Peter Hollings wrote:
> If I may, let's shift to a somewhat different perspective in a hypothetical
> future where most manual tasks are automated via robots, etc. Under current
> institutional arrangements with capital owning the means of production, there
> would be a vast reduction in the need for labor and a concomitant reduction
> in aggregate wages for that resource. <
As old Karlos pointed out [somewhere in volume I of CAPITAL], there's
a possible effect of the decline of wages due to the rise of robots
(and other mechanization) that puts most workers (or at least those
doing routine work) out on the streets: the decline in wages
encourages capitalists to use old or "obsolete" or "inefficient"
(labor-intensive) techniques rather than rushing ahead with the most
"advanced" (capital-intensive) ones -- because it can be more
profitable. We see this in East Asia, I understand, where low wages
compensate the capitalists for using somewhat dated methods.[*]
But that's a very micro-bound viewpoint: we have to consider the
demand for labor to build the robots. The impact depends on the uneven
development of the world economy. If the robots are built in the US
and used in other countries, we might even see a rise in the demand
for labor here. Or if they are built in other countries and used here,
all else constant that would depress the demand for labor in the US
...
To my mind, however, it's not the degree of mechanization that's
crucial on the macro-level. For any given commodity-producing country,
the growth rate of the demand for paid worker-hours equals the growth
rate of the demand for salable output _minus_ the growth rate of how
many units of salable output are produced per paid worker-hour ("labor
productivity"). the demand for hours of labor-power thus falls when
the demand for units of salable output grows more slowly than "labor
productivity." That happens when there's a "realization crisis" (as in
recent years).
(If the working class is extremely well organized it can respond to
this by reducing the aggregate supply of labor-time (as Gene
suggests). But that seems unlikely in the near future. Alas, we're
stuck in a Keynesian world of crises, booms, and stagnation, with the
capitalists in charge.)
On the other hand, rapid introduction of new production techniques and
the reorganization of production on the micro- and macro-levels causes
"pockets of poverty" of people with the "wrong" skills living in the
"wrong" places (structural unemployment) since workers have a hard
time adjusting. But this is more than just technological unemployment
(due to automation). It's due to the (objectively) poor way that
labor-power markets are organized, putting the burden of adjustment on
the workers.
--
Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own
way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
[*] Michael quotes Marx: >To the degree that labour time -- the mere
quantity of labour -- is posited by capital as the sole determinant
element, to that degree does direct labour disappear as the
determinant principle of production ... and [it] is reduced both
quantitatively ... and qualitatively, as an, of course, indispensable
but subordinate moment, compared to general scientific labour,
technological application of natural sciences, one the one side,
and to the general productive force arising from social combination
.... Capital thus works towards its own dissolution as the form
dominating production. [Marx 1974, p. 700]<
Capitalism rushes toward its own dissolution in this sense, but its
own "market forces" depress wages and make the working class pay for
this rush -- which allows capitalism to rise and fight another day.
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