> Well, you should have said truth can't exist
without
> minds. Truth is a property of propositions or
> sentences.
Only sentences or propositions are true or
> false.
So you were
arguing against what I should have said? That's a pretty weak excuse for not
reading what I write with care.
I mentioned "truth" only in
response to you. But it doesn't matter, since I disagree that the idea that
truth is only a property of propositions or sentence. There is a reality
independent of our perceptions of it (I believe). "Truth" would involve a
correspondence between that reality and our perceptions. That might be called
"empirical truth," which is just as relevant as "logical truth." Of course,
empirical truth would be a matter of multiple degrees (i.e., quite complex)
rather than a simple yes/no variable.
> _You_ define propositions as
mental states. That is a
> dumb view.
Really? definitions can be "dumb"? Definitions are not things that are handed down from Olympus by Zeus, or ideal forms on the cave wall that we glimpse only fleetingly, so that those who don't see the true definitions are unfit to be philosopher-kings or dumb.
Definitions are usually _conventions_, created by people, and often differ between groups, cultures, and languages. (This is just as with the definition of "planet". There are shades of gray and the convention helps us draw the line.) One group often thinks that the definitions used by another group are "dumb." But that's just petty squabbling, narrow-minded group-think, or gross elitism.
When you initially misunderstood my reply to DD, I was very clear that by "proposition" I was referring to a mental state.
Lawyers and philosophers win arguments by labeling others' opinions as "dumb"? Is this common?
> Since you are speaking frankly, I will
too.
> No one thinks that propositions are mental states.
> That's silly. Propositions are the contents of some
> mental states. ...
> numbers is idealism is puzzling, but you are entitled
> to stipulate whatever definitions you want for terms...
