On Fri, Oct 9, 2009 at 12:55, David B. Shemano <[email protected]> wrote: > This is a total misinterpretation of the Straussian method or what I wrote. > Yes, Straussians have an interpretation of major political philosophic texts. > Yes, other scholars dispute their interpretation. But the point is that the > Straussian reading is not "mystical" -- if I could understand the > interpretation and see the basis of the interpretation when I was an > undergraduate, it aint no mystical secret. Look, did Maimonides have one > message for the few and a different message for the many, or didn't he? Did > Locke "write between the lines" or didn't he? I think the Straussians are > convincing on these points, but I find them convincing based upon their very > open analysis, not because of some secretive rite I attended. >
But this is totally textually based--and largely justifies the critique that political scientists like C. B. MacPherson that these ideas have to be placed in a context. And in any case, these are still just readings so it is difficult to see how there is some illuminated truth to which only Straussians have access. > Let's see. Nietzche announces that God is dead, and less than 100 years > later the governing powers of Germany, Russia, and China, all > sellf-proclaimed athiests liberated from religious dogma, kill more than 100 > million people. Maybe it would have been better for Nietzche to be more > subtle? > Yeah but Darwin, Betham, and a cast of others help out. Besides, with this trajectory, you could just as easily trace it back to England's break with the Roman Empire or the Treaty of Westphalia's declaration that rulers could choose the religion of their realms--but had to accept infidels. Hell, go on back to the fall in the garden of Eden. It is also worth noting that this example was related to the idea that philosophers couldn't speak the truth for fear of being destroyed. Except for the degenerative diseases (which we could see as the dead God's little joke) he didn't really suffer. If the real implication is that people "can't handle the truth" so they fly off the handle and kill everyone else, well I'm a bit confused about what the role of the philosopher is--unless you simply believe in a permanent class of "philosopher kings" who feed the masses bullshit in order to keep the turd blossoms blooming. > Where is the Nietzche of the Muslim world? there are quite a few theorists in the muslim world who might be on this trajectory--liberalizing their views and so on--but I think the more pertinent question is if it is possible to have a Nietzsche in a subaltern setting? I mean it's not like he's the one who leads the revolution or who helps liberate Germany from actual oppression. He lives in a rising empire and relative material comfort and security, particularly in terms of outside interference. Which predominantly Muslim countries enjoy this kind of situation--or have enjoyed it? In other words, I'm sort of aping the argument of Reza Aslan which says that, whatever its origins and development, Islam has largely had to contend with being under threat for most of its existence--especially in the period after the crusades and throughout colonialism. If it is coming into its own, it has only had a few decades (if that) of relative freedom from outside threats--if that. When you make a statement like this, it is obviously supposed to refer to the closed-mindedness of the people who ascribe to this religion and the countries that claim it as their ruling ideology. But it is not like this set of circumstances has developed in a vacuum. In this, I'd point out again the way that Adam Curtis finds Strauss is similar to the Muslim ideologist Sayyid Qutb, both of whom seem to say that there is a danger to letting the masses get too active. >>How does one philosophize (and state what you truly believe) if you live in a >>society in which religion and society are inseperable and the myths of the >>city are taken very seriously? > I don't know: ask all the neo-conservatives in this country who'd like to return us to that lush garden. > > I think it is also important to recognize that Strauss worked backward. His > formative experince was the behavior of his teacher, Heidegger, and German > liberal society in general, in response to the Nazi movement. It became > clear to him that something had gone wrong with the modern project, which led > him to work backwards to analyze how we got where we are and whether there > was an alternative. This led him to the division between the ancients and the > moderns (with Machiavelli as the dividing point), the tradition of > philosophers writing between the lines, etc. I am not sure why you would > think he was an elitist prick -- by all accounts he was a nice guy who picked > up after himself. > Fine fine. He's not an elitist prick. He just thinks he's the only one with the correct understanding of the relationships here between ancients, moderns, and the plebs who don't know the difference. It is getting off topic anyway... >>> Is not slippery and disingenuous. Are people inadequate or are they >>> not? Is it just a careful reading that anyone could do if the simply >>> took the "time" or is it a brilliant flash of genius that only the >>> brave bold few have the courage to look in the face? > > Excellent question. I have wrestled with the very question and do not know > whether there is a satisfactory answer. I believe a Straussian would say > that, ultimately, it is partially a matter of capacity, but more so of > temperament. We can all see from experience that some people have > intellectual capacity that others do not. More importantly, however, even > those with capacity have no real interest in living the life of Socrates (the > example par excellence of the philosophic life). Instead, they want to live > the life of the city, whether that it a religious life, military life, > business life, family life. These are all competitors for the philosophic > life. > fair enough. glad it's involved some wrestling as i confess part of my disdain was with the relative ease with which you discussed this. > > Ok. You win. Capitalism is great and non-capitalism is bad. However, the > problem is the following: > > 1. Capitalism is good. > 2. Nazi German was a capitalist society. > 3. Therefore, Nazi Germany was good. > > If I play on your field with your definitions and assumptions, I have to > spend too much time explaining why the proof is wrong. No, you just have to admit that the first premise is wrong ; ) If >>> Strauss (or you) wants to make the ideological content of capitalism >>> more important to its definition than its fundamental character, then >>> I'm afraid you've struck upon what is, as you say, "the least >>> interesting part" of capitalism: it is the part, incedentally, to >>> which many of the Western Marxists who had an affinity for Kojeve >>> would be drawn towards, but it doesn't make it any more interesting >>> except as a philosophical problem. The most interesting part is how >>> quickly the fundamental system can shift ideologies based on what is >>> necessary to make a buck. Just ask all the anti-communist business >>> people who do mad business in China and Vietnam how hard it is to work >>> with ostensible commies. > > I made the statement in context of my reference that the issue is repeatedly > debated on the Strauss list. In the Straussian world, "capitalism" is the > social economic phenomena in which the traditional restraints on accumulation > are removed and greed and self-interest are turned from vices into virtues. > Straussians think that is a bad thing, and they blame Locke. Straussians are > not socialists -- they have no problem with private property relations -- but > they believe a society in which people make money to make money (the "joyless > quest for joy") is not a good society. > > But the reason Locke presented this argument was to justify private property with parliamentary government--i.e. to inscribe what Mouffe has called the Democratic Paradix. It's not like he just comes up with it out of the blue: it's supposed to allow all the enormous property owners to keep their plots without, on the one hand, needing the autocratic rule of the religiously associated monarch, and, on the other hand, without acceding to the argument that without the latter you'd have to get permission from everyone to have the common (contra Filmer and the Levellers among others). It is a way of having democracy without any fear that it would interfere with liberalism. It is his use of this argument to place the backstop of democracy (and Liberalism) at the protection of private property--and, of course, for the possibility of piling money on top of money--that justifies the entire liberal order. But he's not intrinsically for the money for the sake of money: just for the importance of private property and a defense of class divisions. In this, I don't see how it can be for one and not the other--especially since, as I pointed out, the acquisitive impulse is only expressed on a mass scale relatively recently. If this is what reading between the lines means, I think I'll take the whole paragraph. > > But why discuss whether Germany was "capitalist" unless you think its > "capitalist" features are relevant to what makes it interesting? Maybe I am > projecting, but when I discuss Russia or China in the 20th Century, I think > their "socialism" is very relevant to the things that made them interesting. > As I said, because other people like to say that the reason Germany did what it did was because it was socialist--e.g. all the wackos in the street. It's not that interesting to discuss it's economic model in particular because that's not what was necessarily distinctive about what happened there. In other words, I'd rather not talk about Germany as being capitalist except when people insist it was socialist. In fact, I'd rather not talk much about the Nazis if I can help it, but Godwin's law is powerful. s _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
