Stiglitz Says Government Misses Mark On Economy US National Public Radio / January 15, 2010 / All Things Considered
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz takes a hard look at how the government handled the financial crisis and offers his advice on how to move forward in Freefall. January 15, 2010 The government's efforts to deal with the worst financial crisis in generations get bad grades from Nobel laureate and Columbia University economics professor Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz, author of Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy, is least scathing when it comes to the stimulus bill, which he finds an anemic and insufficient response to the recession. But when it comes to the housing and financial crisis, he is less charitable: "The government has rushed to save institutions it should have let sink and it has let individuals sink instead of coming to their rescue." Stiglitz served on and later chaired President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers. He was also chief economist at the World Bank. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently spoke with NPR about his confidence in an economic rebound. Geithner said signs that the economy is on the repair include consumers spending more, businesses investing again, and stronger exports, as well as a more stable housing market. In a conversation with host Robert Siegel, Stiglitz reflected on his book and whether he shares Geithner's optimism. "Things are better then they are, say, a little over a year ago," Stiglitz says. "But the fact is that even the growth that he's talking about is not sufficient to really create the jobs the economy needs. Unless the economy is growing between 3 percent and 3.5 percent, it's not growing enough to create the jobs, let alone to get the unemployment rate down from the 10 percent that it is today to a normal level." Joseph Stiglitz, the author of Freefall, says the U.S. needs a new stimulus plan because states and localities continue to suffer from a shortfall in revenues. A New Stimulus Stiglitz says the U.S. needs a new economic stimulus plan beyond the last year's $789 billion package. "At the very least, we need to be ready to put one into place. States and localities are really suffering. There's a shortfall in the revenues. When the current stimulus package comes to an end, those shortfalls and revenues will be even more marked." Stiglitz criticizes the administration's approach to the mortgage crisis. "The problem is the government has been using its ability to lend to give money to the banks," Stiglitz says. "If they had lent it on to households maybe with a little charge for transaction, 1 percent or 2 percent, that would bring down their payments and that would mean that the hundreds and hundreds of thousands of people losing their homes — and with that their life savings — all of that could have been stymied." The Washington Way So why did the government give banks money instead of giving it directly to people in need? Stiglitz says the answer lies in the way Washington, D.C., works, with banks having an estimated five lobbyists per congressman: "It's no wonder with that kind of clout that the banks get more of what they want and American households get less of what they need." Stiglitz dashes the perception that the economy was humming along quite well until unexpectedly it went over a cliff a couple of years ago. Across the world, this has been an era of economic crises. "From a global perspective, we've had one financial crisis after another," Stiglitz says. These include economic upheavals in Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Argentina, Brazil and Russia. "So the banks have consistently done a bad job in assessing creditworthiness," Stiglitz says. "They've consistently been bailed out by public institutions. So, this is not the first crisis and we should keep that in mind." Excerpt: 'Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy' by Joseph Stiglitz Market Failures Today, after the crash, almost everyone says that there is a need for regulation — or at least for more than there was before the crisis. Not having the necessary regulations has cost us plenty: crises would have been less frequent and less costly, and the cost of the regulators and regulations would be a pittance relative to these costs. Markets on their own evidently fail — and fail very frequently. There are many reasons for these failures, but two are particularly germane to the financial sector: "agency" — in today's world scores of people are handling money and making decisions on behalf of (that is, as agents of) others — and the increased importance of "externalities." The agency problem is a modern one. Modern corporations with their myriad of small shareholders are fundamentally different from family-run enterprises. There is a separation of ownership and control in which management, owning little of the company, may run the corporation largely for its own benefit. There are agency problems too in the process of investment: much was done through pension funds and other institutions. Those who make the investment decisions—and assess corporate performance—do so not on their behalf but on behalf of those who have entrusted their funds to their care. All along the "agency" chain, concern about performance has been translated into a focus on short-term returns. With its pay dependent not on long-term returns but on stock market prices, management naturally does what it can to drive up stock market prices — even if that entails deceptive (or creative) accounting. Its short-term focus is reinforced by the demand for high quarterly returns from stock market analysts. That drive for short-term returns led banks to focus on how to generate more fees — and, in some cases, how to circumvent accounting and financial regulations. The innovativeness that Wall Street ultimately was so proud of was dreaming up new products that would generate more income in the short term for its firms. The problems that would be posed by high default rates from some of these innovations seemed matters for the distant future. On the other hand, financial firms were not the least bit interested in innovations that might have helped people keep their homes or protect them from sudden rises in interest rates. In short, there was little or no effective "quality control." Again, in theory, markets are supposed to provide this discipline. Firms that produce excessively risky products would lose their reputation. Share prices would fall. But in today's dynamic world, this market discipline broke down. The financial wizards invented highly risky products that gave about normal returns for a while — with the downside not apparent for years. Thousands of money managers boasted that they could "beat the market," and there was a ready population of shortsighted investors who believed them. But the financial wizards got carried away in the euphoria—they deceived themselves as well as those who bought their products. This helps explain why, when the market crashed, they were left holding billions of dollars' worth of toxic products. Securitization, the hottest financial-products field in the years leading up to the collapse, provided a textbook example of the risks generated by the new innovations, for it meant that the relationship between lender and borrower was broken. Securitization had one big advantage, allowing risk to be spread; but it had a big disadvantage, creating new problems of imperfect information, and these swamped the benefits from increased diversification. Those buying a mortgage-backed security are, in effect, lending to the homeowner, about whom they know nothing. They trust the bank that sells them the product to have checked it out, and the bank trusts the mortgage originator. The mortgage originators' incentives were focused on the quantity of mortgages originated, not the quality. They produced massive amounts of truly lousy mortgages. The banks like to blame the mortgage originators, but just a glance at the mortgages should have revealed the inherent risks. The fact is that the bankers didn't want to know. Their incentives were to pass on the mortgages, and the securities they created backed by the mortgages, as fast as they could to others. In the Frankenstein laboratories of Wall Street, banks created new risk products (collateralized debt instruments, collateralized debt instruments squared, and credit default swaps, some of which I will discuss in later chapters) without mechanisms to manage the monster they had created. They had gone into the moving business—taking mortgages from the mortgage originators, repackaging them, and moving them onto the books of pension funds and others—because that was where the fees were the highest, as opposed to the "storage business," which had been the traditional business model for banks (originating mortgages and then holding on to them). Or so they thought, until the crash occurred and they discovered billions of dollars of the bad assets on their books. Reprinted from Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy by Joseph E. Stiglitz. Copyright 2010 by Joseph E. Stiglitz. Used with permission of the publisher, W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. -- Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante. _______________________________________________ pen-l mailing list [email protected] https://lists.csuchico.edu/mailman/listinfo/pen-l
