Is this discussion being read by anyone? I just tuned in and found this entry. Where do you find in Marx any reference to innate "greed" as the motivation for accumulation under capital? Greed, sloth, etc., are among the seven deadly sins of western mythology and religious doctrine, the basis of Judaeo-Christian "guilt", not the basis for accumulation under capital according to Marx. To ascribe an immanent human propensity to accumulate, or "greed"', as the basis and motivation for capital accretion is another expression of Adam Smith's innate propensity to truck, barter and exchange, which Marx explicitly repudiates.
Ralph ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ted Winslow" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, July 21, 2004 5:57 AM Subject: Re: absolute general law of capitalist accumulation Marx sets out the "differentia specifica" of capitalist production in the following passage from Chap. 25 (that this is an expression of motivation dominated by "greed" is made clear in other passages in Capital and elsewhere). This too is an "absolute law of this mode of production" in the sense of law as immanent. > A rise in the price of labour, as a consequence of accumulation of > capital, only means, in fact, that the length and weight of the golden > chain the wage-worker has already forged for himself, allow of a > relaxation of the tension of it. In the controversies on this subject > the chief fact has generally been overlooked, viz., the differentia > specifica of capitalistic production. Labour-power is sold to-day, not > with a view of satisfying, by its service or by its product, the > personal needs of the buyer. His aim is augmentation of his capital, > production of commodities containing more labour than he pays for, > containing therefore a portion of value that costs him nothing, and > that is nevertheless realised when the commodities are sold. > Production of surplus-value is the absolute law of this mode of > production. Laws of capitalist production are throughout treated as immanent, a treatment Marx persistently contrasts with their treatment as imposed and invariant. > The law of capitalist production, that is at the bottom of the > pretended "natural law of population," reduces itself simply to this: > The correlation between accumulation of capital and rate of wages is > nothing else than the correlation between the unpaid labour > transformed into capital, and the additional paid labour necessary for > the setting in motion of this additional capital. It is therefore in > no way a relation between two magnitudes, independent one of the > other: on the one hand, the magnitude of the capital; on the other, > the number of the labouring population; it is rather, at bottom, only > the relation between the unpaid and the paid labour of the same > labouring population. If the quantity of unpaid labour supplied by the > working-class, and accumulated by the capitalist class, increases so > rapidly that its conversion into capital requires an extraordinary > addition of paid labour, then wages rise, and, all other circumstances > remaining equal, the unpaid labour diminishes in proportion. But. as > soon as this diminution touches the point at which the surplus-labour > that nourishes capital is no longer supplied in normal quantity, a > reaction sets in: a smaller part of revenue is capitalised > accumulation lags, and the movement of rise in wages receives a check. > The rise of wages therefore is confined within limits that not only > leave intact the foundations of the capitalistic system, but also > secure its reproduction on a progressive scale. The law of > capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into pretended > law of Nature, in reality merely states that the very nature of > accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of exploitation > of labour, and every rise in the price of labour, which could > seriously imperil the continual reproduction, on an ever-enlarging > scale, of the capitalistic relation. It cannot be otherwise in a mode > of production in which the labourer exists to satisfy the needs of > self-expansion of existing values, instead of, on the contrary, > material wealth existing to satisfy the needs of development on the > part of the labourer. As, in religion, man is governed by the products > of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is governed by the > products of his own hand. [10] Here, as in many other passages I've previously quoted, rational relations of production are claimed to be characterized by "material wealth existing to satisfy the needs of development on the part of the labourer." The irrational relations of capitalism reverse this rational means/end relation: "the labourer exists to satisfy the needs of self-expansion of existing values." Marx also explicitly opposes an immanent conception of "law" to the Malthus/Darwin mistaken idea of an invariant natural "law of population": > The labouring population therefore produces, along with the > accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which it itself > is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative > surplus-population; and it does this to an always increasing extent. > [15] This is a law of population peculiar to the capitalist mode of > production; and in fact every special historic mode of production has > its own special laws of population, historically valid within its > limits and only in so far as man has not interfered with them. This characterization of law as immanent is also found in the other passages I've quoted. > The law of capitalistic accumulation, metamorphosed by economists into > pretended law of Nature, in reality merely states that the very nature > of accumulation excludes every diminution in the degree of > exploitation of labour, and every rise in the price of labour, which > could seriously imperil the continual reproduction, on an > ever-enlarging scale, of the capitalistic relation. > This antagonistic character of capitalistic accumulation is enunciated > in various forms by political economists, although by them it is > confounded with phenomena, certainly to some extent analogous, but > nevertheless essentially distinct, and belonging to pre-capitalistic > modes of production. The connection of the conception of "law" as "immanent" to the ontological idea of "internal relations" is explicated in the following passage from Whitehead. > “By the doctrine of Law as immanent it is meant that the order of > nature expresses the characters of the real things which jointly > compose the existences to be found in nature. When we understand the > essences of these things, we thereby know their mutual relations to > each other. Thus, according as there are common elements in their > various characters, there will necessarily be corresponding identities > in their mutual relations. In other words, some partial identity of > pattern in the various characters of natural things issues in some > partial identity of pattern in the mutual relations of those things. > These identifies of pattern in the mutual relations are the Laws of > Nature. Conversely, a Law is explanatory of some community in > character pervading the things which constitute Nature. It is evident > that the doctrine involves the negation of ‘absolute being’. It > presupposes the essential interdependence of things. > “There are some consequences to this doctrine. In the first place, > it follows that scientists are seeking for explanations and not merely > for simplified descriptions of their observations. In the second > place the exact confirmation of nature to any law is not to be > expected. If all the things concerned have the requisite common > character, then the pattern of mutual relevance which expresses the > character will be exactly illustrated. But in general we may expect > that a large proportion of things do possess the requisite character > and a minority do not possess it. In such a case, the mutual > relations of these things will exhibit lapses when the law fails to > obtain illustration. In so far as we are merely interested in a > confused result of many instances, then the law can be said to have a > statistical character. It is now the opinion of physicists that most > of the laws of physics, as known in the nineteenth century, are of > this character. > “Thirdly, since the laws of nature depend on the individual > characters of the things constituting nature, as the things change, > then correspondingly the laws will change. Thus the modern > evolutionary view of the physical universe should conceive of the laws > of nature as evolving concurrently with the things constituting the > environment. Thus the conception of the Universe as evolving subject > to fixed, eternal laws regulating all behaviour should be abandoned. > Fourthly, a reason can now be produced why we should put some limited > trust in induction. For if we assume an environment largely composed > of a sort of existences whose natures we partly understand, then we > have some knowledge of the laws of nature dominating that environment. > But apart from that premise and apart from the doctrine of Immanent > Law, we can have no knowledge of the future. We should then > acknowledge blank ignorance, and not make pretences about probability. > “Fifthly, the doctrine of Immanent Law is untenable unless we can > construct a plausible metaphysical doctrine according to which the > characters of the relevant things in nature are the outcome of their > interconnections, and their interconnections are the outcome of their > characters. This involves some doctrine of Internal Relations. > “Finally, the doctrine of Immanence is through and through a > rationalistic doctrine. It is explanatory of the possibility of > understanding nature.” (Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, [Free Press > Paperback Ed., 1967] pp. 111-3) On this basis, he too criticizes the treatment of the Malthus/Darwin "law of population" as an "iron necessity." > By arbitrarily seizing upon one or two factors, and by relegating the > remainder to the status of secondary disturbances, almost any law of > population can be deduced. Thus the Malthusian Law, with its > sociological consequences, is not an iron necessity. It is a > possibility inherent in the facts, which may afford an interpretation > of the circumstances in some human societies, perhaps of all. (pp. > 73-4) Ted
