Jim Devine wrote:
I don't think the leaders of Vietnam _wanted_ to impose their mode of production on the US.
My point is that, in thinking about the efficiency (historical viability) of capitalism vis-a-vis alternative social structures, we need to include the ability of capitalism to violent disrupt preceding or emerging (alternative) social structures. Think of this from the POV of the capitalists, it's not only about profit-making, but also (ultimately) about enabling and preserving your ability to make profits. That's how you assess overall the historical viability or efficiency of your system. (Again, on average, since chance can affect you just as it can help you. I hope you don't think I'm a social Darwinist if I call your attention to the distinction between the pure mechanism of "natural selection" and "random drift" in evolutionary theory.) In that context, I argued that:
You're referring to concrete, shorter-run accidents. I'm referring to the general, longer-run rule. Obviously, for a given nation, the best (most sustainable in the long run) path to military supremacy [...] cannot be the degradation of their productive force, the decay of their economy.
I asked:
Under which conditions a nation with a significantly lower productive force of labor can retain their military supremacy over nations with a higher productive force?
And my answer was, Only under very unlikely conditions. To which you replied:
didn't Vietnam show that it could beat the US on the battlefield even though it had significantly lower productivity? nationalism can beat technology.
If the issue is whether, as a general rule, a country with a chronically lower productive force can remain dominant in the long run by brandishing its military might, extracting rents from subordinate countries, and using them to perpetuate its military supremacy, then the U.S. defeat in Vietnam to which you alluded is not relevant. Between the late 1950s and early 1970s, the U.S. was perceived as dominant militarily. That is true. But it is also true that the U.S. was deemed back then to be much richer and more productive than Vietnam. (I could have been more matter of fact and said that the U.S. *was* richer and more productive than Vietnam in that period, as it continues to be now, but -- for those who need the distinction -- I don't want this to be taken as a *moral* validation of U.S. wealth and productivity as was/is compared to that of the Vietnamese.) Vietnam's victory was a defensive, not an offensive one. That's why I facetiously said that the U.S. didn't become a colony of Vietnam. Yet.
