me:
The institutionalist approach (of which Marxian political economy is a type) does transcend that methodological individualism. It says that not only do people make the world (including its institutions), but those institutions substantially make the people, i.e., their tastes, social values, and expectations. NC economics notes the first and ignores the second. As far as I know, game theory is the same way. I'm sure somebody will correct me if game theory has actually introduced endogenous tastes into their models.
Ann Li:
I don't disagree with Jim's position esp. the competitive fringe surrounding NC econ's disciplinary dominance, <
yay! ;-)
but wouldn't cooperative assumptions in traditional GT [game theory] or some of the decision approaches to behavioral GT and/or even evolutionary GT (esp. as they might apply to social network analysis) include or at least be responsive to the second, ideological consequence of institutional determination?<
I'd like to know if GT involves the endogenous determination of individual tastes, etc. I know that the experimental/behavioral economists that I know (and there are three in my department) do not deal with endogenous taste-determination in a serious way. It's all very individualistic. > Or is that a step down the Roemerian road?< the last time I read Roemer, he followed the NC dogma of taking tastes, etc. as given by god or genes. -- Jim Devine / "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- Karl, paraphrasing Dante.
