On 1/25/07, Marvin Gandall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Yoshie wrote:
> There are lots of factors, from unseasonably warm weather (due in part
> to climate change) to rates of economic growth, many of which are
> beyond the control of oil producers. The issue is what the Saudi
> ruling class are doing with the part they do control, their own oil
> reserves.
=============================
But it is not as if Iran has suddenly become an American target. If it were
as easy - as is being suggested - to force regime change or to otherwise
alter Iranian behaviour by driving the oil price lower, using the the Saudis
as swing producer, you'd think think the Americans would have engineered
this long ago.
Regime change is not easy, but it is not without a precedent either,
e.g., Yugoslavia ("Sanctions on Yugoslavia,"
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/yugo.crisis/story/sanctions/>).
Regime changes through elite and popular discontent induced by
economic sanctions, military attacks, etc., whether successful
(Yugoslavia) or unsuccessful (Iraq), take a long time, probably more
than a decade. In Yugoslavia, US and EU sanctions were imposed in
1991, and regime change did not happen until 2000. Thinking in terms
of a decade-long project, Riyadh's big oil production capacity
expansion makes perfect sense.
Now, a factor exists in Iran that didn't exist earlier in the history
of the Islamic Republic: large and growing domestic oil and gas
consumption, which affects Iran's ability to export oil and gas and
earn foreign exchange and win friends abroad. (It is said that
gasoline will be rationed in Iran, from March this year, but that
won't rein in domestic consumption quickly.) I'm sure Washington,
Riyadh, etc. are thinking hard about how to exploit this problem.
The main weapon being used against Iran is not the oil price, but the
long-standing financial squeeze against its industry organized by the US
Treasury. In the past year, it has stepped up its attempt to cut the flow of
foreign credit which Iran needs to its maintain, upgrade and expand its oil
industry, especially by the European banks who are the most vulnerable to US
sanctions.
Obviously, financial sanctions affect Iran's ability to attract
foreign investment into its oil and gas industries the most.
while the Chinese have compensated for any shortfall by rapidly
becoming a major Iranian energy market and source of investment capital.
China may or may not be able to make up for US, EU, and Japanese sanctions.
That leaves the only remaining alternative on the great chain of
escalation - the threatened Lebanon-style massive destruction of Iranian
facilities by air and missile assault - the dangerous game of chicken in
which the US and Israel are presently engaged.
They might launch missile strikes this year, but missile strikes don't
change regimes, so if they do, that won't be the end of it -- instead,
it will be part of a long-term campaign for regime change.
--
Yoshie
<http://montages.blogspot.com/>
<http://mrzine.org>
<http://monthlyreview.org/>
