Thanks for this informative discussion. One last question: somewhere it was mentioned in the discussion that the conditions in which a "general strike" might otherwise be expected to arise would be likely to be solidarity strikes governed by Taft-Hartley.
Wasn't the 1906 general strike in San Francisco in fact a solidarity strike? Are there other historical U.S. examples that speak to this question? On Tue, Jun 23, 2009 at 12:37 PM, <[email protected]> wrote: > At the risk of belaboring the obvious, and also of belaboring matters of law > on a list devoted primarily to matters of economics and to more general > economics related political concerns, Mr. O'Connor's glib reply to my > comment/query quoted in full below illustrates not merely the abstractly > "metalegal" (i.e., non real-life elements) of the (putatively) "legal" > question whether, as he said earlier, Taft-Hartley makes a general strike in > the U.S. "absolutely [sic] illegal" or devolves into an itself politically > and intellectually vacuous definitional kerfuffle about what a "general > [sic] strike" would mean in a milieu, as (regrettably) at present in the > U.S., in which, especially the private sector compared with the > 1940s-through-1950s, unionization has dwindled radically.* > > There are, to be (somewhat) sure, provisions state and federal law that deal > with public sector employee strikes and of federal law that address > "national emergency" related general strikes within particular industries -- > e.g., most notably, in the railroad and related transportation industries -- > and also some provisions in Taft-Hartley (but very far from "absolutely" > such) that deal with strikes which, depending on particular context, are > unlawful. > > But it is ridiculous to cite the unfair labor practice provisions of > Taft-Hartley, which require the existence of a > union-management/collective-bargaining relationship to become applicable, as > if significant for a nationwide "general strike" as that term is now most > commonly understood. Indeed, as Sen. Taft (in this otherwise > comparatively narrow context) famously said in emphasizing what he, as > Taft-Hartley's principal drafter, emphasized what that law did _not_ provide > for: > > "We did not feel that we should put into the law, as a part of the > collective > bargaining machinery, an ultimate resort to compulsory arbitration, or to > seizure, or to any other action. We feel that it would interfere with the > whole process of collective bargaining. If such a remedy is available as a > routine remedy, there will always be pressure to resort to it by whichever > party thinks it will receive better treatment through such a process than > it would receive in collective bargaining, and it will back out of > collective > bargaining. It will not make a bona-fide attempt to settle if it thinks it > will > receive a better deal under the final arbitration which may be provided." > > "We have felt that perhaps in the case of a general strike, or in the case > of other serious strikes, after the termination of every possible effort to > resolve the dispute, the remedy might be an emergency act by Congress > for that particular purpose." > > "I have had in mind drafting such a bill, giving power to seize the plants > and other necessary facilities, to seize the unions, their money, and their > treasury, and requisition trucks and other equipment; in fact, to do > everything that the British did in their general strike of 1926. But while > such a bill might be prepared, I should be unwilling to place such a law > on the books until we actually face such an emergency, and Congress > applies the remedy for the particular emergency only. Eighty days will > provide plenty of time within which to consider the possibility of what > should be done, and we believe very strongly that there should not be > anything in this law which prohibits finally the right to strike." > > 93 Cong.Rec. 3835-3836. > > And of course it was this language that material influenced the U.S. supreme > court to invalidate Pres. Truman's attempted 1952 seizure of the steel mills > in his effort to avoid a nationwide strike by unionized steel workers in the > Youngstown case (343 U.S. 579). > > As a matter of Real Politick, however, I do not doubt that state and federal > courts and other governmental bodies, possibly including the federal > executive branch, would devise means they characterize as (if) "law" to try > on an ad hoc basis to put down an actual general strike, or numerous > nationwide general strikes, in the (again: fantasitical?) event that there > were such; although even if so, trying to predict ("speculate"? "guess"?) > how such scenarios possibly would occur would be (and as noted) a classic > exercise in "meta" theorizing. > > Anyway, insofar as Mr. O'Connor's rejoinder is concerned, if there were > actually a _general_ strike, which by (my) definition would include > non-union workers and other citizens, it would require fantasizing, not > meaningful analysis of law, to presume that presently existing NLRB > procedures even if facilitated by ancillary judicial procedures would be > even (practically) relevant much less "absolute[ly]" significant. > > -------------------------------------------------------- > * He said: > >> [email protected] writes: >> >>> Apart from this being, at best, a theoretical metalegal" but not >>> real-life legal question and from the related fantastical factual >>> premise of the above ruminations (i.e., that it is not >>> culturally/politically unrealistic even in light of presently ongoing >>> circumstances to posit anything close to a general strike in the >>> U.S.), what provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act (whether as originally >>> enacted or as since amended) or, for that matter, anywhere else in >>> U.S. law make a "general strike" as that term is commonly understood >>> "absolutely illegal in the U.S."? >> >> >> http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/uscode29/usc_sec_29_00000158----000-.html#FN-1REF >> ... >> It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its >> agents— >> ... >> to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by >> any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce >> to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to >> use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on >> any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; >> > > _______________________________________________ > pen-l mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l > -- Robert Naiman Just Foreign Policy www.justforeignpolicy.org [email protected] _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
