceptions include
(1) cases of nationalistic competition (e.g., WW1, WW2). Nationalism -- involving a
cross-class coalition -- evolved in a way that stabilizes the state and the social
situation, so that capitalists latched onto nationalism as not only good for them as
individuals but as good for them as a class within the given nation. But nationalism
typically involves competition with other nations (and oppression or even genocide of
national minorities). This gets the cappos beyond the "rules of the game" of "normal"
competition and "normal" capitalism.
(2) in the case of the international spread of capitalism (of whatever sort, the
"classical" imperialism described by Lenin, Bukharin, Luxemburg, etc., the
US-hegemonic capitalism of the post-WW2 era, etc.) Various populations of the world
don't have the power to resist those blocs of capital who see international expansion
as beneficial to themselves. Even the big capitalists -- to the extent they exist --
of the invaded countries seem to be mere "petty bourgeois" to the imperialists. And
the p.b. is one of the groups run over the capitalist steamroller, along with peasants
and workers. Others decide "if you can't fight 'em, join 'em" and become local tools
of the imperium.
Capitalism is expanding and becoming "purer" _via_ primitive accumulation, which
brings new areas and populations under its sway. There's a new version of this, i.e.,
the war against the old "model" of capitalism, nation-centered development. During
most of the 20th century, the nation-state was the basis of capitalist development. As
noted, nationalism stabilized the system. In many cases, it also promoted national
prosperity. There are all sorts of versions of this, ranging from Naziism to fascism
to FDR's New Deal to social democracy. But in the rich countries, the national model
of development is _passé_ (partly because of the fall of the USSR, partly because of
the decline of labor movements and immobile capitalist forces). The capitalist classes
of the rich countries are slowly merging. The neo-liberal policy revolution of the
last 25 years or so expresses this merger. We also see a confluence of this new
expression of "what's good for the capitalist class" with particularistic interests of
capitalists: some powerful blocs can profit from privatization, etc., imposed on
subordinate countries (and also from privatization in the rich countries themselves).
By abolishing the "third world" versions of the nation-centered development model
("Arab socialism," "the non-capitalist road to development," etc.) particularistic
interests and ideology merge. Control over key resources such as oil fit here.
US nationalism persists, even if the nation-centered model has been shelved. But
nowadays "USA! USA! USA!" is expressed as vigorous endorsement of imperial expansion,
pushing "our" values and boosting "our" pride. Part of the Bushwa rejection of
multilateralism is due to this nationalism.
To some extent, competition amongst national capitals still exists in the "first
world," e.g., the US vs. Japan, as Brenner and others argue. Usually, it's not a
military matter (so that it differs from classical capitalist imperialism) but
involves fights over exchange rates and (perhaps) oil supplies.
In sum, capitalism has been amazingly successful at returning "more wealth to the
wealthy," but it's still got its contradictions.
------------------------
Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Julio Huato [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Sunday, April 11, 2004 9:18 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [PEN-L] Mark Jones Was Right
>
>
> k hanly wrote:
>
> >The Japanese know that access to energy resources is
> essential for their
> >capitalists and the US knows the same.
>
> Access to food is essential for people in Brooklyn. There's some food
> stored in supermarkets, grocery stores, etc. But usually we
> don't steal it.
> We buy it at the going prices. Were some individuals to
> steal food, some
> nasty consequences would follow. Somehow, people here
> evolved laws that
> roughly speaking preserve and enforce private ownership --
> and that works
> out for them, especially for the very wealthy. I imagine
> that whenever the
> wealthy indulge in violating these laws overtly,
> systematically, and with
> impunity (and this of course happens as the recent corporate
> scandals show),
> the poor would feel less compelled to take them seriously and
> the wealthy
> would end up regretting it most.
>
> Marx's hypothesis is that profit making under capitalism is
> essentially the
> appropriation of someone else's unpaid labor by means of a
> kosher, voluntary
> market transaction. It's not outright theft. It is disguised theft,
> because the initial asymmetry of wealth between the parties turns the
> voluntary part of the transaction into a sham. With initial wealth
> asymmetry, any process by which people negotiate their
> interests (say, a
> democracy or a market) will in effect be a form for the rich
> to abuse the
> poor. In this case, we're talking about the market being the form of
> abusing, but *the form* (as Marx insisted) is what makes here
> the essential
> difference. After all, the wealthy had been stealing labor
> from direct
> producers since the onset of history, but no form of theft has been as
> effective and dynamic -- as able to revolutionize production,
> consumption,
> and life in general -- as capitalism.
>
> Marx's hypothesis is that the normal mode of accumulation
> under capitalism
> is by the reinvestment of profits. "Primitive" accumulation,
> characteristic
> of a period when capitalist production is young, is expected to play a
> decreasing role as capitalism develops. Profit making and
> accumulation
> entail a functional market setting, which in turn entails
> private ownership
> and its enforcement. Of course, that's in the abstract.
> Historically,
> these forms don't pop up in a pure form, they struggle
> against a bunch of
> contrary historical influences, but Marx's hypothesis is
> that, as capitalism
> evolves, its laws of motion defeat the countertendencies and end up
> asserting themselves in an increasingly pure form.
>
> In any case, for the capitalists, nation (i.e., the national
> state) was
> never an end in itself. It was a means to reproducing the
> conditions that
> enabled them to make a profit. Only in the most "backward" case, the
> national state was a direct vehicle to make profits (e.g., by
> protection,
> subsidies, corruption, imperialism, etc.), but when
> capitalists used the
> state this way they were eroding their legitimacy and
> compromising their
> collective wealth. Many Marxists, from Lenin to Sweezy to Miliband,
> believed that Marx's biggest omission was a "theory of the
> state" under
> capitalism. In spite of Marx's warnings on method, they
> couldn't understand
> why he would leave the topic of the state to a latter stage of his
> theoretical work. They thought that the reversion in late
> 19th century
> capitalist Europe to extra-economic tricks of accumulation
> similar to those
> practiced in the early stages of bourgeois history had set
> capitalism on a
> track different from that hypothesized by Marx in Capital.
>
> IMO, with the hindsight of 21st century capitalism, Marx's
> hypothesized laws
> of motion stand to reason. They were not meant as iron laws
> of history.
> They were meant as tendencies, subject to contrary
> influences, which -- even
> during entire historical periods -- could be reversed or slowed down
> significantly. Yet, overall, if the system was to retain its
> vitality and
> dynamism, these laws of motion would have to assert themselves in an
> increasingly pure form.
>
> Why is this necessary to understand the current juncture in
> the Middle East?
> I'd think it is. In Marx's hypothesis, the drive to
> *control* Arab oil by
> using the U.S. state cannot be essential to U.S. capitalists.
> No matter how
> dependent the industrial apparatus of the rich countries is
> on oil. Whoever
> owns the oil, self-interest would drive him to sell it to the highest
> bidder. Appropriating someone else's resources by force can
> only backfire
> on the essential logic of capitalist production and
> accumulation. And it is
> in this essential logic -- rather than in imperialist
> parasitism -- where it
> lies the remarkable ability of capitalist economies to return
> more wealth to
> the wealthy.
>
> Of course, Marx knew that -- if a venture was sufficiently
> profitable --
> capitalists would gladly break any law or ethical code. But
> if all were to
> systematically violate the laws of voluntary commerce on
> which surplus value
> production was based, then they would regress to the old times.
> Collectively, capitalists had to overcome a myriad of
> prisoner dilemmas. A
> legitimate legal and political system conducive to capitalist
> production and
> accumulation is a positive externality to private profit making and
> decentralized markets cannot handle externalities properly.
> This legal and
> political system would not emerge spontaneously. Capitalists
> would have to
> purposefully cooperate through a political process to put it
> in place or
> bang their heads against a wall repeatedly.
>
> In our times, this very problem is current again, but now in the
> international arena. "Neoliberal globalization," predicated on "free
> trade," was fairly consistent with Marx's hypothesis. I
> mean, "free trade"
> (as meant by the U.S. negotiators) was not entirely free, but the Doha
> agenda was not naked imperialism either. In accordance with
> this, the right
> capitalist agenda in the Middle East and elsewhere was
> stability: defusing
> the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, given the balance of forces
> between the
> parties in conflict. In modern times land is not such an
> important form of
> wealth and the expectation of future economic benefits
> following peace in
> the Middle East -- if shown to be likely enough -- would end
> up persuading
> the parties to accept the quid pro quos ("land for peace,"
> etc.). Clinton
> and Albright seemed to follow the script. Wolfowitz, Cheney,
> Rumsfeld, and
> Bush dumped it, with the consequences everybody can now see.
>
> I'm not saying that the reality in the U.S. conforms
> perfectly to Marx's
> abstractions. There are layers upon layers of concretion
> that alter Marx's
> pure "model." (Even if we could abstract it from economic
> factors, religion
> is a historical force -- no doubt.) But do these layers alter Marx's
> "model" essentially? I don't think Marx's emphasis was
> entirely misplaced.
> Think about it. In accordance with Marx's hypothesis, in the current
> juncture (subject to historical contingency), we would expect
> enlightened,
> global capitalist interests pushing a strategy like this:
>
> (0) The U.S. exits Iraq and leaves the UN in charge to handle
> the transfer
> of sovereignty to some Iraqi government. (Here they have to
> stop digging
> deeper the hole dug by the neo-cons.)
>
> (1) The U.S. -- involving the EU, Japan, Russia, China,
> India, and Brazil in
> the process -- leads the setting up of a binding international legal
> framework to handle the global-externality issues that
> currently the UN
> system only discusses with no or little teeth (except when
> the interests of
> the rich countries are perceived to be at stake). The WTO,
> WB, and IMF are
> reformed accordingly. (Clinton didn't tackle this. For all
> its domestic
> punch, Rubinomics didn't have the intellectual gravity to go
> really global.
> It was excessively tied to the narrow interests of Wall Street.)
>
> (2) Without waiting for the former framework to coagulate,
> the U.S. leads a
> serious effort to stabilize the Middle East by making sure
> Palestinians and
> Israelis agree on a peace plan and stick to it. (Clinton,
> Barak, and Arafat
> began this but they didn't pull it off.) Withdrawing from
> Iraq would be a
> strong incentive for Israel to negotiate seriously.
>
> We don't need to swallow Tom Friedman's editorial manure to
> imagine the
> domino effects of these events on Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
> Turkey, etc. -- the
> whole region.
>
> (3) The U.S. normalizes relations with Iran thus showing that U.S.
> capitalists can trade and have normal relations with a fundamentalist
> Islamic state. (Clinton began this.)
>
> (4) The U.S. drops the privileged relationship with the Saudi royals,
> promises respect to whatever regime may emerge there if there
> were to be a
> regime change, and lets the chips fall where they may. The
> worst thing that
> can happen is to have the Wahabites in power, but that's
> where the example
> set with Iran would kick in.
>
> Etc.
>
> The main counteracting factors are, of course, the bizarre social and
> political conditions prevailing in the U.S., which allowed
> for the neo-cons
> to get as far as they've gotten. Some of these conditions
> are built into
> the political system -- the electoral college, the disproportionate
> electoral weight of rural America and states that are virtual
> parasites of
> the federal budget (especially of the DoD and the Justice
> Department), etc.
> Some have to do with the history of slavery in the U.S., the religious
> upbringing of the country, etc. But, has a decade of
> "globalized" growth
> (as reflected in, say, trade as a percent of U.S. GDP going
> from 15% to 25%)
> been enough to generate the critical mass of collective, international
> capitalist consciousness among the U.S. bourgeoisie to push a
> strategy like
> the one outlined -- getting around and even dissolving
> political rigidities
> as those described above? Will the short-run benefits promised by
> additional tax cuts keep them supporting the Bushies? Here's
> a concrete
> opportunity to test Marx's hypotheses.
>
> Of course, more than the validity of Marx's theory is at
> stake here, and we
> better try to play our little hand the best way we can.
>
> Julio
>
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