Tom Walker wrote:
Here is a simple illustration of what I will
euphemistically call the no-cut-in-pay fallacy.
Let's say the current wage is $10 an hour for a 40
hour standard week.
Which would be a better outcome of contract
negotiations: a 37.5-hour week at $10.67 an hour or
a
32-hour week at $11.25 an hour?
(Make that $11.35 an hour just so the wage increase is
double that of the $10.67 rate.)
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MG: Since most workers don't have enough disposible income - except perhaps
the very best paid and those with pressing family responsibilities - they
would vote for the 37.5 rather than 32 hour week since it would give them
more take home pay. In other words, they would opt for the more shallow cut
in work time, unless they felt they could bridge the gap through OT - which
no employer in control of his senses and aware of his shift requirements
would ever agree to in the first place.
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Tom: The wage increase for the 32-hour week would be
twice
as large as for the 37.5-hour week and the reduction
in working time would be more than three times
larger.
But the 37.5-hour week meets the "no cut in pay"
criteria and the 32-hour week doesn't.
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MG: These are hourly paid workers who in each scenario would enjoy a wage
increase and a shorter work week. I fail to see how this fails to meet the
criterion of a "shorter work week at no loss in pay" than the existing 40
hours at $10. Of course, the shallower drop in work hours, as noted above,
would be more widely preferred because the take home pay would be greater.
But the comparison is not between your two scenarios with each other, but
each in relation to the existing schedule of pay and hours.
