This is riminescent of the nonsense over altruism from a couple of decades back: whatever nice thing you do, it is really selfish underneath. Two references come to mind that counter this nonsense. David Collard's Altruism and economy showed the neoclassicals that altruism is rational after all. Mark Lutz and Kenneth Lux in their book The Challenge of Humanistic Economics turned the usual argument on its head in a section that showed selfishness is really altruism in disguise.
>Jim Devine wrote: >>> For e.g., in a lecture at Princeton he referred to research >>> by John List on the "Dictator Game", and went on to argue how it is >>> entirely consistent with the self-interested individuals hypothesis. >>> >>> In this game, one subject (the dictator) is given $10.00, and is then >>> given a choice - to either give part of the $10.00 to another subject, >>> or to give nothing, or even to steal some or all of $10.00 from the >>> other. Levitt says that apparently altruistic behavior found in this >>> experiment is merely an artifact of the subjects trying to win the >>> approval of the experimenter. >> >> I didn't know that he's the one who made that argument. Behaviorists >> have responded to that. It'd be nice if there were an expert in the >> house... >> > >I am not such an expert, but I have read a bit of this literature. > >1) The dictator game is a variation of the "ultimatum game." In these >games, the player who makes the offer is the "Allocator" and the other >player is the "Recipient." In the Dictator version the Recipient must >accept whatever unilateral offer the Allocator makes. In the ultimatum >game the Recipient has the option to reject or accept the offer. > >2) My guess about the behaviorist response to Levitt and List is >something like this: Although one might interpret the "Allocator's" >action as trying to win the approval of the experimenter, it is less >reasonable, in the ultimatum version, to interpret the "Recipient's" >action in the same way. The Recipient in the experiment is given the >ability to accept or reject the Allocator's offer. If the offer is >rejected neither player gets any payoff. It is common for recipients to >reject offers that are positive but unfair allocations. For a $10 stake, >$1 and $3 offers have been rejected. In general, offers less than 20% of >the stake are frequently rejected. The Recipient sacrifices a positive >payoff and punishes the other player for acting unfairly. > >3) The behaviorists interpret the experiment as the players exercising a > sense of fairness, not altruistic behavior. Here is what Richard >Thaler wrote some time ago: > >"One conclusion which emerges clearly from this research is that notions >of fairness can play a significant role in determining the outcomes of >negotiations. However, a concern for fairness does not preclude other >factors, even greed, from affecting behavior." > >I'm reminded of a comment by RH Tawney: > >"It is obvious, indeed, that no change of system or machinery can avert >those causes of social malaise which consist in the egotism, greed, or >quarrelsomeness of human nature. What it can do is to create an >environment in which those are not the qualities which are encouraged. >It cannot secure that men live up to their principles. What it can do is >establish their social order upon principles to which, if they please, >they can live up and not live down." > >4) The relevant Chicago boys articles appear to be: > >Levitt, Steven D. and John A. List, What do Laboratory Experiments >Measuring Social Preferences tell us about the Real World, Journal of >Economic Perspectives, (Spring 2007). > >List, John A. On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games, >Journal of Political Economy, (June 2007). > >
