We're All Minskyites Now

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by Robert Pollin

The Nation (November 17 2008 edition)


As the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s Depression has
unfolded over the past eighteen months, the ideas of the late economist
Hyman Minsky have suddenly come into fashion. In the summer of 2007, the
Wall Street Journal ran a front-page article describing the emerging
crisis as the financial market's "Minsky moment". His ideas have since
been featured in the Financial Times, BusinessWeek and The New Yorker,
among many other outlets. Minsky, who spent most of his academic career
at Washington University in St Louis and remained professionally active
until his death, in 1996, deserves the recognition. He was his
generation's most insightful analyst of financial markets and the causes
of financial crises.

Even so, most mainstream economists have shunned his work because it
emerged out of a dissident left Keynesian tradition known in economists'
circles as post-Keynesianism. Minsky's writings, and the post-Keynesian
tradition more generally, are highly critical of free-market capitalism
and its defenders in the economics profession - among them Milton
Friedman and other Nobel Prize-winning economists who for a generation
have claimed to "prove", usually through elaborate mathematical models,
that unregulated markets are inherently rational, stable and fair. For
Friedmanites, regulations are harmful most of the time.

Minsky, by contrast, explained throughout his voluminous writings that
unregulated markets will always produce instability and crises. He
alternately termed his approach "the financial instability hypothesis"
and "the Wall Street paradigm".

For Minsky, the key to understanding financial instability is to trace
the shifts that occur in investors' psychology as the economy moves out
of a period of crisis and recession (or depression) and into a phase of
rising profits and growth. Coming out of a crisis, investors will tend
to be cautious, since many of them will have been clobbered during the
just-ended recession. For example, they will hold large cash reserves as
a cushion to protect against future crises.

But as the economy emerges from its slump and profits rise, investors'
expectations become increasingly positive. They become eager to pursue
risky ideas such as securitized subprime mortgage loans. They also
become more willing to let their cash reserves dwindle, since idle cash
earns no profits, while purchasing speculative vehicles like subprime
mortgage securities that can produce returns of ten percent or higher.

But these moves also mean that investors are weakening their defenses
against the next downturn. This is why, in Minsky's view, economic
upswings, proceeding without regulations, inevitably encourage
speculative excesses in which financial bubbles emerge. Minsky explained
that in an unregulated environment, the only way to stop bubbles is to
let them burst. Financial markets then fall into a crisis, and a
recession or depression ensues.

Here we reach one of Minsky's crucial insights - that financial crises
and recessions actually serve a purpose in the operations of a
free-market economy, even while they wreak havoc with people's lives,
including those of tens of millions of innocents who never invest a dime
on Wall Street. Minsky's point is that without crises, a free-market
economy has no way of discouraging investors' natural proclivities
toward ever greater risks in pursuit of ever higher profits.

However, in the wake of the calamitous Great Depression, Keynesian
economists tried to design measures that could supplant financial crises
as the system's "natural" regulator. This was the context in which the
post-World War II system of big-government capitalism was created. The
package included two basic elements: regulations designed to limit
speculation and channel financial resources into socially useful
investments, such as single-family housing; and government bailout
operations to prevent 1930s-style depressions when crises broke out anyway.

Minsky argues that the system of regulations and the bailout operations
were largely successful. That is why from the end of World War II to the
mid-1970s, markets here and abroad were much more stable than in any
previous historical period. But even during the New Deal years,
financial market titans were fighting vehemently to eliminate, or at
least defang, the regulations. By the 1970s, almost all politicians -
Democrats and Republicans alike - had become compliant. The regulations
were initially weakened, then abolished altogether, under the strong
guidance of, among others, Federal Reserve chair Alan Greenspan,
Republican Senator Phil Gramm and Clinton Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin.

For Minsky, the consequences were predictable. Consider the scorecard
over the twenty years before the current disaster: a stock market crash
in 1987; the savings-and-loan crisis and bailout in 1989-90; the
"emerging markets" crisis of 1997-98 - which brought down, among others,
Long-Term Capital Management, the super-hedge fund led by two Nobel
laureates specializing in finance - and the bursting of the dot-com
market bubble in 2001. Each of these crises could easily have produced a
1930s-style collapse in the absence of full-scale government bailout
operations.

Here we come to another of Minsky's major insights - that in the absence
of a complementary regulatory system, the effectiveness of bailouts will
diminish over time. This is because bailouts, just like financial
crises, are double-edged. They prevent depressions, but they also limit
the costs to speculators of their financial excesses. As soon as the
next economic expansion begins gathering strength, speculators will
therefore pursue profit opportunities more or less as they had during
the previous cycle. This is the pattern that has brought us to our
current situation - a massive global crisis, being countered by an
equally massive bailout of thus far limited effectiveness.

Minsky's Wall Street paradigm did not address all the afflictions of
free-market capitalism. In particular, his model neglects the problems
that arise from the vast disparities of income, wealth and power that
are just as endemic to free-market capitalism as are its tendencies
toward financial instability, even though he fully recognized that these
problems exist.

Yet Minsky's approach still provides the most powerful lens for
understanding the roots of financial instability and developing an
effective regulatory system.

Minsky understood that his advocacy of comprehensive financial
regulations made no sense whatsoever within the prevailing professional
orthodoxy of free-market cheerleading. In his 1986 magnum opus,
Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, he concluded that "the policy failures
since the mid-1960s are related to the banality of orthodox economic
analysis ... Only an economics that is critical of capitalism can be a
guide to successful policy for capitalism".

_____

Robert Pollin is a professor of economics and co-director of the
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the University of
Massachusetts. He was a member of the Capital Formation Subcouncil of
the US Competitiveness Policy Council in the 1990s. His books include
The Macroeconomics of Saving, Finance, and Investment (1997), of which
he was the editor, and New Perspectives in Monetary Macroeconomics:
Explorations in the Tradition of Hyman P Minsky (1994), which he co-edited.

http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081117 





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